StreamURL built http://user:pass@127.0.0.1:8010/api/cameras/<id>/ stream.mjpeg and handed it to an <img>, with a comment saying the credentials were inline "so an <img> tag can load it". It cannot. Chromium strips credentials from subresource URLs and has since M59, and WebView2 is Chromium - so on the one platform this product ships to, every camera tile on a shop counter was a broken image. Measured against a running engine: the app's Go-side calls returned stats and people while an <img> on that very URL failed, and curl proved the URL answered 200. The engine was never the problem. The password now stays on this side of the process boundary. A loopback relay attaches Basic auth and streams the engine's bytes back unchanged - the same reasoning Shot.jsx already follows at head office, where an <img> equally cannot carry a session. What the relay is careful about, since it is a door onto the biometric API with a credential attached: - loopback only, on a port the OS picks; a fixed one would collide with whatever else a shop PC runs and read as "the cameras broke" - a per-run random token in the path. The engine's own credential exists so the live face feed is never served open; an unauthenticated relay would hand that feed to any other process on the PC. Compared in constant time, and a wrong one is 404, not 403 - an allow-list of stream.mjpeg and frame.jpg. Holding the token does not reach the identity list, the gallery, or erasure - camera ids validated, not interpolated - every chunk flushed; a buffered MJPEG stream is a tile that never paints, which looks identical to the bug being fixed Two of those were written after a test failed, not before: - `..` MATCHES the id pattern, because real camera ids contain dots. `/api/cameras/../stream.mjpeg` is not the endpoint anyone intended. The id can never hold a slash, so `.` and `..` are the whole remaining traversal surface and are now refused by name. - the serve goroutine read p.srv off the struct while stop() was nilling it, so a quick start/stop dereferenced nil and took the process down. Captured before launching now. FrameURL is deliberately not added. No screen asks for a still, and a bound method nothing calls is the same defect as a capability the UI cannot reach, only pointing the other way. Verified: nine unit tests, plus a live test against the real engine and the real office camera - two MJPEG frames, 90,793 bytes, no credential in the URL. Windows and darwin both build; vet clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Pcn9asw19WGBfCEaHvNug6
Behavision
Production face recognition over RTSP. Watches camera streams, detects and tracks faces, recognizes known people, auto-enrolls new visitors, records visit history, and serves a live dashboard + JSON API.
Clean-room rewrite of the previous Camera/ and pattern_reg/ projects:
same core ideas, correct engineering.
Quick start (Windows)
cd D:\NEARLE\Behavision
python -m venv .venv
.venv\Scripts\activate
pip install -r requirements.txt
python -m behavision setup-models # downloads YuNet, copies ArcFace etc. from the old project
python -m behavision run # dashboard at http://localhost:8010
Camera credentials live in .env (gitignored) — never in code or YAML.
So do the dashboard credentials: set BEHAVISION_API_USER and
BEHAVISION_API_PASSWORD, or let the server generate one into
data/api_credentials.txt on first boot. A routable api.host is never
served without HTTP Basic auth; 127.0.0.1 is left open.
To test without a camera, set webcam: 0 on a camera in
config/default.yaml.
Enroll a person by name from photos:
python -m behavision enroll --name "Alice" --images C:\photos\alice\
Architecture
behavision/
├── config.py typed config: YAML + ${ENV} expansion, validated (pydantic)
├── capture.py RTSP/webcam reader thread: latest-frame slot, TCP transport,
│ exponential-backoff reconnect, percent-encoded credentials
├── detection.py YuNet face detector (OpenCV) → boxes + 5 landmarks, clipped
├── recognition.py ArcFace ONNX encoder (correct (x-127.5)/127.5 RGB preprocessing,
│ unit-norm output) + clamped face-quality scoring
├── tracking.py IoU tracker: identity decided once per TRACK, not per frame
├── gallery/
│ ├── index.py FAISS IndexFlatIP (exact cosine) with identical numpy fallback
│ ├── store.py SQLite (WAL): identities, embeddings, sightings — source of truth
│ └── service.py three-zone matching: match / ambiguous(do nothing) / enroll
├── attributes.py optional age, gender, emotion on the aligned chip
├── events.py async event bus → log / webhook / rate-limited email sinks
├── engine.py one worker thread per camera, shared models + gallery
├── api.py FastAPI: dashboard, MJPEG stream, identities, events, stats
└── __main__.py CLI: run | enroll | setup-models
Pipeline
RTSP ──► capture ──► detect (YuNet) ──► track (IoU)
│ once per track, quality-gated
▼
align (Umeyama 5-pt) ──► ArcFace ──► cosine search
│
┌───────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────┐
sim ≥ 0.42 0.32 ≤ sim < 0.42 sim < 0.32
known person ambiguous → retry new visitor
sighting + event on a better frame auto-enroll + event
Design decisions (and the failure they prevent)
| Decision | Prevents |
|---|---|
Per-camera FaceDetector, shared thread-safe encoder |
cv2 input-size race between camera workers |
| HTTP Basic on every route, escaped dashboard output | open biometric API on the LAN; stored XSS via identity labels |
| Percent-encoded credentials, URL built from parts | @ in password silently breaking the stream (old bug) |
| Track-level identity, sighting cooldown | one user registered per frame (old bug) |
Exact IndexFlatIP on unit vectors, -1 guarded |
inverted L2 threshold + wrong-person metadata[-1] (old bugs) |
| SQLite as source of truth, index rebuilt at boot | index/metadata drift, untrained-IVF crash (old bugs) |
| Three-zone thresholds with ambiguous no-op | duplicate identities and wrong merges |
| One color conversion, ArcFace-native normalization | off-distribution embeddings making thresholds meaningless (old bug) |
| All quality terms clamped to [0,1] | unreachable registration threshold (old bug) |
| Readiness-guarded API, sinks off the hot path | startup crashes, notification stalls |
API
| Method | Path | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| GET | / |
live dashboard |
| GET | /api/health, /api/stats |
liveness / metrics |
| GET | /api/cameras/{id}/stream.mjpeg |
annotated live stream |
| GET | /api/cameras/{id}/frame.jpg |
latest annotated frame |
| GET | /api/identities, /api/sightings, /api/events |
data |
| PATCH | /api/identities/{id} |
rename a visitor ({"label": "Alice"}) |
| DELETE | /api/identities/{id} |
forget a person (embeddings removed) |
Tests
pip install pytest
pytest tests -q
Configuration
Everything lives in config/default.yaml; ${VAR} placeholders resolve
from the environment (.env is loaded first). Thresholds:
recognition.match_threshold(default 0.42): raise for fewer false matches, lower for fewer duplicates.recognition.min_enroll_quality(0.65): how good a face must look (sharpness, size, lighting, frontality) before a new identity is minted.tracking.min_hits_for_id(4): frames a face must persist before we spend an embedding on it — filters passers-by and phantom detections.cameras[].max_width(1280): frames are downscaled at ingest — full 3MP streams waste memory and detector time.
Recognition models
The encoder picks the first usable model in models/:
arcface_int8.onnx → w600k_mbf.onnx (MobileFaceNet, 13 MB, downloaded
automatically) → arcface.onnx (r100, 260 MB, copied from the old project;
needs ~1.5 GB free RAM to load). Pin one with recognition.model_file.
Every stored embedding is tagged with the model that produced it, and only
embeddings from the active model are searched — different encoders'
vectors are numerically incompatible and never mix.