I got this wrong first time. "Head office cannot show live video cheaply" conflated TRUE VIDEO with SEEING THE CAMERA NOW, and only the first needs WebRTC and a TURN server. The shop PC is behind a router with no inbound route, so head office cannot pull the engine's MJPEG. It can answer the agent's outbound requests, which is the shape of everything else here: the server holds a poll open, the agent asks "is anyone watching?", and pushes JPEGs up for exactly as long as somebody is. Measured on the office camera: 98 KB full frame, 20.8 KB re-encoded at 640/q60, so one watcher costs ~83 KB/s. 47 frames arrived in 12 seconds - 4 fps, as configured. The UI says "about 4 frames a second" rather than letting anyone conclude the camera stutters. Nothing is uploaded when nobody is looking, which is the whole cost argument: Publish returns false once the last viewer goes, interest lapses on a timer each viewer refreshes as it reads (so a closed tab stops the upload within seconds), one push is capped at five minutes, and the UI streams one camera at a time. LiveHub is deliberately the opposite of the arrivals Hub. There a doorbell pushes nothing because nothing may be lost; here a dropped frame is the correct outcome, so each viewer has a one-slot buffer that is overwritten - the only frame worth having is the newest, and a queue would show an ever-growing delay behind the shop instead of dropping back to live. Ownership is proved once, before anything streams: the relay is keyed on a camera id, a hub does not know whose camera it holds, and a camera id is not a secret. Verified: another tenant gets 404, no session gets 401, and an agent cannot push into another site's camera. Also fixes a bug I introduced with it - the Live button was gated on `connected`, which is head office's last report and up to two minutes stale, so it hid itself during every reconnect. "Is that camera really down?" is exactly when somebody wants to look, and a hidden control says "you cannot" where the honest answer is "here is why". Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HViLj9gYNRtSr7YVZmW5sn
465 lines
19 KiB
Go
465 lines
19 KiB
Go
// Package api is the request/response half of the server: staff signing in
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// from the desktop app, reports, the in-store customer form, and a fresh PC
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// collecting its broker credentials.
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//
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// The MQTT consumer in `ingest` is the other half and shares nothing with this
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// but the database. That separation is deliberate — an agent is authenticated
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// by the broker and identified by its topic, a person is authenticated by a
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// password and identified by a session. Merging the two would mean one code
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// path deciding two very different questions about who is asking.
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//
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// Every handler here derives the tenant from the SESSION, never from the
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// request body. A client_id parameter that the caller can set is a cross-tenant
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// read waiting for someone to try it.
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package api
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/rand"
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"encoding/hex"
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"encoding/json"
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"errors"
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"io"
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"log"
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"net/http"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"github.com/loyaly/behavision-server/internal/auth"
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)
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// Store is what the API needs from the database. Declared here, implemented in
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// package store, so handlers can be tested against a fake with no Postgres —
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// the same pattern ingest already uses.
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type Store interface {
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// --- identity ---
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UserByEmail(ctx context.Context, email string) (UserRecord, error)
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TouchUserLogin(ctx context.Context, userID string) error
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CreateSession(ctx context.Context, s NewSession) error
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SessionByAccess(ctx context.Context, hash []byte) (auth.Principal, time.Time, error)
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SessionByRefresh(ctx context.Context, hash []byte) (auth.Principal, time.Time, error)
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RotateSession(ctx context.Context, sessionID string, s NewSession) error
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RevokeSession(ctx context.Context, sessionID string) error
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// --- reports ---
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Footfall(ctx context.Context, q ReportQuery) ([]FootfallPoint, Totals, error)
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Conversion(ctx context.Context, q ReportQuery) (SalesReport, error)
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SiteHealth(ctx context.Context, clientID string) ([]SiteHealth, error)
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// --- people ---
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SearchVisitors(ctx context.Context, clientID, query string, limit int) ([]Customer, error)
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VisitorHistory(ctx context.Context, clientID, visitorID string, limit int) ([]VisitRow, error)
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// Arrivals is the live feed: who walked in, newest window or from a cursor.
