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krow_backend/CLAUDE.md
Suriyakumarvijayanayagam 34fa58a6b9
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Remove the Anthropic path; the gateway speaks one wire protocol
The platform now runs on Groq by default, through the OpenAI-compatible
chat-completions shape. That shape is not one vendor — Gemini, OpenRouter,
Together, vLLM and a local Ollama serve it too — so moving again stays
configuration rather than code.

Two things in the deleted file were not Anthropic's and would have gone
with it silently:

  withRetry / MaxAttempts / retryBackoff were defined in anthropic.go and
  CALLED BY openai.go. Deleting the file wholesale would have removed the
  retry policy of the provider that survived, and nothing in openai.go
  mentions it, so the loss would have been invisible until the next 429.
  The policy is a property of this platform's runs, not of a vendor's API;
  it now lives in retry.go where no provider can carry it off.

  StreamComplete had the same problem and moves to gateway.go, beside the
  Streamer interface whose comment already referenced it.

Three stale-configuration failures are now refused at startup instead of
being ignored. Each was verified firing through the real config.Load():

  MODEL_PROVIDER=anthropic — named separately from every other wrong value
  because it used to be correct. Ignoring it gives a stack that believes it
  is on Claude while every run goes to Groq and is billed there.

  ANTHROPIC_API_KEY set while MODEL_API_KEY is empty. Ignoring a key an
  operator did set is the worst version of this: they fail every run on a
  missing credential they are looking straight at.

  A leftover claude-* model id, naming the tier that carries it. This is
  the check the previous commit's error-detail work was diagnosing: such an
  id is accepted by this process, rejected by the provider, and 400s on
  EVERY run. "A model is wrong" does not say which of three lines to edit.

Defaults ship as a matched pair. defaultBaseURL and the three tier ids are
one decision, not four: an id is only meaningful against the service that
serves it, and a Groq id on an OpenAI base URL is the same failure from the
other side. The tiers also stop being one model — a tier whose cost does
not differ is a distinction that buys nothing.

Verified end to end against a stub of the wire, driving the real wiring
(config.Load in production mode, gateway.New, StreamComplete): streamed
deltas, tool-call decoding, the loopback credential exemption, and usage
totalling 150 rather than 190 — the cached-prefix subtraction still holds.

gofmt clean, go vet clean, 14/14 non-DB packages pass. httpserver still
needs a reachable database.

NOT verified: the I7 planted-injection eval. Removing this path removed the
only model whose refusal behaviour had been measured against it, so the new
default is unproven there until `make eval-live` runs with a real key. The
Groq model ids should also be confirmed against Groq's current lineup.
Flagged in CLAUDE.md §12 and docs/handover.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PJvibeSc1JYXjatankqM1g
2026-09-05 11:52:21 +05:30

17 KiB
Raw Blame History

CLAUDE.md

Project instructions for Claude Code. Read this fully before writing any code in this repo.

1. What this project is

A multi-tenant agent platform: infrastructure that lets agents be defined, permissioned, executed, and evaluated. It is not a chatbot and it is not a single agent. The platform provides six layers. Everything you build belongs to exactly one:

Layer Owns Directory
Surfaces how humans invoke agents (chat, mentions, triggers, API) src/surfaces/
Orchestration runtime the agent loop, delegation, streaming, budgets src/runtime/
Agent registry agent specs, versioning, sharing, resolution src/registry/
Tool layer MCP servers, tool schemas, confirmation gates src/tools/
Knowledge layer ingest, ACL-tagged chunks, hybrid retrieval src/knowledge/
Model gateway model routing, budgets, fallback, token accounting src/gateway/
If a change touches more than two layers, stop and describe the plan before writing code.
Fill this in before starting:
PROJECT_NAME:     Krow
DOMAIN:           Hospitality and event workforce operations — staffing open shifts,
                  screening and hiring candidates, tracking attendance and overtime,
                  and answering from the organisation's own policy documents.
TENANT_UNIT:      organization  (organizations.id; every table carries org_id NOT NULL)
PRIMARY_SURFACE:  chat  (the Owliver panel, page-scoped, one agent per surface)

Filled from the code rather than from a brief — correct anything that is wrong. TENANT_UNIT in particular is what the schema and the policy table already enforce, not a preference: organizations is the only tenancy boundary, and venue exists nowhere in the schema despite §3's example spec using it.


