Files
Behavision/API.md
Suriyakumarvijayanayagam 3f9fb33b24 Accounts people can create, and photos on a server with no bucket
A tenant had exactly the users somebody had created with a command on the
server. That is not a missing screen: a shop with an owner and four staff
either shared one password or raised a ticket per person, and a phone app
for the shop floor could not exist while there was one account to sign in
as.

Registration is by invitation, never open signup - the same line already
drawn around creating a company. The code carries the address and the role
and the request carries only a password, so a code that gets forwarded
cannot become somebody else's account, and a staff invitation cannot be
redeemed as an owner. Single use lives in the UPDATE and the account is
created in the same transaction.

Deactivating a member revokes their sessions in that transaction too. An
access token lives twelve hours, so without it "remove their access"
removed it sometime tomorrow. The session list and revoke that go with it
are the benefit of opaque tokens the product had been paying for and never
collecting: nothing could say what was signed in, let alone stop one.

Face images now work on a deployment with no object storage, which was
every local install and every self-hosted site - the arrivals feed said
"not storing customer photos" for every customer forever, on the screen
whose whole job is to show a face. Bounded to one row per visitor, so it
grows with the customer base and not with footfall; the bucket stays
primary wherever one exists.

Image.auth says whether a URL needs the session, because a browser img
cannot load one that does, a mobile image view can, and a webview can do
neither - the desktop client resolves those to a data URI in Go.

Found by running it, not by tests:

  * UPDATE ... RETURNING gives the value AFTER the update, so the prune
    read back empty keys, deleted nothing, and the table grew with
    footfall exactly as if it were not there. The fake agreed with either
    version; only the live Postgres test caught it.
  * Trusting only the auth flag broke every shop card, because Sites.jsx
    rebuilt a partial snapshot object and dropped it. A relative URL is
    now sufficient on its own.
  * ago() renders a future time as "just now", so a code valid for a week
    read "expires just now".

Verified live against real Postgres: invite, preview, escalation refused,
register into a session, replay 404, staff forbidden, device revoked and
401 at once, last owner refused, and a 92,405-byte camera JPEG stored,
served to its owner, 401 with no session, 404 to another tenant, and
rendered in a browser.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HViLj9gYNRtSr7YVZmW5sn
2026-09-05 11:45:42 +05:30

12 KiB

Behavision API — for the web console and a mobile app

Base URL: https://platform.loyaly.ai (locally http://127.0.0.1:8088). Everything is JSON unless stated. All times are RFC 3339 UTC unless a field says otherwise.

There is one API, not a web one and a mobile one. The web console in this repository uses exactly these calls; anything it can do, an app can do.


1. Signing in

POST /api/auth/login

{ "email": "priya@tenext.in", "password": "…", "device": "Pixel 8" }
{
  "access_token":  "…",
  "refresh_token": "…",
  "expires_at":    "2026-09-05T18:00:00Z",
  "user": { "id": "…", "email": "…", "full_name": "Priya R",
            "role": "staff", "client_id": "…", "client_name": "TeNext Retail" }
}

Send Authorization: Bearer <access_token> on every other call.

device is worth sending. It is the only thing that lets somebody look at their list of signed-in devices and tell which one to sign out. Keep it coarse and human — "Pixel 8", "Shop till" — never a device identifier; a fingerprint here is a tracking signal nobody asked for.

Failures:

status error what it means
401 bad_credentials Wrong password or no such account. Deliberately the same answer: telling them apart turns this form into a way to find out who works at a customer. Show the server's message.
429 too_many_attempts 10 failures per account / 60 per IP in 15 minutes. Cleared by a success.

POST /api/auth/refresh

{ "refresh_token": "…", "device": "Pixel 8" }

Returns the same shape. Both tokens rotate — the old refresh token stops working the instant the new one is issued, so a copy taken off a resold device cannot keep working alongside the real one.

Three rules a client must follow, and all three have already been the cause of a bug in this codebase:

  1. An expired access token returns 401 with "error": "token_expired", distinct from a real 401. Refresh once and retry, silently — otherwise staff are thrown back to a login form twice a day.
  2. Serialise refresh behind one lock. The refresh token is single use, so four screens polling at once would each spend it and three would lose, logging the user out at random.
  3. Persist the rotated tokens before doing anything else. A client that refreshes and is then killed comes back holding a token the server has already invalidated — indistinguishable from a normal expiry, at the worst possible moment.

