POST /api/auth/password. The cost of its absence was measured today rather than argued: rotating three production accounts took a shell on the host, three round trips, and briefly left a PLATFORM ADMIN - the account that reads every company on the estate - with the password PASTE_IT_HERE, because a placeholder in a pasted command was taken literally and there was no way to correct it from the product. A manager could always reset somebody ELSE's password. A platform admin could be reset by nobody: they have no client, so the team routes are not theirs, and `provision user` on the host was the only route. For software that puts accounts on shop-floor PCs and staff phones, this is not a feature - it is what makes every other credential decision recoverable. Three decisions: - **authed, not tenantOnly.** A session is not a company's data, and the account with no company is precisely the one that had no route. Scoping this by client would have reproduced the hole it exists to close, which is also why SetUserPassword is not scoped by client the way ResetMemberPassword beside it is. The user id comes from the verified session, never the request, so there is nothing to point at anyone else. - **The current password is required.** An access token lives twelve hours and travels on devices that get lost and shared; without this a stolen one owns the account permanently instead of until it expires. - **Every OTHER session is revoked, and the caller's is kept.** Somebody changing their password because they believe it is known must not have to wonder whether the device that already had it is still signed in - and must not be signed out of the one in their hand while dealing with it. A failure there is logged, not returned: the password IS changed by then, and reporting an error would send them to retry with a current password that no longer exists. The suite's login() helper fatals on anything but 200, which is right everywhere else and useless here - half of what these tests assert is that a password has STOPPED working. loginCode() returns the status. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KGcjxF1cNLcuwc3DAPcnfj
1283 lines
35 KiB
Go
1283 lines
35 KiB
Go
package api
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import (
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"context"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/hex"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgconn"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
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"github.com/loyaly/behavision-server/internal/auth"
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)
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// fakeStore is an in-memory Store. Handlers are where the security decisions
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// live - which tenant, which message on failure, what is echoed back - and
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// those are exactly what a real database would make slow and awkward to test.
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type fakeStore struct {
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// Which tenant and site each camera belongs to. The live relay is keyed on
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// a camera id and a hub does not know whose camera it holds, so ownership
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// is proved before anything streams - and that is what these tests check.
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cameraRefs map[string]cameraRef
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// Camera pictures held by the server, for a deployment with no bucket.
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// Keyed as written by PutCameraSnapshot (by camera_id) and as read by
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// CameraSnapshot ("client/camera"), so a test has to say which it means.
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snapshots map[string][]byte
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snapshotRejects bool
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lastSnapshotClient string
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lastSnapshotSite string
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mu sync.Mutex
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users map[string]UserRecord // by lower-cased email
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sessions map[string]*fakeSession
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byAccess map[string]string // access hash hex -> session id
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byRefresh map[string]string
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visitors []Customer
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history []VisitRow
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footfall []FootfallPoint
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totals Totals
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sales SalesReport
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sites []SiteHealth
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// The admin drill-down is the one surface where the fake MUST know which
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// merchant owns what. Everywhere else the client id comes from the session
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// and every query scopes on it, so a fake that ignores it still exercises
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// the handler. Here the client id comes from the PATH and the scoping is
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// the thing under test - a fake that ignored it would pass the
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// cross-merchant tests while returning another company's shops.
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// Camera ownership already has a home: cameraRefs, read through the
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// cameraOwner method below.
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siteOwner map[string]string // site id -> client id
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salesRows []Sale
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saleOwner map[string]string // sale id -> client id
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lastSaleQuery SaleQuery
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clientRows map[string]ClientDetail
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enrolment map[string]Enrolment
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// Recorded calls, so a test can assert what the handler asked for rather
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// than only what it returned.
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lastReport ReportQuery
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lastProfile Profile
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lastProfileClient string
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lastPurchase PurchaseInput
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audits []AuditEntry
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// arrivals is the whole table; arrivalQ records what the handler asked for
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// so a test can assert on the keyset window rather than only its output.
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arrivals []Arrival
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arrivalQ ArrivalQuery
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arrivalsErr error
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arrivalCalls int
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pendingChecks []AgentCheckJob
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checkResults []AgentCheckResult
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releasedStale int
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lastCodeActor string
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lastCodeTTL time.Duration
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lastCheckKind string
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lastCheckSeconds int
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// Invitations, and the faces this server holds itself.