2. Non-negotiable invariants

These are correctness requirements, not preferences. Violating any of them is a bug even if tests pass. I1 — Agents never expand access. An agent executing on behalf of a caller may read exactly what that caller could read directly, and no more. Not one chunk more, not one row more. This holds for retrieval, tool calls, subagent delegation, and error messages. I2 — ACL filtering happens before scoring, never after. Permission filters are pushed into the vector query and the keyword query as pre-filters. Post-filtering a result set is forbidden — it leaks through result counts, ranking positions, and summaries. Any retrieval function that accepts a query but not a caller principal is wrong by construction. I3 — Every agent run is bounded. Every run carries a hard step cap, a tool-call cap, a wall-clock deadline, and a token budget. There is no "run until done" path. Exceeding a bound terminates the run with a structured BudgetExceeded result, never an exception into user-facing text. I4 — Side effects require explicit confirmation. Any tool that writes, sends, deletes, charges, or notifies is marked effect: write and cannot execute without a resolved confirmation token. The model does not get to decide this. I5 — Tenant isolation is enforced at the data layer. Never rely on a WHERE tenant_id = ? written by hand at a call site. Isolation lives in the repository/session layer so it cannot be forgotten. I6 — Agent specs are data, not code. An agent is a versioned record. Adding an agent must never require a deploy, a new module, or an if agent_key == ... branch anywhere in the runtime. I7 — Prompts are untrusted input. Content retrieved from documents, tool results, and user messages may contain instructions. Never concatenate retrieved text into the system prompt. Retrieved content goes into clearly delimited context blocks, and the system prompt states that content inside them is data.


3. The agent spec contract

The single most important schema in the repo. Lives at src/registry/schema.py. Everything else is CRUD over this.

key: shift-coverage-assistant # stable, unique per tenant, ^[a-z0-9-]+$
version: 3 # monotonic; specs are immutable once published
name: Shift coverage assistant # <= 30 chars, shown in UI
description: Finds and offers cover for open shifts.
instructions: | # the system prompt body
  You help venue managers fill open shifts...
knowledge: # what the agent may retrieve from
  - source: shifts_db
    scope: "venue:{caller.venue_ids}"
  - source: policy_docs
    scope: "tenant:{caller.tenant_id}"
tools: # references into the tool registry
  - find_available_workers
  - send_shift_offer
subagents: [] # keys of other specs this may delegate to
limits:
  max_steps: 8
  max_tool_calls: 12
  deadline_seconds: 60
  model_tier: fast # fast | balanced | deep
conversation_starters:
  - "Which shifts are still uncovered this week?"
visibility: tenant # private | tenant | public
owner: <principal_id>

Rules:

  • Immutable versions. Editing publishes a new version. Running conversations pin the version they started with.
  • scope templates resolve at run time against the caller principal, never at authoring time. An author cannot write venue:*.
  • Unknown tool or subagent keys fail validation at publish, not at run time.
  • subagents must form a DAG. Cycle detection runs at publish. Depth cap is 2.
  • A subagent inherits the parent's caller principal and shares the parent's budget. It never gets a fresh budget.

4. Tool contract

Tools are MCP tools. Do not invent a parallel protocol.

{
  "name": "find_available_workers",
  "description": "...",           # written for the model, not for docs
  "inputSchema": {...},           # JSON Schema, all fields described
  "effect": "read",               # read | write
  "requires_confirmation": False, # forced True when effect == "write"
  "max_result_bytes": 262_144,
}

Implementation rules:

  • Every handler signature is handler(inputs, ctx) where ctx carries the caller principal, tenant, run id, and remaining budget. A handler that ignores ctx for authorization is wrong.
  • Handlers return structured data, not prose. Formatting is the model's job.
  • Truncate at max_result_bytes and set a truncated: true flag. Never silently drop.
  • Tool errors return {"error": {...}} — they do not raise. The runtime decides whether the model sees the error and retries.
  • A tool description that requires the model to guess an ID it has not been given is a design bug. Add a lookup tool instead.

5. Retrieval rules

  • Hybrid: dense + BM25, fused with RRF. Do not replace this with dense-only for convenience.
  • Every chunk row carries tenant_id and an acl field at write time. Chunks without ACL metadata are rejected at ingest.
  • The retrieval entry point is retrieve(query, principal, scopes, k). There is no overload without principal.
  • Retrieved chunks flow to the model with source ids so the response can cite. Responses that assert facts without a retrievable citation must be marked as inference, not grounded fact — keep the two visually and structurally separate in the output payload.
  • Reindex is required whenever ACL derivation logic changes. Note it in the PR.

