Five components that ship as one product:
- behavision/ the recognition engine. RTSP ingest, YuNet detection, IoU
tracking, ArcFace embeddings, a FAISS/SQLite gallery, and a
FastAPI dashboard. Identity is decided once per TRACK from an
average of at least three embeddings, never per frame.
- agent/ the Go edge agent: supervises the engine, holds a durable
spool, and drains it to MQTT. Nothing is acked before the
broker confirms.
- desktop/ the shop PC application (Wails + React + tray).
- server/ the cloud API, MQTT consumer, reports and assistant.
- web/ platform.loyaly.ai, the head-office app, embedded in the
server binary.
The gallery stores 512-float embeddings and timestamps - no images unless
`app.store_faces` is switched on. Those embeddings are biometric personal
data under GDPR and India's DPDP: template inversion reconstructs a
recognisable face from an ArcFace vector, so data/behavision.db is treated
as a biometric database and DELETE /api/visitors/{id} is a real erasure.
CLAUDE.md carries the reasoning behind every non-obvious decision here,
including the ones that were measured and the ones that were wrong first.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HViLj9gYNRtSr7YVZmW5sn
142 lines
4.6 KiB
Go
142 lines
4.6 KiB
Go
package auth
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import (
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"net/http/httptest"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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)
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func TestPasswordRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
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hash, err := HashPassword("correct horse battery")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if strings.Contains(hash, "correct") {
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t.Fatal("the hash contains the password")
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}
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if !VerifyPassword(hash, "correct horse battery") {
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t.Fatal("the right password was rejected")
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}
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if VerifyPassword(hash, "correct horse batteru") {
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t.Fatal("a wrong password was accepted")
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}
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}
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func TestPasswordPolicyIsLengthOnly(t *testing.T) {
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if _, err := HashPassword("short"); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("a five-character password was accepted")
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}
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// Composition rules push people towards Passw0rd! for the same annoyance,
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// so a long all-lower-case passphrase must be fine.
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if _, err := HashPassword("all lower case and long enough"); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("a good passphrase was refused: %v", err)
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}
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if _, err := HashPassword(strings.Repeat("x", 300)); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("a 300-character password was accepted")
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}
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}
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// DummyHash exists so an unknown address costs the same time as a wrong
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// password. A hash that does not parse returns instantly and puts the timing
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// leak straight back, which is why this asserts it actually verifies.
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func TestDummyHashIsARealBcryptHashThatNothingMatches(t *testing.T) {
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// Two separate properties, because the suite runs at a lowered cost and
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// only one of them is about the cost.
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//
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// 1. Production hashes at 12. Asserted against the constant rather than
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// against a hash, so lowering the cost for the tests cannot silently
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// lower it for real users too.
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if ProductionBcryptCost != 12 {
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t.Errorf("production bcrypt cost is %d - login should stay expensive",
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ProductionBcryptCost)
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}
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// 2. DummyHash is a real, parseable bcrypt hash. That is what makes an
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// unknown address cost the same time as a wrong password; a hash that
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// fails to parse returns instantly and puts the timing leak straight
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// back.
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if !strings.HasPrefix(DummyHash, "$2a$") {
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t.Fatalf("dummy hash is not a bcrypt hash at all: %q", DummyHash)
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}
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if VerifyPassword(DummyHash, "") || VerifyPassword(DummyHash, "password") {
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t.Fatal("something matched the dummy hash")
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}
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}
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func TestTokensAreDistinctAndOnlyTheHashIsStorable(t *testing.T) {
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a, err := NewToken()
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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b, err := NewToken()
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if a.Plain == b.Plain {
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t.Fatal("two tokens came out the same")
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}
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if len(a.Plain) < 40 {
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t.Fatalf("token is only %d characters", len(a.Plain))
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}
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if strings.Contains(string(a.Hash), a.Plain) {
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t.Fatal("the stored hash contains the token")
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}
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if string(HashToken(a.Plain)) != string(a.Hash) {
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t.Fatal("hashing the token again gave a different answer")
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}
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// URL-safe alphabet: this ends up in config files and gets copied by hand.
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if strings.ContainsAny(a.Plain, "+/=") {
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t.Fatalf("token needs escaping: %q", a.Plain)
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}
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}
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func TestBearerTokenIsReadFromTheHeaderOnly(t *testing.T) {
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r := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/auth/me?access_token=leaked", nil)
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if got := BearerToken(r); got != "" {
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t.Fatalf("a query parameter was accepted as a credential: %q", got)
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}
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r.Header.Set("Authorization", "bearer abc123")
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if got := BearerToken(r); got != "abc123" {
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t.Fatalf("got %q", got)
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}
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r.Header.Set("Authorization", "Basic abc123")
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if got := BearerToken(r); got != "" {
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t.Fatalf("Basic was read as a bearer token: %q", got)
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}
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}
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func TestNormalizeCodeAcceptsHowPeopleActuallyType(t *testing.T) {
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want := "ABCDEF123456"
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for _, in := range []string{
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"ABCDEF-123456", "abcdef-123456", "abcdef 123456",
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"ABC DEF-123 456", "ABCDEF123456",
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} {
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if got := NormalizeCode(in); got != want {
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t.Errorf("NormalizeCode(%q) = %q, want %q", in, got, want)
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}
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}
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}
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func TestRolesDefaultToDenying(t *testing.T) {
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if (Principal{Role: "auditor"}).CanWriteProfiles() {
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t.Fatal("an unrecognised role could write customer details")
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}
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if (Principal{}).CanManageSites() {
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t.Fatal("the zero-value principal could manage sites")
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}
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if !(Principal{Role: "staff"}).CanWriteProfiles() {
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t.Fatal("staff must be able to fill in the in-store form")
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}
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// Staff fill the form in; they do not hand out broker credentials.
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if (Principal{Role: "staff"}).CanManageSites() {
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t.Fatal("staff could manage sites")
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}
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}
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func TestNormalizeEmailMatchesTheUniqueIndex(t *testing.T) {
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// The index is on lower(email); anything reaching the database must already
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// agree with it or the constraint stops meaning what it says.
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if NormalizeEmail(" Asha@Acme.COM ") != "asha@acme.com" {
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t.Fatal("email normalisation disagrees with lower(email)")
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}
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}
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