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invites map[string]*fakeInvite // by code hash hex
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faces map[string][]byte // "client/id"
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lastFaceClient string
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lastFaceSite string
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deletedFaces []string
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faceDeleteErr error
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cameras []Camera
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agentCameras []AgentCamera
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lastCameraReport AgentCameraReport
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lastReportClient string
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lastReportSite string
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saveCameraErr error
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lastSaved CameraInput
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clients []ClientRow
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lastNewClient NewClientInput
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newClientErr error
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loginTouched []string
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profileErr error
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purchaseErr error
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forgetErr error
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nextID int
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agentTokens map[string]AgentPrincipal
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imageKeys map[string]string
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forgotten []string
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}
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type fakeSession struct {
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id string
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p auth.Principal
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accessExp, refreshExp time.Time
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device string
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revoked bool
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}
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func newFakeStore() *fakeStore {
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return &fakeStore{
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users: map[string]UserRecord{},
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sessions: map[string]*fakeSession{},
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byAccess: map[string]string{},
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byRefresh: map[string]string{},
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enrolment: map[string]Enrolment{},
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agentTokens: map[string]AgentPrincipal{},
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imageKeys: map[string]string{},
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}
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}
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func (f *fakeStore) addUser(email, password string, rec UserRecord) {
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hash, err := auth.HashPassword(password)
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if err != nil {
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panic(err)
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}
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rec.Email = email
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rec.PasswordHash = hash
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rec.Found = true
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if rec.ID == "" {
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rec.ID = "user-" + email
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}
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if rec.Role == "" {
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rec.Role = "manager"
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}
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f.users[auth.NormalizeEmail(email)] = rec
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}
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func (f *fakeStore) UserByEmail(_ context.Context, email string) (UserRecord, error) {
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f.mu.Lock()
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defer f.mu.Unlock()
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u, ok := f.users[email]
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if !ok {
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return UserRecord{Found: false}, nil
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}
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return u, nil
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}
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func (f *fakeStore) TouchUserLogin(_ context.Context, id string) error {
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f.mu.Lock()
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defer f.mu.Unlock()
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f.loginTouched = append(f.loginTouched, id)
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return nil
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}
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func (f *fakeStore) CreateSession(_ context.Context, n NewSession) error {
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f.mu.Lock()
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defer f.mu.Unlock()
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f.nextID++
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// uuid-SHAPED, because the handlers validate the shape of an id before
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// spending a database round trip on it. A fake that mints "sess-1" would
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// make every id-addressed session route 404 in tests and pass in
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// production, which is the wrong way round.
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id := fmt.Sprintf("00000000-0000-4000-8000-%012d", f.nextID)
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var rec UserRecord
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for _, u := range f.users {
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if u.ID == n.UserID {
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rec = u
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}
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}
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s := &fakeSession{
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id: id,
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p: auth.Principal{
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UserID: n.UserID, SessionID: id, ClientID: n.ClientID,
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ClientName: rec.ClientName, Email: rec.Email,
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FullName: rec.FullName, Role: rec.Role,
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},
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accessExp: n.AccessExpiry, refreshExp: n.RefreshExp,
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device: n.Device,
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}
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f.sessions[id] = s
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f.byAccess[hex.EncodeToString(n.AccessHash)] = id
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f.byRefresh[hex.EncodeToString(n.RefreshHash)] = id
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return nil
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}
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func (f *fakeStore) lookup(index map[string]string, hash []byte, refresh bool) (
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auth.Principal, time.Time, error) {
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f.mu.Lock()
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defer f.mu.Unlock()
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id, ok := index[hex.EncodeToString(hash)]
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if !ok {
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return auth.Principal{}, time.Time{}, auth.ErrNoSession
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}
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s := f.sessions[id]
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if s == nil || s.revoked {
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return auth.Principal{}, time.Time{}, auth.ErrNoSession
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}
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if refresh {
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return s.p, s.refreshExp, nil
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}
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return s.p, s.accessExp, nil
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}
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func (f *fakeStore) SessionByAccess(_ context.Context, h []byte) (auth.Principal, time.Time, error) {
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return f.lookup(f.byAccess, h, false)
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}
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func (f *fakeStore) SessionByRefresh(_ context.Context, h []byte) (auth.Principal, time.Time, error) {
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return f.lookup(f.byRefresh, h, true)
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}
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func (f *fakeStore) RotateSession(_ context.Context, id string, n NewSession) error {
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f.mu.Lock()
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defer f.mu.Unlock()
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s := f.sessions[id]
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if s == nil || s.revoked {
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return auth.ErrNoSession
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}
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// Mirrors the real store: the old hashes stop resolving the moment the new
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// ones are written.
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for k, v := range f.byAccess {
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if v == id {
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delete(f.byAccess, k)
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}
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}
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for k, v := range f.byRefresh {
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if v == id {
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delete(f.byRefresh, k)
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}
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}
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f.byAccess[hex.EncodeToString(n.AccessHash)] = id
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f.byRefresh[hex.EncodeToString(n.RefreshHash)] = id
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s.accessExp, s.refreshExp = n.AccessExpiry, n.RefreshExp
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return nil
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}
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func (f *fakeStore) RevokeSession(_ context.Context, id string) error {
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f.mu.Lock()
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defer f.mu.Unlock()
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if s := f.sessions[id]; s != nil {
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s.revoked = true
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}
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return nil
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}
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func (f *fakeStore) Footfall(_ context.Context, q ReportQuery) ([]FootfallPoint, Totals, error) {
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f.mu.Lock()
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defer f.mu.Unlock()
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f.lastReport = q
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return f.footfall, f.totals, nil
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}
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func (f *fakeStore) Conversion(_ context.Context, q ReportQuery) (SalesReport, error) {
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f.mu.Lock()
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defer f.mu.Unlock()
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f.lastReport = q
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return f.sales, nil
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}
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func (f *fakeStore) CreateSite(_ context.Context, clientID, slug, name, tz string) (NewSite, error) {
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f.mu.Lock()
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defer f.mu.Unlock()
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for _, s := range f.sites {
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if s.Slug == slug {
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return NewSite{}, &pgconn.PgError{Code: "23505"}
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}
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}
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id := "site-" + slug
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f.sites = append(f.sites, SiteHealth{SiteID: id, Slug: slug, Name: name, Timezone: tz})
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return NewSite{SiteID: id, Slug: slug, Name: name, Timezone: tz, Username: "acme." + slug, Password: "pw-" + slug}, nil
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}
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func (f *fakeStore) DeleteNewSite(_ context.Context, _ string, siteID string) error {
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f.mu.Lock()
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defer f.mu.Unlock()
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kept := f.sites[:0]
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for _, s := range f.sites {
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if s.SiteID != siteID {
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kept = append(kept, s)
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}
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}
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f.sites = kept
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return nil
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}
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func (f *fakeStore) SiteHealth(_ context.Context, clientID string) ([]SiteHealth, error) {
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// Scoped only when a test has declared ownership; otherwise every existing
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// tenant test would have to grow a fixture it does not care about.