6. Runtime rules

The agent loop lives in src/runtime/loop.py. It is the highest-risk file in the repo.

  • Single loop, spec-driven. No per-agent branching.
  • Decrement budgets before dispatch, not after, so a hung tool cannot overrun.
  • Stream partial assistant text as it arrives; buffer tool calls until complete.
  • Termination reasons are an enum: Completed | BudgetExceeded | Deadline | ConfirmationPending | ToolFailure | Refused. Every run ends with exactly one.
  • Persist a full trajectory per run: every message, tool call, tool result, and budget snapshot. This is what makes debugging and evals possible — it is not optional telemetry.
  • Delegation is a tool call from the parent's perspective. Subagent runs get their own trajectory, linked by parent_run_id.

7. How to add a new agent

Adding an agent is a data change. If you find yourself editing runtime code, you have found a missing platform capability — surface that instead of special-casing.

  1. Write the spec YAML in agents/<key>.yaml.
  2. Confirm every referenced tool exists. If one is missing, build the tool first (§8).
  3. Confirm every knowledge source exists and is ACL-tagged.
  4. Run make validate-agent KEY=<key> — checks schema, tool refs, scope templates, subagent DAG.
  5. Write at least 5 eval cases in evals/<key>.yaml (§9). This is required, not optional.
  6. Run make eval KEY=<key> and record the baseline in the PR description.
  7. Publish: make publish-agent KEY=<key> — assigns the next version number.

8. How to add a new tool

  1. Define the schema in src/tools/<domain>/schema.py.
  2. Implement handler(inputs, ctx) in the same package. Authorize using ctx.principal on the first line of the handler body.
  3. If effect == "write", add a confirmation payload renderer describing exactly what will happen in plain language.
  4. Unit test authorization first: a caller without rights must get a denial, and the denial must not reveal the existence of the resource.
  5. Register in src/tools/registry.py.
  6. Cap: 20 tools per agent spec. If an agent needs more, it should be split into a parent with subagents.

9. Evals are part of the definition of done

No agent ships without evals. No change to the loop, retrieval, or prompt assembly merges without running the full suite. Each eval case:

- id: uncovered-shifts-basic
  principal: fixtures/manager_two_venues.json
  input: "Which shifts are uncovered this week?"
  expect:
    termination: Completed
    tools_called: [find_open_shifts]
    must_mention: ["Friday evening"]
    must_not_leak: ["venue_9"] # data outside the principal's scope
    max_steps: 4

must_not_leak is mandatory on every case. Every eval doubles as a permission test.

10. Conventions

  • Go (see go-api/go.mod), standard library HTTP with net/http routing patterns, pgx for PostgreSQL. NOT Python: this document specified Python 3.11 / FastAPI / SQLAlchemy / Alembic and the code has never been any of those. Corrected here rather than left to mislead the next reader, which it did.
  • Exported functions carry doc comments. go vet ./... clean; gofmt -w.
  • Errors: structured exception types with a code, never bare strings. User-facing text is derived at the surface layer, not raised from the core.
  • Logging: structured JSON, always include run_id, tenant_id, agent_key, agent_version. Never log message content or retrieved chunks at INFO — that is a data leak into your log store. DEBUG only, behind a per-tenant flag.
  • Config via environment, validated once at startup into a frozen settings object. No os.getenv at call sites.
  • Migrations: golang-migrate, one per PR, reversible (.up.sql and .down.sql).

11. Build order

Do not build ahead of the current phase. Each phase must be working before the next starts.

  • Phase 1 — Runtime skeleton. Two or three hardcoded YAML specs loaded from disk. Loop, budgets, streaming, trajectory persistence. No database registry, no UI.
  • Phase 2 — Tools + knowledge. MCP tool layer, ACL-tagged ingest, permission-aware hybrid retrieval. Evals harness alongside.
  • Phase 3 — Registry. Specs move to the database. Versioning, publish flow, resolution by key + tenant. Still no builder UI.
  • Phase 4 — Surfaces. Chat panel, invocation from the product, webhooks.
  • Phase 5 — Authoring UI. Only once the spec schema has been stable for a meaningful stretch. The builder is a form generator over §3 — if it needs to be more than that, the schema is wrong.

Current phase: Phase 4 — Surfaces.