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Arrivals(ctx context.Context, q ArrivalQuery) ([]Arrival, error)
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SaveProfile(ctx context.Context, clientID string, p Profile, actor string) error
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RecordPurchase(ctx context.Context, clientID string, p PurchaseInput, actor string) error
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// --- cameras ---
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Cameras(ctx context.Context, clientID, siteID string) ([]Camera, error)
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CameraByID(ctx context.Context, clientID, id string) (Camera, error)
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SaveCamera(ctx context.Context, clientID, siteID, cameraID string, in CameraInput) (Camera, error)
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DeleteCamera(ctx context.Context, clientID, id string) (Camera, error)
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// AgentCameras is the only path that decrypts a camera password, and it is
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// reachable only with that site's own agent token.
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AgentCameras(ctx context.Context, siteID string) ([]AgentCamera, error)
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ApplyAgentReport(ctx context.Context, clientID, siteID string, rep AgentCameraReport) error
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// CameraRef resolves one of a TENANT's cameras to its site and the name the
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// engine knows it by. Used to prove ownership before anything is streamed.
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CameraRef(ctx context.Context, clientID, cameraID string) (siteID, engineID string, err error)
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// CameraRefBySite is the same question asked by an agent, which is
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// authenticated for a site rather than a tenant.
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CameraRefBySite(ctx context.Context, siteID, cameraID string) (site, engineID string, err error)
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// SiteCameraIDs lists a site's camera uuids, for the agent's live poll.
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SiteCameraIDs(ctx context.Context, siteID string) ([]string, error)
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// Camera pictures held by this server, for deployments with no object
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// storage. Where a bucket is configured neither of these is called.
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PutCameraSnapshot(ctx context.Context, clientID, siteID, cameraID string, jpeg []byte) error
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CameraSnapshot(ctx context.Context, clientID, cameraID string) ([]byte, time.Time, error)
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// --- claiming a shop PC ---
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IssueEnrolmentCode(ctx context.Context, clientID, siteID, actorID,
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label string, ttl time.Duration) (EnrolmentCode, error)
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// --- proving a camera works ---
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RequestCheck(ctx context.Context, clientID, id, kind string, seconds int) error
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ClaimChecks(ctx context.Context, siteID string) ([]AgentCheckJob, error)
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RecordCheckResult(ctx context.Context, siteID string, res AgentCheckResult) error
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ReleaseStaleChecks(ctx context.Context, olderThan time.Duration) error
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// --- platform administration ---
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CreateClientWithOwner(ctx context.Context, in NewClientInput) (NewClientResult, error)
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ListClients(ctx context.Context) ([]ClientRow, error)
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// --- enrolment ---
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RedeemEnrolment(ctx context.Context, hash []byte) (Enrolment, error)
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SetAgentAPIToken(ctx context.Context, agentID string, hash []byte) error
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AgentByToken(ctx context.Context, hash []byte) (AgentPrincipal, error)
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// --- images ---
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VisitorImageKey(ctx context.Context, clientID, visitorID string) (string, error)
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VisitorImageKeys(ctx context.Context, clientID, visitorID string) ([]string, error)
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ForgetVisitor(ctx context.Context, clientID, visitorID string) error
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Audit(ctx context.Context, e AuditEntry)
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}
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type Server struct {
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Store Store
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Log *log.Logger
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Bootstrap BootstrapConfig
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// Now is injectable so expiry logic is testable without sleeping.
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Now func() time.Time
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// Throttle limits failed sign-ins per account, IPThrottle per source
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// address. Built on first use so a zero-value Server is still safe: an
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// unlimited login endpoint reached by forgetting one field is not a failure
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// mode worth leaving open.
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Throttle *Throttle
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IPThrottle *Throttle
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// Blob is object storage. Nil means this deployment stores no images,
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// which is a supported configuration and the default: the product shipped
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// without images on purpose, and turning them on changes what the database
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// is under data-protection law.
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Blob BlobStore
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// Assistant answers questions in plain language by calling the same
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// business questions the screens ask. Nil means this deployment has no
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// API key, which is supported: the UI hides the panel.
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Assistant Assistant
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// Live relays camera frames from a shop PC to whoever is watching, on
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// demand. Created on first use.
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Live *LiveHub
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liveOnce sync.Once
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// Hub wakes live arrival streams when the MQTT consumer records a visit.
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// Nil is supported and means the streams fall back to their slow tick -
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// a server assembled without one is slower, not broken.