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if f.siteOwner == nil {
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return f.sites, nil
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}
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var out []SiteHealth
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for _, s := range f.sites {
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if f.siteOwner[s.SiteID] == clientID {
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out = append(out, s)
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}
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}
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return out, nil
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}
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func (f *fakeStore) SetUserPassword(_ context.Context, userID, hash string) error {
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f.mu.Lock()
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defer f.mu.Unlock()
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for email, u := range f.users {
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if u.ID == userID {
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u.PasswordHash = hash
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f.users[email] = u
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return nil
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}
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}
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return errors.New("no such user")
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}
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func (f *fakeStore) Sales(_ context.Context, q SaleQuery) ([]Sale, error) {
|
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f.mu.Lock()
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defer f.mu.Unlock()
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f.lastSaleQuery = q
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var out []Sale
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for _, sale := range f.salesRows {
|
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if q.SiteID != "" && sale.SiteID != q.SiteID {
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continue
|
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}
|
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if q.VisitorID != "" && sale.VisitorID != q.VisitorID {
|
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continue
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}
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out = append(out, sale)
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}
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if q.Limit > 0 && len(out) > q.Limit {
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out = out[:q.Limit]
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}
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return out, nil
|
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}
|
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|
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func (f *fakeStore) Sale(_ context.Context, clientID, id string) (Sale, error) {
|
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f.mu.Lock()
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defer f.mu.Unlock()
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for _, sale := range f.salesRows {
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// Scoped, so the cross-tenant test is not vacuous.
|
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if sale.ID == id && f.saleOwner[id] == clientID {
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return sale, nil
|
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}
|
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}
|
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return Sale{}, nil
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}
|
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|
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func (f *fakeStore) ClientDetail(_ context.Context, clientID string) (ClientDetail, error) {
|
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f.mu.Lock()
|
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defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
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return f.clientRows[clientID], nil
|
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}
|
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|
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func (f *fakeStore) AdminSiteID(_ context.Context, clientID, ref string) (string, error) {
|
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for _, s := range f.sites {
|
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if s.SiteID != ref && s.Slug != ref {
|
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continue
|
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}
|
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if f.siteOwner != nil && f.siteOwner[s.SiteID] != clientID {
|
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return "", nil // owned by somebody else: a miss, not a match
|
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}
|
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return s.SiteID, nil
|
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}
|
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return "", nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
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func (f *fakeStore) AdminCameraID(_ context.Context, clientID, siteID, ref string) (string, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
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defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
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for _, c := range f.cameras {
|
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if c.ID != ref && c.CameraID != ref {
|
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continue
|
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}
|
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if c.SiteID != siteID {
|
|
return "", nil
|
|
}
|
|
if f.cameraRefs != nil && f.cameraOwner(c.ID) != clientID {
|
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return "", nil
|
|
}
|
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return c.ID, nil
|
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}
|
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return "", nil
|
|
}
|
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|
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func (f *fakeStore) PlatformSummary(_ context.Context) (PlatformSummary, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
return PlatformSummary{
|
|
CamerasTotal: len(f.cameras), MerchantsActive: len(f.clientRows),
|
|
SitesTotal: len(f.sites), AsOf: "2026-09-28T00:00:00Z",
|
|
}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) SearchVisitors(_ context.Context, clientID, q string, limit int) (
|
|
[]Customer, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
f.lastReport = ReportQuery{ClientID: clientID}
|
|
if limit < len(f.visitors) {
|
|
return f.visitors[:limit], nil
|
|
}
|
|
return f.visitors, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) VisitorHistory(_ context.Context, _, _ string, _ int) ([]VisitRow, error) {
|
|
return f.history, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Arrivals fakes the keyset window in memory: rows are held oldest-first, a
|
|
// cursor slices past it, and no cursor returns the newest Limit - the same
|
|
// contract the SQL implements, so a handler test that passes here is testing
|
|
// the handler and not a stub that is easier than the real thing.
