The role split was right; only its source was wrong. Signing in matched what
was typed against two constants compiled into the app — admin@nearle.in and
cashier@nearle.in — so which shell a person got was a property of the *build*.
A shop could not add a third person, revoke either of the two it had, or stop
anyone with the APK reading both passwords out of it.
TerminalLogin survives unchanged in shape, because the shape was the good part:
one flag the shell reads, a session that decides it, and a cashier sign-out that
takes the catalogue with it while a supervisor's leaves it behind. Every
consumer — visibleModulesProvider, resolvedModuleProvider, the sidebar, the page
header, the sign-out dialog — is untouched. What changed is that the enum is now
only constructible from a session the back office signed, so there is no path
left where the terminal grants itself a permission the server did not send.
It reads `can_manage_staff` rather than the role name or id. app_roles holds six
rows for four distinct roles, a great many accounts carry a roleid that is not
in the table at all, and the name comes back blank for most of them. Matching on
either would mean shipping a copy of the role table in the app and keeping the
two in step for ever. One boolean, decided server-side, cannot drift. It
defaults to false, which matters on the restore path: a session saved by a build
that predates the field comes back as a cashier, never silently as an admin.
This also restores the sign-in layer itself — pos_auth_api, pos_session,
session_store, the staff import and the bearer token — which an earlier commit
removed wholesale from a stale checkout. Its parent was the commit that added
them, so the deletion was a bad merge rather than a decision; the terminal has
been running on the two constants since.
The login screen loses its role tabs and its credential prefill. You do not
choose what you are on the way in.
The opener is now matched on the back office user id rather than on the first
account with a matching role, so the first bill of a shift is attributed to
whoever actually signed in.
Tests: the smoke suite pinned only the supervisor shell, and it was passing for
the wrong reason — the fake session omitted can_manage_staff, and the sidebar it
asserted on was there because the role was hardcoded. Both halves are pinned now
and the fake is parameterised. widget_test.dart was the stock Flutter counter
template, restored by the same bad merge, testing a MyApp that has never existed
in this repo.
292 tests pass; analyzer reports no errors and no warnings.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Suriya/4821, Divya/5093, Rahul/6274 were compiled into the app — the same three
logins on every install, readable by anyone with the APK, and unreplaceable.
Sign-in now imports the outlet's real staff and deactivates everything it
didn't import, so the built-in PINs stop working the moment a shop has anyone
recorded. That deactivation is the point: merging would have left the hardcoded
logins alive alongside the real ones for ever.
The seeds stay, and that is not a hedge. Only 116 of 596 accounts on the
platform have a PIN set, and outlet 1135 — the one this build ships pointed at
— has none at all. Deleting them would hand 33 of 34 tenants a till nobody can
sign in to. So: back office first, local database once synced, seeds only when
there is nothing else.
Rows are keyed on the back office user id, so a re-sync updates one account
rather than creating a second. A leaver removed upstream loses the till on the
next sign-in. Accounts are deactivated rather than deleted, because bills carry
the cashier's name and shifts settle against it.
An import that writes nobody is treated exactly like an empty answer — a back
office full of `pin = 0` rows must not deactivate the seeds and strand the
counter. That is a real shape in the data, not a hypothetical.
An imported PIN is not flagged for change; the shop already chose it. The flag
belongs to the seeds, which everyone shares.
Role names are mapped by name and fall back to cashier. `app_roles` holds six
rows for four roles — Admin and Manager appear twice each — and most accounts
carry a roleid absent from the table entirely, so an unrecognised role must not
quietly become an admin.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three StaffUser constants carried plaintext PINs (1234/2345/3456) in
auth_controller.dart. Every build shipped every till's credentials, readable
by anyone who unzipped the APK. Across 100 deployed devices that is one
credential, not a hundred.
- Schema v5 adds a staff table. Only a PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 hash and a per-user
random salt are stored; the PIN itself exists nowhere, including there.
12,000 iterations, tuned so one sign-in is imperceptible while working
through all 10,000 four-digit PINs against a stolen database takes ~15
minutes per account instead of milliseconds.
- Verification is constant-time. String == returns at the first differing
byte, and that timing leaks how much of a guess was right.
- StaffUser no longer has a pin field at all, so the credential cannot drift
back into memory, into widgets, or into a const declaration.
- Weak PINs are refused: under four digits, non-numeric, repeated digits, and
sequences. Two staff cannot share a PIN — the till identifies a cashier by
PIN alone, so a shared one would attribute bills to whichever row was
checked first.
- The last admin cannot be demoted or deactivated. A till with no admin cannot
be administered, including to appoint one, and recovering means editing the
database by hand.
- Staff are deactivated, never deleted, so bills already rung keep naming a
real person.
Seed accounts are now 4821/5093/6274 rather than 1234/2345/3456 — the weak-PIN
rule refuses the old ones, and a default the rule itself would reject is not a
defensible default. All three are flagged must-change-pin so they get a shop
trading on day one without becoming permanent.
Store details are now editable data, not compile-time constants. Name,
address, GSTIN and phone persist to the database and are read back rather than
falling through to the build's constants, which would silently undo a failed
save. GSTIN is format-validated including the state code — it prints on every
invoice as a legal requirement, so a typo is a compliance problem across
hundreds of bills before anyone notices.
Tests: 141 -> 160. Includes a test that reads every column of every staff row
and asserts no seed PIN appears anywhere in the database.
Migration test now asserts v5 and that an upgraded terminal comes up with the
staff table present but empty — seeding is the store's job on first open, so
an existing shop is never handed accounts it did not create.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