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Hub *Hub
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once sync.Once
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}
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func (s *Server) throttles() (perUser, perIP *Throttle) {
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s.once.Do(func() {
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if s.Throttle == nil {
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s.Throttle = NewThrottle(10, 15*time.Minute)
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}
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if s.IPThrottle == nil {
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// Far looser than the per-account limit, and deliberately so. A
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// whole shop sits behind one NAT address, so a per-IP limit tight
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// enough to stop a targeted attack locks out every member of staff
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// because one of them fumbled their password. The per-ACCOUNT limit
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// is what actually stops somebody working through a password list;
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// this is only a backstop against spraying one guess across many
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// addresses.
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s.IPThrottle = NewThrottle(60, 15*time.Minute)
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}
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})
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return s.Throttle, s.IPThrottle
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}
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// BootstrapConfig is what a newly enrolled PC is told about the estate. It
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// comes from the server's own environment, never from the request: an agent
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// asking where to connect must not be able to influence the answer.
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type BootstrapConfig struct {
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MQTTURL string
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CACert string
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Models []ModelRef
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}
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type ModelRef struct {
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Name string `json:"name"`
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URL string `json:"url"`
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SHA256 string `json:"sha256"`
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Bytes int64 `json:"bytes"`
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}
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func (s *Server) now() time.Time {
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if s.Now != nil {
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return s.Now()
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}
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return time.Now().UTC()
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}
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func (s *Server) logf(format string, v ...any) {
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if s.Log != nil {
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s.Log.Printf(format, v...)
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}
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}
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// Routes returns the mux. Patterns use method-qualified paths so a GET to a
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// write endpoint is a 405 rather than falling through to the catch-all as a
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// confusing 404.
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func (s *Server) Routes() *http.ServeMux {
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mux := http.NewServeMux()
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mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/auth/login", s.handleLogin)
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mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/auth/refresh", s.handleRefresh)
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mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/auth/logout", s.authed(s.handleLogout))
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mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/auth/me", s.authed(s.handleMe))
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mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/reports/footfall", s.authed(s.handleFootfall))
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mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/reports/conversion", s.authed(s.handleConversion))
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mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/sites", s.authed(s.handleSites))
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// Cameras, onboarded from head office. The shop PC still does the
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// connecting - it is the only thing on the camera's network - so these
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// write desired state that its agent pulls and applies.
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mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/cameras", s.authed(s.handleCameras))
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mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/sites/{site}/cameras", s.authed(s.handleCreateCamera))
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mux.HandleFunc("PATCH /api/cameras/{id}", s.authed(s.handleUpdateCamera))
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mux.HandleFunc("DELETE /api/cameras/{id}", s.authed(s.handleDeleteCamera))
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mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/cameras/{id}/snapshot.jpg", s.authed(s.handleGetSnapshot))
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mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/cameras/{id}/live", s.authed(s.handleWatchLive))
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// Prove a camera works: "connection" asks whether the shop PC can open the
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// stream, "placement" asks whether somebody walking past produces a view
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// good enough to recognise. Two questions, because a camera passes the
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// first and fails the second all the time - that is the Office1 case.
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mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/cameras/{id}/check", s.authed(s.handleRequestCheck))
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// The end-to-end answer for one shop, assembled from what head office
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// already knows - so it works even when the shop PC is off, which is one of
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// the things it reports.
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mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/sites/{site}/check", s.authed(s.handleSiteCheck))
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mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/sites/{site}/enrolment-code",
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s.authed(s.handleIssueEnrolmentCode))
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// The assistant. Every tool it calls runs as the signed-in user, so it can
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// only ever see what the person asking could already see.
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mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/assistant", s.authed(s.handleAssistant))
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// The live feed. `visitors` searches a customer list by name; `visits`
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// answers the question a shop screen or a mobile app actually asks - who
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// came through the door just now - and carries each person's photo with
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// them so rendering four simultaneous arrivals is one request, not nine.
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mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/visits", s.authed(s.handleArrivals))
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mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/visits/stream", s.authed(s.handleArrivalStream))
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mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/visitors", s.authed(s.handleVisitors))
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mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/visitors/{id}/history", s.authed(s.handleVisitorHistory))
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mux.HandleFunc("PUT /api/visitors/{id}/profile", s.authed(s.handleSaveProfile))
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mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/purchases", s.authed(s.handlePurchase))
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// Platform administration. Not public registration: an open endpoint that
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// mints tenants is a far larger thing to secure than one behind an account
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// that already exists. The `provision` CLI remains the bootstrap path,
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// because creating the first admin cannot require being signed in as one.