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) Arrivals(_ context.Context, q ArrivalQuery) ([]Arrival, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
f.arrivalQ = q
|
|
f.arrivalCalls++
|
|
if f.arrivalsErr != nil {
|
|
return nil, f.arrivalsErr
|
|
}
|
|
rows := make([]Arrival, 0, len(f.arrivals))
|
|
for _, a := range f.arrivals {
|
|
if q.SiteID != "" && a.SiteID != q.SiteID {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if q.AfterSeq != nil && a.Seq <= *q.AfterSeq {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
rows = append(rows, a)
|
|
}
|
|
if q.AfterSeq == nil && len(rows) > q.Limit {
|
|
// No cursor: the newest window, matching the real query.
|
|
rows = rows[len(rows)-q.Limit:]
|
|
} else if len(rows) > q.Limit {
|
|
rows = rows[:q.Limit]
|
|
}
|
|
return rows, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) SaveProfile(_ context.Context, clientID string, p Profile, _ string) error {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
f.lastProfile, f.lastProfileClient = p, clientID
|
|
return f.profileErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) RecordPurchase(_ context.Context, _ string, p PurchaseInput, _ string) error {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
f.lastPurchase = p
|
|
return f.purchaseErr
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) RedeemEnrolment(_ context.Context, hash []byte) (Enrolment, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
en, ok := f.enrolment[hex.EncodeToString(hash)]
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return Enrolment{}, errors.New("unknown token")
|
|
}
|
|
// Single use, like the real UPDATE.
|
|
delete(f.enrolment, hex.EncodeToString(hash))
|
|
return en, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) Cameras(_ context.Context, _, siteID string) ([]Camera, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
var out []Camera
|
|
for _, c := range f.cameras {
|
|
if siteID == "" || c.SiteID == siteID {
|
|
out = append(out, c)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return out, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) CameraByID(_ context.Context, _, id string) (Camera, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
for _, c := range f.cameras {
|
|
if c.ID == id {
|
|
return c, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return Camera{}, errors.New("no rows in result set")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) SaveCamera(_ context.Context, _, siteID, cameraID string,
|
|
in CameraInput) (Camera, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
f.lastSaved = in
|
|
if f.saveCameraErr != nil {
|
|
return Camera{}, f.saveCameraErr
|
|
}
|
|
// A real-shaped uuid: the handlers check the shape before touching SQL, so
|
|
// a placeholder id would exercise the 404 path instead of the one under
|
|
// test.
|
|
cam := Camera{ID: fakeCameraUUID(cameraID), SiteID: siteID, CameraID: cameraID,
|
|
Port: 554, Path: "/", MaxWidth: 1280, Enabled: true, Revision: 1}
|
|
if in.Label != nil {
|
|
cam.Label = *in.Label
|
|
}
|
|
if in.Host != nil {
|
|
cam.Host = *in.Host
|
|
}
|
|
if in.Username != nil {
|
|
cam.Username = *in.Username
|
|
}
|
|
cam.HasPassword = in.Password != nil && *in.Password != ""
|
|
f.cameras = append(f.cameras, cam)
|
|
return cam, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// fakeCameraUUID derives a stable uuid-shaped id from a camera name so tests
|
|
// can address a camera they just created without reading the response.
|
|
func fakeCameraUUID(cameraID string) string {
|
|
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(cameraID))
|
|
h := hex.EncodeToString(sum[:16])
|
|
return h[0:8] + "-" + h[8:12] + "-" + h[12:16] + "-" + h[16:20] + "-" + h[20:32]
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) DeleteCamera(_ context.Context, _, id string) (Camera, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
for i, c := range f.cameras {
|
|
if c.ID == id {
|
|
f.cameras = append(f.cameras[:i], f.cameras[i+1:]...)
|
|
return c, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return Camera{}, errors.New("no rows in result set")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) AgentCameras(_ context.Context, _ string) ([]AgentCamera, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
return f.agentCameras, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) ApplyAgentReport(_ context.Context, clientID, siteID string,
|
|
rep AgentCameraReport) error {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
f.lastCameraReport = rep
|
|
f.lastReportClient, f.lastReportSite = clientID, siteID
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) IssueEnrolmentCode(_ context.Context, clientID, siteID,
|
|
actorID, label string, ttl time.Duration) (EnrolmentCode, error) {
|
|
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
for _, si := range f.sites {
|
|
if si.SiteID == siteID {
|
|
f.lastCodeActor, f.lastCodeTTL = actorID, ttl
|
|
return EnrolmentCode{
|
|
Code: "ABCDEF-123456-GHIJKL-789012", SiteID: siteID,
|
|
SiteName: si.Name, Label: label,
|
|
ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(ttl).UTC(),
|
|
}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return EnrolmentCode{}, pgx.ErrNoRows
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) RequestCheck(_ context.Context, _, id, kind string, seconds int) error {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
for i := range f.cameras {
|
|
if f.cameras[i].ID == id {
|
|
f.cameras[i].Check = CameraCheck{Kind: kind, Seconds: seconds, State: "requested"}
|
|
f.lastCheckKind, f.lastCheckSeconds = kind, seconds
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return errors.New("no rows in result set")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) ClaimChecks(_ context.Context, _ string) ([]AgentCheckJob, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
out := f.pendingChecks
|
|
f.pendingChecks = nil // claimed once, like the real UPDATE ... RETURNING
|
|
return out, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) RecordCheckResult(_ context.Context, _ string, res AgentCheckResult) error {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
f.checkResults = append(f.checkResults, res)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) ReleaseStaleChecks(_ context.Context, _ time.Duration) error {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
