Files
Behavision/server/internal/api/admin_test.go
Suriyakumarvijayanayagam dad04e8cda Behavision: face recognition for retail, edge to head office
Five components that ship as one product:

- behavision/  the recognition engine. RTSP ingest, YuNet detection, IoU
               tracking, ArcFace embeddings, a FAISS/SQLite gallery, and a
               FastAPI dashboard. Identity is decided once per TRACK from an
               average of at least three embeddings, never per frame.
- agent/       the Go edge agent: supervises the engine, holds a durable
               spool, and drains it to MQTT. Nothing is acked before the
               broker confirms.
- desktop/     the shop PC application (Wails + React + tray).
- server/      the cloud API, MQTT consumer, reports and assistant.
- web/         platform.loyaly.ai, the head-office app, embedded in the
               server binary.

The gallery stores 512-float embeddings and timestamps - no images unless
`app.store_faces` is switched on. Those embeddings are biometric personal
data under GDPR and India's DPDP: template inversion reconstructs a
recognisable face from an ArcFace vector, so data/behavision.db is treated
as a biometric database and DELETE /api/visitors/{id} is a real erasure.

CLAUDE.md carries the reasoning behind every non-obvious decision here,
including the ones that were measured and the ones that were wrong first.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HViLj9gYNRtSr7YVZmW5sn
2026-09-04 11:14:18 +05:30