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mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/admin/clients", s.adminOnly(s.handleListClients))
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mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/admin/clients", s.adminOnly(s.handleCreateClient))
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// Not session-authenticated: this is how a PC with no credentials gets
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// some. The enrolment token is the credential.
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mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/agent/enrol", s.handleEnrol)
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// Authenticated by the agent's own API token, not a user session.
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mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/agent/upload-url", s.agentAuthed(s.handleUploadURL))
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// What this shop PC should be running, and what it reports back.
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mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/agent/cameras", s.agentAuthed(s.handleAgentCameras))
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mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/agent/cameras", s.agentAuthed(s.handleAgentCameraReport))
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mux.HandleFunc("PUT /api/agent/cameras/{camera}/snapshot",
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s.agentAuthed(s.handlePutSnapshot))
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mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/agent/live", s.agentAuthed(s.handleAgentLiveWanted))
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mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/agent/cameras/{camera}/live",
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s.agentAuthed(s.handleAgentPushLive))
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mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/agent/checks", s.agentAuthed(s.handleAgentChecks))
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mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/agent/checks", s.agentAuthed(s.handleAgentCheckResult))
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mux.HandleFunc("GET /api/visitors/{id}/image", s.authed(s.handleVisitorImage))
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// The erasure path. Destroys the template and the photo; keeps the
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// anonymous visit counts, which are legitimate aggregate data.
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mux.HandleFunc("DELETE /api/visitors/{id}", s.authed(s.handleForgetVisitor))
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return mux
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------- plumbing
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type ctxKey int
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const principalKey ctxKey = 1
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// PrincipalFrom returns the authenticated caller. Handlers behind authed() can
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// rely on it being present.
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func PrincipalFrom(ctx context.Context) auth.Principal {
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p, _ := ctx.Value(principalKey).(auth.Principal)
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return p
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}
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func (s *Server) authed(next http.HandlerFunc) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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tok := auth.BearerToken(r)
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if tok == "" {
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unauthorized(w, "sign in to continue")
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return
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}
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p, expires, err := s.Store.SessionByAccess(r.Context(), auth.HashToken(tok))
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if err != nil {
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// One message for "no such session" and "revoked": telling the
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// difference is only useful to someone probing tokens.
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unauthorized(w, "sign in to continue")
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return
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}
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if s.now().After(expires) {
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// A distinct code so the client refreshes silently instead of
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// throwing the user back to a login form every twelve hours.
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writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "token_expired",
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"your session needs refreshing")
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return
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}
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next(w, r.WithContext(context.WithValue(r.Context(), principalKey, p)))
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}
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}
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func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, code int, body any) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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w.WriteHeader(code)
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if err := json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(body); err != nil {
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// Nothing useful left to do: the status line is already sent.
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return
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}
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}
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// writeCompactJSON writes JSON with no trailing newline.
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//
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// Encoder.Encode appends one, which inside an SSE `data:` line closes the event
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// a frame early. Everywhere else that newline is invisible; here it is a
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// protocol bug, so the stream gets its own writer rather than a comment on the
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// shared one asking people to remember.
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func writeCompactJSON(w io.Writer, body any) error {
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b, err := json.Marshal(body)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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_, err = w.Write(b)
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return err
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}
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// writeErr uses the shape the desktop client parses: it shows `message`
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// verbatim, so that string is user-facing text, not a developer note.
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func writeErr(w http.ResponseWriter, code int, kind, message string) {
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writeJSON(w, code, map[string]string{"error": kind, "message": message})
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}
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func unauthorized(w http.ResponseWriter, msg string) {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "unauthorized", msg)
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}
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func badRequest(w http.ResponseWriter, msg string) {
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writeErr(w, http.StatusBadRequest, "bad_request", msg)
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}
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func (s *Server) serverError(w http.ResponseWriter, where string, err error) {
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// The error text stays in the log. A database error surfaced to a shop
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// floor tells an attacker about the schema and tells the operator nothing
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// they can act on.