f.releasedStale++
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) SetClientActive(_ context.Context, clientID string, active bool) (ClientRow, int, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
for i := range f.clients {
|
|
if f.clients[i].ID != clientID {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
f.clients[i].Active = active
|
|
revoked := 0
|
|
if !active {
|
|
for _, sess := range f.sessions {
|
|
if sess.p.ClientID == clientID && !sess.revoked {
|
|
sess.revoked = true
|
|
revoked++
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return f.clients[i], revoked, nil
|
|
}
|
|
return ClientRow{}, 0, pgx.ErrNoRows
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) ClientOwners(_ context.Context, clientID string) ([]TeamMember, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
var out []TeamMember
|
|
for _, u := range f.users {
|
|
if u.ClientID == clientID && u.Role == "owner" && u.Active {
|
|
out = append(out, TeamMember{ID: u.ID, Email: u.Email, FullName: u.FullName, Role: u.Role, Active: u.Active})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return out, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) ClientImageKeys(_ context.Context, _ string) ([]string, error) { return nil, nil }
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) DeleteClient(_ context.Context, clientID string) (ClientRow, []string, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
for i, c := range f.clients {
|
|
if c.ID != clientID {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if c.Active {
|
|
return c, nil, errors.New("client is active")
|
|
}
|
|
f.clients = append(f.clients[:i], f.clients[i+1:]...)
|
|
return c, []string{c.Slug + ".shop1"}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
return ClientRow{}, nil, pgx.ErrNoRows
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) UpdateSite(_ context.Context, _ string, siteID string, in SiteUpdate) (SiteHealth, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
for i := range f.sites {
|
|
if f.sites[i].SiteID == siteID {
|
|
if in.Name != nil {
|
|
f.sites[i].Name = *in.Name
|
|
}
|
|
if in.Timezone != nil {
|
|
f.sites[i].Timezone = *in.Timezone
|
|
}
|
|
return f.sites[i], nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return SiteHealth{}, pgx.ErrNoRows
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) DeleteEmptySite(_ context.Context, _ string, siteID string) (string, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
for _, c := range f.cameras {
|
|
if c.SiteID == siteID {
|
|
return "", ErrSiteInUse
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
for i, s := range f.sites {
|
|
if s.SiteID == siteID {
|
|
f.sites = append(f.sites[:i], f.sites[i+1:]...)
|
|
return "acme." + s.Slug, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return "", pgx.ErrNoRows
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) ListClients(_ context.Context) ([]ClientRow, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
return f.clients, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) CreateClientWithOwner(_ context.Context, in NewClientInput) (
|
|
NewClientResult, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
f.lastNewClient = in
|
|
if f.newClientErr != nil {
|
|
return NewClientResult{}, f.newClientErr
|
|
}
|
|
pw := in.Password
|
|
if pw == "" {
|
|
pw = "generated-password"
|
|
}
|
|
return NewClientResult{ClientID: "new-client-id", Slug: in.Slug,
|
|
OwnerEmail: in.OwnerEmail, Password: pw}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) Audit(_ context.Context, e AuditEntry) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
f.audits = append(f.audits, e)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func itoa(n int) string {
|
|
if n == 0 {
|
|
return "0"
|
|
}
|
|
var b []byte
|
|
for n > 0 {
|
|
b = append([]byte{byte('0' + n%10)}, b...)
|
|
n /= 10
|
|
}
|
|
return string(b)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// -- images and agents ------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) SetAgentAPIToken(_ context.Context, agentID string, hash []byte) error {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
if f.agentTokens == nil {
|
|
f.agentTokens = map[string]AgentPrincipal{}
|
|
}
|
|
f.agentTokens[hex.EncodeToString(hash)] = AgentPrincipal{
|
|
AgentID: agentID, ClientID: "client-acme", SiteID: "site-1",
|
|
Slug: "acme.store1", Client: "acme", Site: "store1",
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// addAgent registers a plaintext agent token, hashed the way the middleware
|
|
// will look it up.
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) addAgent(token string, ap AgentPrincipal) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
f.agentTokens[hex.EncodeToString(auth.HashToken(token))] = ap
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) AgentByToken(_ context.Context, hash []byte) (AgentPrincipal, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
ap, ok := f.agentTokens[hex.EncodeToString(hash)]
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return AgentPrincipal{}, errors.New("no such agent")
|
|
}
|
|
return ap, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) VisitorImageKey(_ context.Context, _, visitorID string) (string, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
return f.imageKeys[visitorID], nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) VisitorImageKeys(_ context.Context, _, visitorID string) ([]string, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
if k := f.imageKeys[visitorID]; k != "" {
|
|
return []string{k}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
return nil, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) ForgetVisitor(_ context.Context, _, visitorID string) error {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
if f.forgetErr != nil {
|
|
return f.forgetErr
|
|
}
|
|
f.forgotten = append(f.forgotten, visitorID)
|
|
delete(f.imageKeys, visitorID)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// fakeBlob records what the handlers asked storage to do. Deleting is the part
|
|
// worth recording: an erasure that reports success without removing the object
|
|
// is the failure this whole path exists to prevent.
