c8a9b5d797
- POST /customer/reset-pin was unauthenticated and overwrote a customer's PIN
given only their phone number — which is the login identifier, not a secret —
so reset-pin followed by verify-pin took over any customer account. Exactly
the miler flaw fixed in fd7cf3e, on the B2C side. It now requires the account's
registered email to have been verified through the existing
send-email-otp/verify-email-otp flow; the verification is recorded in Redis
for 10 minutes and consumed on use, so one verification authorises one reset.
Accounts with no email on file are directed to support rather than left open.
- GET /customer/bookings/:id/price had no ownership check, unlike every other
customer booking route, so any signed-in customer could read the price quoted
on anyone else's booking by walking the id.
- GET /miler/consignments/userlogs/:userid took the rider from the URL and never
compared it to the caller, letting any miler read another miler's movement
history.
Verified as already correct while sweeping: miler assignment and booking-flow
handlers all scope by mileruserid/assignedmileruserid, customer booking detail
and cancel scope by appcustomerid, /internal sits behind InternalKeyAuth, and
CreateHubStaffAccount already refuses non-Doormile staff.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
20 KiB
20 KiB