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s.logf("ERROR %s: %v", where, err)
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writeErr(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, "server_error",
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"something went wrong at our end - please try again")
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}
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// decode reads a JSON body with a hard size limit. Unknown fields are rejected
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// so a client sending `client_id` to a handler that ignores it finds out,
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// rather than believing it took effect.
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func decode(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, out any) error {
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dec := json.NewDecoder(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 1<<20))
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dec.DisallowUnknownFields()
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if err := dec.Decode(out); err != nil {
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return errors.New("could not read the request: " + err.Error())
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}
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return nil
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}
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// decodeOptional is decode for a body where every field has a default.
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//
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// An empty body is then a legitimate request - "mint me a code, I have nothing
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// to say about it" - and answering that with 400 "could not read the request:
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// EOF" is a confusing failure for the simplest possible call. Not the default,
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// because for most endpoints an empty body IS the mistake, and silently
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// treating it as an empty object would let a PUT wipe a profile.
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func decodeOptional(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, out any) error {
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dec := json.NewDecoder(http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 1<<20))
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dec.DisallowUnknownFields()
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if err := dec.Decode(out); err != nil {
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if errors.Is(err, io.EOF) {
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return nil
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}
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return errors.New("could not read the request: " + err.Error())
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}
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return nil
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}
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func queryInt(r *http.Request, name string, def, max int) int {
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v, err := strconv.Atoi(r.URL.Query().Get(name))
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if err != nil || v <= 0 {
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return def
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}
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if v > max {
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return max
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}
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return v
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}
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func trim(s string) string { return strings.TrimSpace(s) }
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// looksLikeUUID checks the shape of a path id before it reaches SQL.
|
|
//
|
|
// Every id in this schema is a uuid, and `$1::uuid` on a malformed string is a
|
|
// Postgres cast error - which surfaces as a 500. A mistyped URL is not a server
|
|
// fault, and answering one with "something went wrong at our end" sends an
|
|
// operator looking for an outage that is not there. It also means a scanner
|
|
// walking the API can tell, from the status code alone, which of its guesses
|
|
// reached a query.
|
|
func looksLikeUUID(s string) bool {
|
|
if len(s) != 36 {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
for i, c := range s {
|
|
switch i {
|
|
case 8, 13, 18, 23:
|
|
if c != '-' {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
default:
|
|
isHex := (c >= '0' && c <= '9') || (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') || (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
|
|
if !isHex {
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ErrNoSecrets means the server has no encryption key, so camera passwords can
|
|
// be neither stored nor handed out. Declared here so handlers can recognise it
|
|
// without importing the store package.
|
|
var ErrNoSecrets = errors.New("this server has no encryption key, so camera passwords cannot be stored")
|
|
|
|
// ErrNoSnapshot means a camera has no stored picture. An ordinary state - a
|
|
// camera added a minute ago has none - so it is reported as absence, never as
|
|
// a failure.
|
|
var ErrNoSnapshot = errors.New("no snapshot for this camera")
|
|
|
|
// BlobStore is what the API needs from object storage. Declared here and
|
|
// implemented by internal/blob, so the handlers can be tested without a bucket
|
|
// and so a deployment with images switched off is a nil field rather than a
|
|
// second code path.
|
|
type BlobStore interface {
|
|
Key(client, site, objectID string, at time.Time) string
|
|
PresignPut(key string, ttl time.Duration) (string, http.Header, error)
|
|
PresignGet(key string, ttl time.Duration) (string, error)
|
|
Delete(ctx context.Context, key string) error
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// newObjectID names one uploaded image.
|
|
//
|
|
// Random rather than derived from the event id: an object key is guessable if
|
|
// it is derived, and this bucket allows anonymous listing, so a predictable key
|
|
// would let someone enumerate a shop's customers by date. It is also the only
|
|
// identifier the agent gets, and it must not encode who the person is.
|
|
func newObjectID() string {
|
|
var b [16]byte
|
|
if _, err := rand.Read(b[:]); err != nil {
|
|
// Cannot happen short of a broken kernel, and a predictable key here
|
|
// would be worse than a failed upload.
|
|
panic("api: no entropy for an object id: " + err.Error())
|
|
}
|
|
return hex.EncodeToString(b[:])
|
|
}
|