|
|
type fakeBlob struct {
|
|
mu sync.Mutex
|
|
deleted []string
|
|
presigns []string
|
|
failNext error
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (b *fakeBlob) Key(client, site, objectID string, at time.Time) string {
|
|
return fmt.Sprintf("behavision/%s/%s/%04d/%02d/%02d/%s.jpg",
|
|
client, site, at.Year(), int(at.Month()), at.Day(), objectID)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (b *fakeBlob) PresignPut(key string, _ time.Duration) (string, http.Header, error) {
|
|
h := http.Header{}
|
|
h.Set("x-amz-acl", "private")
|
|
h.Set("Content-Type", "image/jpeg")
|
|
return "https://bucket.example.com/" + key + "?X-Amz-Signature=fake", h, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (b *fakeBlob) PresignGet(key string, _ time.Duration) (string, error) {
|
|
b.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer b.mu.Unlock()
|
|
b.presigns = append(b.presigns, key)
|
|
return "https://bucket.example.com/" + key + "?X-Amz-Signature=fake", nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (b *fakeBlob) Delete(_ context.Context, key string) error {
|
|
b.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer b.mu.Unlock()
|
|
if b.failNext != nil {
|
|
err := b.failNext
|
|
b.failNext = nil
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
b.deleted = append(b.deleted, key)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ------------------------------------------------------- camera snapshots --
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) PutCameraSnapshot(_ context.Context,
|
|
clientID, siteID, cameraID string, jpeg []byte) error {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
if f.snapshots == nil {
|
|
f.snapshots = map[string][]byte{}
|
|
}
|
|
if f.snapshotRejects {
|
|
return ErrNoSnapshot
|
|
}
|
|
f.lastSnapshotClient, f.lastSnapshotSite = clientID, siteID
|
|
f.snapshots[cameraID] = append([]byte(nil), jpeg...)
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) CameraSnapshot(_ context.Context, clientID, cameraID string) (
|
|
[]byte, time.Time, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
img, ok := f.snapshots[clientID+"/"+cameraID]
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil, time.Time{}, ErrNoSnapshot
|
|
}
|
|
return img, time.Unix(1756900000, 0).UTC(), nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ------------------------------------------------------------ live relay --
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) CameraRef(_ context.Context, clientID, cameraID string) (string, string, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
ref, ok := f.cameraRefs[cameraID]
|
|
if !ok || ref.client != clientID {
|
|
return "", "", ErrNoSnapshot
|
|
}
|
|
return ref.site, ref.engineID, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) CameraRefBySite(_ context.Context, siteID, cameraID string) (string, string, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
ref, ok := f.cameraRefs[cameraID]
|
|
if !ok || ref.site != siteID {
|
|
return "", "", ErrNoSnapshot
|
|
}
|
|
return ref.site, ref.engineID, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) SiteCameraIDs(_ context.Context, siteID string) ([]string, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
var out []string
|
|
for id, ref := range f.cameraRefs {
|
|
if ref.site == siteID {
|
|
out = append(out, id)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return out, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// addCameraRef registers a camera so ownership checks have something to check.
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) addCameraRef(id, client, site, engineID string) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
if f.cameraRefs == nil {
|
|
f.cameraRefs = map[string]cameraRef{}
|
|
}
|
|
f.cameraRefs[id] = cameraRef{client: client, site: site, engineID: engineID}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type cameraRef struct{ client, site, engineID string }
|
|
|
|
// ==================================== team, invitations, sessions, faces ====
|
|
//
|
|
// These behave rather than merely satisfy the interface: single use, tenant
|
|
// scoping and "the role comes from the invitation" are the properties the
|
|
// handlers are trusted for, so a fake that always says yes would make the tests
|
|
// that check them meaningless.