179 lines
6.1 KiB
Go

package api
import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"net/http"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func seedPlatformAdmin(fs *fakeStore) {
// No client id. A platform admin is defined by the ABSENCE of a tenant,
// not by a flag, which is what keeps its scope from depending on which
// query happens to check first.
fs.addUser("root@loyaly.ai", "admin123", UserRecord{
ID: "admin-1", ClientID: "", FullName: "Platform", Role: "admin", Active: true,
})
}
func TestAnAdminCreatesATenantAndItsOwnerInOneCall(t *testing.T) {
s, fs := newServer(t)
seedPlatformAdmin(fs)
sess := login(t, s, "root@loyaly.ai", "admin123")
rec := do(t, s, "POST", "/api/admin/clients", sess.Token, map[string]string{
"company_name": "Nearle Retail",
"owner_email": "aravind@nearle.in",
"owner_name": "Aravind",
"password": "admin123",
})
if rec.Code != http.StatusCreated {
t.Fatalf("got %d: %s", rec.Code, rec.Body.String())
}
var out NewClientResult
if err := json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &out); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if out.Password != "admin123" {
t.Errorf("the password is shown once and must be the one that was set, got %q", out.Password)
}
// The slug becomes an MQTT topic segment, so it has to be derived rather
// than left to whatever the operator typed.
if out.Slug != "nearle-retail" {
t.Errorf("slug %q, want it derived from the company name", out.Slug)
}
}
// A tenant user must not learn that a platform-administration surface exists.
func TestATenantUserGets404FromTheAdminRoutes(t *testing.T) {
s, fs := newServer(t)
seedUser(fs) // a manager inside client-acme
sess := login(t, s, "manager@acme.com", "correct horse battery")
for _, call := range []struct{ method, path string }{
{"GET", "/api/admin/clients"},
{"POST", "/api/admin/clients"},
} {
rec := do(t, s, call.method, call.path, sess.Token,
map[string]string{"company_name": "X", "owner_email": "x@x.com"})
if rec.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Errorf("%s %s: got %d, want 404 - a 403 confirms the surface exists",
call.method, call.path, rec.Code)
}
}
}
// The one that would be a cross-tenant breach: an account INSIDE a client whose
// role happens to be "admin". Scope is the absent client id, not the role.
func TestARoleOfAdminInsideATenantIsNotAPlatformAdmin(t *testing.T) {
s, fs := newServer(t)
fs.addUser("sneaky@acme.com", "admin123", UserRecord{
ID: "u9", ClientID: "client-acme", Role: "admin", Active: true,
})
sess := login(t, s, "sneaky@acme.com", "admin123")
if rec := do(t, s, "GET", "/api/admin/clients", sess.Token, nil); rec.Code != http.StatusNotFound {
t.Fatalf("a tenant-scoped 'admin' reached the platform routes: %d", rec.Code)
}
}
func TestTheAdminRoutesNeedASession(t *testing.T) {
s, fs := newServer(t)
seedPlatformAdmin(fs)
if rec := do(t, s, "GET", "/api/admin/clients", "", nil); rec.Code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Fatalf("got %d, want 401", rec.Code)
}
}
// Without an owner the tenant is invisible-broken: it looks normal in every
// list and nobody can sign into it.
func TestACompanyWithNoOwnerEmailIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
s, fs := newServer(t)
seedPlatformAdmin(fs)
sess := login(t, s, "root@loyaly.ai", "admin123")
rec := do(t, s, "POST", "/api/admin/clients", sess.Token,
map[string]string{"company_name": "Nearle"})
if rec.Code != http.StatusBadRequest {
t.Fatalf("got %d, want 400", rec.Code)
}
if !strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), "nobody can sign in") {
t.Errorf("the message should say why it matters: %s", rec.Body.String())
}
}
// A clashing slug means the operator is about to hand somebody else's tenant to
// a new owner. It must fail, and say which mistake it was.
func TestADuplicateIsAConflictAnOperatorCanActapon(t *testing.T) {
s, fs := newServer(t)
seedPlatformAdmin(fs)
sess := login(t, s, "root@loyaly.ai", "admin123")
for _, tc := range []struct{ pgErr, want string }{
{`duplicate key value violates unique constraint "clients_slug_key"`, "short name already exists"},
{`duplicate key value violates unique constraint "app_users_email_idx"`, "already has an account"},
} {
fs.newClientErr = errors.New(tc.pgErr)
rec := do(t, s, "POST", "/api/admin/clients", sess.Token, map[string]string{
"company_name": "Nearle", "owner_email": "a@nearle.in"})
if rec.Code != http.StatusConflict {
t.Errorf("got %d, want 409 for %q", rec.Code, tc.pgErr)
}
if !strings.Contains(rec.Body.String(), tc.want) {
t.Errorf("message %q does not name the clash", rec.Body.String())
}
}
}
func TestSlugsCannotChangeWhatAnMQTTTopicMeans(t *testing.T) {
for in, want := range map[string]string{
"Nearle Retail Pvt Ltd": "nearle-retail-pvt-ltd",
" Acme ": "acme",
"a/b+c#d": "a-b-c-d", // the three MQTT wildcards and separator
"---Nearle---": "nearle",
"Café 21": "caf-21",
"!!!": "",
} {
if got := slugify(in); got != want {
t.Errorf("slugify(%q) = %q, want %q", in, got, want)
}
}
}
// Creating a tenant is rare and consequential. It should leave a name against it.
func TestCreatingATenantIsAudited(t *testing.T) {
s, fs := newServer(t)
seedPlatformAdmin(fs)
sess := login(t, s, "root@loyaly.ai", "admin123")
do(t, s, "POST", "/api/admin/clients", sess.Token, map[string]string{
"company_name": "Nearle", "owner_email": "aravind@nearle.in"})
fs.mu.Lock()
defer fs.mu.Unlock()
for _, a := range fs.audits {
if a.Action == "client.create" && a.ActorID == "admin-1" {
return
}
}
t.Fatalf("no audit row for creating a tenant: %+v", fs.audits)
}
// An operator inventing a password for somebody else invents a weak one and
// sends it over chat. Omitting it must generate one, not create an account with
// an empty password.
func TestAnOmittedPasswordIsGeneratedNotBlank(t *testing.T) {
s, fs := newServer(t)
seedPlatformAdmin(fs)
sess := login(t, s, "root@loyaly.ai", "admin123")
rec := do(t, s, "POST", "/api/admin/clients", sess.Token, map[string]string{
"company_name": "Nearle", "owner_email": "aravind@nearle.in"})
var out NewClientResult
json.Unmarshal(rec.Body.Bytes(), &out) //nolint:errcheck
if out.Password == "" {
t.Fatal("no password was returned, so nobody can ever sign in")
}
}