Marshal the request body before the first attempt: a retry has to send it again, and a stream is spent after the first read.

POST /api/auth/logout · GET /api/auth/me

Logout revokes the calling session. me returns the user object above.


2. Joining — how somebody gets an account

There is no open registration, by design. A manager or owner mints a code and hands it over; the holder chooses their own password.

POST /api/team/invitations — manager or owner

{ "email": "arjun@tenext.in", "full_name": "Arjun", "role": "manager",
  "expires_in_days": 7 }
{ "id": "…", "email": "arjun@tenext.in", "role": "manager",
  "code": "LQOUHR-AYYTPE-7Q756N-PGAAN6",
  "expires_at": "…", "created_at": "…" }

code is returned exactly once and is not recoverable. Only a hash is stored. Show it immediately; do not expect to read it back.

role is staff, manager or owner. Only an owner may mint an owner. admin is not accepted at all.

GET /api/auth/invitation?code=… — no auth

{ "client_name": "TeNext Retail", "email": "arjun@tenext.in",
  "full_name": "Arjun", "role": "manager" }

Call this before asking anyone to choose a password, so the screen can say what they are joining and a mistyped code is caught early. Unknown, expired, spent and withdrawn all return 404 invalid_code with one message.

POST /api/auth/register — no auth

{ "code": "LQOUHR-AYYTPE-7Q756N-PGAAN6",
  "full_name": "Arjun", "password": "…", "device": "Pixel 8" }

Returns 201 and a full session — the same shape as login. Sign the person straight in; do not send them to a login form.

Do not send email or role. They come from the invitation, and the request is rejected outright if it names either. That is what stops a forwarded code becoming somebody else's account, or a staff invitation being redeemed as an owner.

Dashes and case in the code are ignored. A rejected attempt (short password, wrong code) does not spend the invitation.

status error
400 password under 8 characters, or a body naming email/role
404 invalid_code
409 conflict — that address already has an account; sign in instead

GET / DELETE /api/team/invitations[/{id}] — manager or owner

List what is still pending, or withdraw one before it is used.


3. Devices

GET /api/auth/sessions this account's signed-in devices
DELETE /api/auth/sessions/{id} sign one out, immediately
POST /api/auth/sessions/revoke-others sign out everywhere else
[{ "id": "…", "device": "Pixel 8", "created_at": "…",
   "last_used_at": "…", "expires_at": "…", "current": true }]

current marks the session making the request — label it, and warn before somebody signs out the device in their hand. revoke-others deliberately keeps the caller's own session.

A person can revoke only their own sessions. To remove a colleague's access, deactivate them (below); that revokes every session they hold.


4. The team

GET /api/team everybody in this company
PATCH /api/team/{id} {"role": "manager"} and/or {"active": false}

Deactivating signs that person out immediately and stops them signing back in. Reactivating restores the account but not their old sessions.

409 last_owner if the change would leave the company with no active owner.


5. Who just walked in — the screen a mobile app is for

GET /api/visits

?limit=50&cursor=…&site_id=…

{
  "arrivals": [{
    "visit_id": "…", "seq": 412,
    "occurred_at": "2026-09-05T06:01:45Z",
    "site_id": "…", "site": "TeNext Chennai", "camera_id": "Office1",
    "visitor_id": "…", "label": "Priya",
    "is_new_visitor": false, "similarity": 0.71, "quality": 0.66,
    "attributes": { "gender": "Male", "age": 32, "emotion": "neutral" },
    "image": { "available": true,
               "url": "/api/faces/8e7d3d7a-….jpg", "auth": true }
  }],
  "cursor": "djE6NDEy",
  "polled_at": "…"
}

Echo cursor back on every poll. It is opaque and it is the only thing that makes the feed lossless: a burst larger than limit leaves rows behind, and polling by timestamp alone would skip them permanently. Rows are ascending, so the last row's position is your new cursor — which the response already gives you. A cursor that fails to parse means the format changed; drop it and poll again without one.