|
|
|
|
type fakeInvite struct {
|
|
id, clientID, email, fullName, role string
|
|
expires time.Time
|
|
used, revoked bool
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) CreateInvitation(_ context.Context, in NewInvitation) (Invitation, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
if f.invites == nil {
|
|
f.invites = map[string]*fakeInvite{}
|
|
}
|
|
f.nextID++
|
|
id := fmt.Sprintf("00000000-0000-4000-9000-%012d", f.nextID)
|
|
f.invites[hex.EncodeToString(in.CodeHash)] = &fakeInvite{
|
|
id: id, clientID: in.ClientID, email: in.Email,
|
|
fullName: in.FullName, role: in.Role, expires: in.ExpiresAt,
|
|
}
|
|
return Invitation{
|
|
ID: id, Email: in.Email, FullName: in.FullName, Role: in.Role,
|
|
ExpiresAt: in.ExpiresAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
|
|
CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
|
|
}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) PendingInvitations(_ context.Context, clientID string) ([]Invitation, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
var out []Invitation
|
|
for _, v := range f.invites {
|
|
if v.clientID != clientID || v.used || v.revoked {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
out = append(out, Invitation{ID: v.id, Email: v.email,
|
|
FullName: v.fullName, Role: v.role,
|
|
ExpiresAt: v.expires.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)})
|
|
}
|
|
return out, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) RevokeInvitation(_ context.Context, clientID, id string) error {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
for _, v := range f.invites {
|
|
if v.id == id && v.clientID == clientID && !v.used && !v.revoked {
|
|
v.revoked = true
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return errors.New("no such pending invitation")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) InvitationByCode(_ context.Context, hash []byte) (InvitationPreview, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
v, ok := f.invites[hex.EncodeToString(hash)]
|
|
if !ok || v.used || v.revoked || time.Now().After(v.expires) {
|
|
return InvitationPreview{}, errors.New("that invitation is not valid")
|
|
}
|
|
return InvitationPreview{Client: "Fake Co", Email: v.email,
|
|
FullName: v.fullName, Role: v.role}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) RedeemInvitation(_ context.Context, hash []byte,
|
|
fullName, passwordHash string) (UserRecord, error) {
|
|
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
v, ok := f.invites[hex.EncodeToString(hash)]
|
|
if !ok || v.used || v.revoked || time.Now().After(v.expires) {
|
|
return UserRecord{}, errors.New("that invitation is not valid")
|
|
}
|
|
if _, taken := f.users[v.email]; taken {
|
|
return UserRecord{}, errors.New("app_users_email_idx")
|
|
}
|
|
// Marked spent BEFORE the account exists, mirroring the real store's one
|
|
// transaction: a test that redeems the same code twice must get one user.
|
|
v.used = true
|
|
f.nextID++
|
|
rec := UserRecord{
|
|
ID: fmt.Sprintf("00000000-0000-4000-a000-%012d", f.nextID),
|
|
// From the INVITATION, never from the request - which is the property
|
|
// worth having a fake at all for.
|
|
ClientID: v.clientID, ClientName: "Fake Co", Email: v.email,
|
|
FullName: fullName, Role: v.role, Active: true, Found: true,
|
|
PasswordHash: passwordHash,
|
|
}
|
|
if rec.FullName == "" {
|
|
rec.FullName = v.fullName
|
|
}
|
|
f.users[v.email] = rec
|
|
return rec, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) Team(_ context.Context, clientID string) ([]TeamMember, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
var out []TeamMember
|
|
for _, u := range f.users {
|
|
if u.ClientID != clientID {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
out = append(out, TeamMember{ID: u.ID, Email: u.Email,
|
|
FullName: u.FullName, Role: u.Role, Active: u.Active})
|
|
}
|
|
return out, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) UpdateTeamMember(_ context.Context, clientID, userID string,
|
|
up TeamUpdate) (TeamMember, error) {
|
|
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
for email, u := range f.users {
|
|
if u.ID != userID || u.ClientID != clientID {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if up.Role != nil {
|
|
u.Role = *up.Role
|
|
}
|
|
if up.Active != nil {
|
|
u.Active = *up.Active
|
|
if !u.Active {
|
|
// The real store revokes in the same transaction; the fake
|
|
// does it here so a test can prove "they have left" actually
|
|
// signs them out rather than waiting twelve hours.
|
|
for _, s := range f.sessions {
|
|
if s.p.UserID == userID {
|
|
s.revoked = true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
f.users[email] = u
|
|
return TeamMember{ID: u.ID, Email: u.Email, FullName: u.FullName,
|
|
Role: u.Role, Active: u.Active}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
return TeamMember{}, errors.New("no such team member")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) UserSessions(_ context.Context, userID string) ([]DeviceSession, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
var out []DeviceSession
|
|
for _, s := range f.sessions {
|
|
if s.p.UserID != userID || s.revoked {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
out = append(out, DeviceSession{ID: s.id, Device: s.device,
|
|
ExpiresAt: s.refreshExp.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)})
|
|
}
|
|
return out, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) RevokeUserSession(_ context.Context, userID, sessionID string) error {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
s, ok := f.sessions[sessionID]
|
|
// Scoped by user id, exactly as the real UPDATE is: a session id travels in
|
|
// a list and is not a secret, so it must not sign anybody else out.
|
|
if !ok || s.p.UserID != userID || s.revoked {
|
|
return errors.New("no such session")
|
|
}
|
|
s.revoked = true
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) RevokeOtherSessions(_ context.Context, userID, keep string) (int, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
n := 0
|
|
for _, s := range f.sessions {
|
|
if s.p.UserID == userID && s.id != keep && !s.revoked {
|
|
s.revoked = true
|
|
n++
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return n, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) PutVisitFace(_ context.Context, clientID, siteID string,
|
|
jpeg []byte) (string, error) {
|
|
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
if f.faces == nil {
|
|
f.faces = map[string][]byte{}
|
|
}
|
|
f.nextID++
|
|
id := fmt.Sprintf("00000000-0000-4000-b000-%012d", f.nextID)
|
|
f.faces[clientID+"/"+id] = jpeg
|
|
f.lastFaceClient, f.lastFaceSite = clientID, siteID
|
|
return "db:" + id, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) VisitFace(_ context.Context, clientID, key string) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
img, ok := f.faces[clientID+"/"+strings.TrimPrefix(key, "db:")]
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("no such face image")
|
|
}
|
|
return img, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) DeleteVisitFaces(_ context.Context, clientID string, keys []string) error {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
if f.faceDeleteErr != nil {
|
|
return f.faceDeleteErr
|
|
}
|
|
for _, k := range keys {
|
|
delete(f.faces, clientID+"/"+strings.TrimPrefix(k, "db:"))
|
|
f.deletedFaces = append(f.deletedFaces, k)
|
|
}
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ============================================ public reference resolution ===
|
|
//
|
|
// These behave rather than merely satisfy the interface. The properties the
|
|
// handlers are trusted for - a reference resolves only within the caller's own
|
|
// tenant, and an ambiguous camera name resolves to nothing rather than to
|
|
// whichever row came first - are exactly what a fake that always said yes would
|
|
// stop any test from checking.