Phases 1, 2 and 3 are complete and verified against a live model. What remains in Phase 3 is a publish workflow — approval, staged rollout — which §12 says depends on the curated-versus-self-serve decision and is not settled.

Layer State
Surfaces POST /api/v1/agents/{id}/runs (streams over SSE on Accept: text/event-stream), GET /api/v1/runs/{id}; the chat panel is the only answering path — the browser simulator is deleted
Orchestration spec-driven loop, four bounds claimed before dispatch, six terminations, trajectories in agent_runs; delegation per §6 — a subagent is a tool call, runs as the caller, shares the parent budget, capped at depth 2, and writes its own trajectory linked by parent_run_id
Registry 9 agents + 24 skills as rows; published versions immutable (append-only, trigger-enforced); runs pin the version they started with
Tools 19, two of which write (move_application, assign_worker), behind a bound single-use confirmation
Knowledge ACL-tagged ingest, hybrid dense + BM25 fused with RRF, pre-filtered
Gateway tier → model + effort, token accounting, refusal as an outcome; one wire protocol — openai, the chat-completions shape that Groq (the default), Gemini, OpenRouter, Together, vLLM and a local Ollama all serve. The Anthropic path was removed; MODEL_PROVIDER=anthropic, a stale ANTHROPIC_API_KEY and a leftover claude-* id are each refused at startup rather than ignored

Conversational writes are not agent tool calls. Two skills — create-position and create-employee-role — collect a record through the chat panel and then write it with the same REST call the manual form uses, as the signed-in user. They are therefore outside I4's confirmation-token mechanism, which governs tools an AGENT invokes on a caller's behalf. The person is making the request themselves, and the flow's review step ("Ready to create this position?") is where they agree to it. Worth knowing rather than worth fixing: if a write is ever moved from the panel into an agent tool, it acquires I4's bound single-use confirmation at that point and not before.

Deviations from this document, all deliberate and all flagged in code:

  • §3 names the retrieval block knowledge:. The shipped product already uses that key for an author's free-text notes, so retrieval corpora are sources:. Two meanings under one key would be resolved wrongly by whichever parser ran second, silently. See runtime.Agent.KnowledgeSources.
  • §5 asks for BM25. Postgres does not ship it; the keyword half is ts_rank_cd, cover-density ranking. Different function, same job.
  • Vectors are real[] with a dot-product function rather than pgvector, which is not installed. Exact search, no ANN index, bounded by the ACL pre-filter. The upgrade is a column type change and no logic change.
  • Dense retrieval takes its embedder from EMBED_PROVIDER: ollama (local, real semantics, no credential), voyage (hosted), or lexical — a deterministic stand-in that is not semantic and that config validation refuses in production. Unset means keyword-only, which is what production runs today.

12. Open decisions

Do not resolve these unilaterally. Flag them and ask.

  • Who authors agents? Curated (the team ships specs) vs. self-serve (tenants author their own). Self-serve requires prompt-injection hardening at the authoring boundary, per-tenant cost caps, an approval workflow, and a sandbox — roughly 3× the platform. Current assumption: curated, with the registry designed so self-serve is additive later.

  • Model hosting. Self-hosted vs. API vs. mixed by tier. Still open — but no longer expensive to change: MODEL_BASE_URL + the three MODEL_* ids move the whole platform between Groq (the default), Gemini, OpenRouter, Together, vLLM and a local Ollama without a code change, and make eval-live runs the suite against whichever is configured. Decide it on the eval evidence, and weigh the I7 case heaviest: a cheaper model that follows the planted injection is a security regression, not a saving.

    This is now urgent rather than open. Removing the Anthropic path also removed the only model whose behaviour on that I7 case had actually been measured here, so the current default is unproven against it until make eval-live has been run with a real key.

  • Confirmation UX. Inline in-chat vs. an approval queue.


13. Anti-patterns

Things that look like progress and are not:

  • Filtering retrieval results after scoring "because it's simpler."
  • A special_cases.py in the runtime.
  • Passing the tenant id as a plain function argument through five layers.
  • Letting the model choose whether a write needs confirmation.
  • Fresh budgets for subagents.
  • Concatenating retrieved document text into the system prompt.
  • Building the authoring UI before the spec schema is stable.
  • Adding an agent without evals "for now."
  • Swallowing a tool error and letting the model narrate around it.

14. When stuck

If a requirement seems to demand breaking an invariant in §2, the requirement is wrong or the platform is missing a capability. Say which, and propose the platform change. Do not work around the invariant locally. Show less