An empty poll returns your own cursor back, not an empty string.

GET /api/visits/stream — server-sent events

The same rows, pushed. Send Authorization (so EventSource will not do — read the stream with an HTTP client) and resume with Last-Event-ID or ?cursor=. Falls back to polling cleanly; the failure mode is latency, never silence.


6. Photos

A missing photo is data, not an error. Images are off by default across the whole product, so on most deployments every arrival legitimately has none. Show initials or a placeholder — a screen of red for a system working as configured is a screen whose real errors get ignored.

"image": { "available": false,
           "reason": "This system is not storing customer photos." }

When a photo is available there are two kinds of URL, and the auth flag is how you tell them apart. Do not infer it from the shape of the URL.

auth how to load it
presigned object-storage link absent/false use it directly; it carries its own signature and expires in expires_in seconds
served by this API true send Authorization: Bearer …
  • Mobile: an image view can attach the header — Image source={{ uri, headers: { Authorization: 'Bearer …' } }}.
  • Web: an <img> cannot. Fetch it and use an object URL (URL.createObjectURL), and revoke it on unmount — a screen left open all afternoon otherwise holds hundreds of copies of the same photograph.

Prefix a relative URL with the base URL. Treat any relative URL as needing auth whether or not the flag is set: there is no public one.

GET /api/visitors/{id}/image

The same image object for one customer's latest photo. 404 no_image (nothing captured) or 404 images_disabled (this deployment stores none) — two different absences, because a shop can act on one and not the other.

Every hand-out of a photo link is written to the audit log. Fetch it once per screen, not once per component: two components asking for the same face put two rows in "who looked at my customers" for one glance at one person.


7. Customers

GET /api/visitors?q=… search by name or phone
GET /api/visitors/{id}/history their past visits
PUT /api/visitors/{id}/profile name, phone, notes — staff and above
DELETE /api/visitors/{id} erasure — manager and above
POST /api/purchases link a sale to a visit

Erasure destroys the face template and the photo outright and keeps the visit rows, unlinked. It is irreversible. If the photo cannot be deleted the whole request fails with 502 and nothing is erased — so an error there means the data is still there, and must be reported as a failure, never swallowed.


8. Shops, cameras, reports

GET /api/sites estate health: online, cameras up, fraction_below_gate
GET /api/sites/{id}/check five-step smoke test for one shop
GET /api/cameras cameras and their latest still
GET /api/cameras/{id}/live live view relayed from the shop PC (SSE)
GET /api/reports/footfall ?from=&to=&site=&tz=&bucket=
GET /api/reports/conversion same parameters; revenue and basket size

The site parameter is spelled differently here. Reports take site; the arrivals feed takes site_id. That is a wart, not a rule — but an unknown query parameter is silently ignored, so getting it wrong returns the whole estate rather than an error.

Dates are YYYY-MM-DD. to is inclusive: "1st to the 7th" includes the 7th.

Two arithmetic traps the API is explicit about, so a client does not reinvent them wrongly:

  • total is unique people over the window; the chart does not sum to it. Somebody who came Monday and Thursday is one person and two bucket-visitors. Show the server's total, with visits underneath.
  • new + returning can be less than the total. A site sending counts without templates records real footfall by an unidentified person, which belongs to neither.

Report buckets are local wall time with no offset, labelled by timezone. Do not parse them as a Date — the viewer's own zone would shift every label.


9. Errors

{ "error": "invalid_code", "message": "That invitation code is not valid. Ask for a new one." }

message is written to be shown to a person; prefer it over inventing your own. error is the stable code to branch on — never match on the prose, which is rewritten freely.

status meaning
400 the request was wrong; message says how
401 not signed in, or token_expired → refresh once and retry
403 signed in, but this role may not
404 not found — also what another tenant's data returns, always
409 a conflict message explains (last_owner, duplicate address)
429 throttled
501 the feature is off for this deployment, not an error
502 a downstream failure; for erasure it means nothing was deleted

Roles, in increasing order: staff → manager → owner. A platform admin has role: "admin" and an empty client_id — the two together, never the role alone.