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) SiteIDBySlug(_ context.Context, clientID, slug string) (string, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
for _, s := range f.sites {
|
|
// An owner of "" is a site the fake was not told about, which is the
|
|
// ordinary case: SiteHealth carries no client id, and most tests seed
|
|
// one tenant. Tests that assert cross-tenant resolution seed a camera,
|
|
// which is what gives a site an owner here.
|
|
if owner := f.siteClient(s.Slug, s.SiteID); s.Slug == slug &&
|
|
(owner == "" || owner == clientID) {
|
|
return s.SiteID, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return "", nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// siteClient answers which tenant a site belongs to. SiteHealth carries no
|
|
// client id of its own - it is already scoped by the query that returns it - so
|
|
// the fake reads ownership from the cameras it was seeded with.
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) siteClient(_, siteID string) string {
|
|
for _, ref := range f.cameraRefs {
|
|
if ref.site == siteID {
|
|
return ref.client
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
for _, c := range f.cameras {
|
|
if c.SiteID == siteID {
|
|
return f.cameraOwner(c.ID)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) cameraOwner(id string) string {
|
|
if ref, ok := f.cameraRefs[id]; ok {
|
|
return ref.client
|
|
}
|
|
return ""
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) CameraIDByRef(_ context.Context, clientID, ref string) (string, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
var found []string
|
|
for _, c := range f.cameras {
|
|
if c.CameraID != ref {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
if owner := f.cameraOwner(c.ID); owner != "" && owner != clientID {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
found = append(found, c.ID)
|
|
}
|
|
// A camera id is unique per site, not per tenant. Two shops may each have
|
|
// an "Office1", and acting on whichever sorted first would edit the wrong
|
|
// shop's camera, so ambiguity is no match.
|
|
if len(found) != 1 {
|
|
return "", nil
|
|
}
|
|
return found[0], nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) VisitorIDByNumber(_ context.Context, clientID string, number int64) (string, error) {
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
want := VisitorRef(number)
|
|
for _, v := range f.visitors {
|
|
if v.Ref == want {
|
|
return v.ID, nil
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return "", nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// CreateMember behaves like the real store on the two things the handler
|
|
// branches on: the account lands in the caller's tenant and nowhere else, and
|
|
// an address that already exists anywhere is a conflict named the way Postgres
|
|
// names it, so conflictMessage recognises it.
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) CreateMember(_ context.Context, clientID string,
|
|
in NewMemberInput, hash string) (TeamMember, error) {
|
|
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
if _, taken := f.users[in.Email]; taken {
|
|
return TeamMember{}, errors.New(`duplicate key value violates unique constraint "app_users_email_idx"`)
|
|
}
|
|
// The real UserByEmail joins clients for the name; this fake reads it off
|
|
// the record, so copy it from a tenant-mate or a login as the new member
|
|
// comes back with no company name and looks like it landed nowhere.
|
|
clientName := ""
|
|
for _, u := range f.users {
|
|
if u.ClientID == clientID && u.ClientName != "" {
|
|
clientName = u.ClientName
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
id := "member-" + itoa(len(f.users)+1)
|
|
f.users[in.Email] = UserRecord{
|
|
ID: id, ClientID: clientID, ClientName: clientName,
|
|
Email: in.Email, FullName: in.FullName,
|
|
Role: in.Role, Active: true, PasswordHash: hash, Found: true,
|
|
}
|
|
return TeamMember{ID: id, Email: in.Email, FullName: in.FullName,
|
|
Role: in.Role, Active: true}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ResetMemberPassword mirrors the real one: tenant-scoped, and every session
|
|
// the member holds is revoked with it.
|
|
func (f *fakeStore) ResetMemberPassword(_ context.Context, clientID, userID,
|
|
hash string) (TeamMember, error) {
|
|
|
|
f.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer f.mu.Unlock()
|
|
for email, u := range f.users {
|
|
if u.ID != userID || u.ClientID != clientID {
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
u.PasswordHash = hash
|
|
f.users[email] = u
|
|
for _, s := range f.sessions {
|
|
if s.p.UserID == userID {
|
|
s.revoked = true
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return TeamMember{ID: u.ID, Email: u.Email, FullName: u.FullName,
|
|
Role: u.Role, Active: u.Active}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
return TeamMember{}, errors.New("no such team member")
|
|
}
|