/**
 * Sign-in and session persistence.
 *
 * The session is the user record plus, now, a signed token. Until Fiesta grew
 * `middleware.WebAuth` there was no token to hold: login returned the record and
 * nothing else, the console asserted its own `tenantid` on every request, and
 * the server believed it. The record is still what the app renders from; the
 * token is the only part the server will not take our word for.
 *
 * Kept in sessionStorage rather than localStorage: a shared back-office machine
 * should not stay signed in after the browser closes. That also means the tab
 * closing is what normally ends a session — the token's own expiry is a
 * backstop for a tab left open, not the mechanism.
 *
 * The storage key lives in `./token`, which the HTTP client also reads. It has
 * to sit under both: this file calls the API to sign in, and the client needs
 * the token to make that call authorised, so neither can import the other.
 */

import { api, WEB } from '@/api/client';
import type { FiestaUser } from '@/api/types';
import { toSessionUser, type SessionUser } from './roles';
import { SESSION_STORAGE_KEY } from './token';

/** Thrown when the account exists but has never had a password set. */
export class PasswordSetupRequiredError extends Error {
  readonly userid: number;
  constructor(userid: number) {
    super('This account needs a password before it can sign in.');
    this.name = 'PasswordSetupRequiredError';
    this.userid = userid;
  }
}

interface LoginBody {
  authname: string;
  password: string;
  /**
   * Not optional in practice.
   *
   * The lookup behind every login is `WHERE authname = ? AND configid = ?`
   * (`userRepository.go:218`). Omitted, Go receives 0, the query matches no
   * row, and every account on the platform answers "Invalid Email". The console
   * surface is configid 1 — `createtenantuser` hard-codes it into the account it
   * spawns for exactly this reason.
   */
  configid: number;
}

/** The console's surface. Every account this app can sign in carries it. */
const CONFIG_ID = 1;

/**
 * Signs in.
 *
 * `applogin`, not `tenant/weblogin`. The latter carries a check the former does
 * not — `request.roleid == app_users.roleid` (`userService.go:224`) — and since
 * Go's zero value is 0, a request without a roleid means "roleid must be 0".
 * That is the branch-user role, so weblogin silently locked out every Store
 * Admin and every platform operator with a 403 reading "Unauthorized email".
 *
 * The handler answers HTTP 200 with `status: false` for most failures, so the
 * envelope is inspected rather than the HTTP status.
 */
export async function login(email: string, password: string): Promise<SessionUser> {
  const body: LoginBody = { authname: email.trim(), password, configid: CONFIG_ID };

  const envelope = await api.envelope<FiestaUser & { setup?: boolean; userid?: number }>(
    `${WEB}/users/applogin`,
    { method: 'POST', body },
  );

  // A brand-new account — `createtenantlocation` spawns branch logins with an
  // empty password — answers `status: true` with a 409 and the userid to set
  // one against. It is not a failure, it is the first step.
  if (envelope.code === 409 && envelope.details?.setup === true) {
    throw new PasswordSetupRequiredError(envelope.details.userid ?? 0);
  }

  if (envelope.status !== true || !envelope.details) {
    throw new Error(loginMessage(envelope.code, envelope.message));
  }

  // The token rides on the envelope, not on `details` — it is not a fact about
  // the user, it is what proves a later request is theirs.
  //
  // Refused when absent, rather than stored and hoped for. `attachWebSession`
  // on the server logs a minting failure and returns the user record anyway,
  // which was correct while WEB_AUTH_REQUIRED was off and is a broken console
  // now that it defaults on: the sign-in succeeds, the shell renders, and every
  // request after it goes out with no `authorization` header and comes back
  // 401 with nothing on screen to say why.
  //
  // Failing here names the problem at the moment it happens, to the person best
  // placed to report it, instead of scattering 401s across every page.
  if (!envelope.token) {
    throw new Error(
      'Signed in, but the server did not issue a session. Nothing would load — ' +
        'tell your administrator the API could not mint a session token.',
    );
  }

  const session = { ...toSessionUser(envelope.details), token: envelope.token };
  persist(session);
  return session;
}

/**
 * What the next step is for this email — before anyone types a password.
 *
 * `'setup'` means the account exists and has never had a password; `'password'`
 * means it has one. Anything else throws with a message worth showing.
 *
 * ── Why probe at all ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 *
 * A tenant created by `createtenantuser`, and every branch created by
 * `createtenantlocation`, is spawned with an EMPTY password. Their owner's
 * first sign-in therefore cannot succeed, and asking them for a password first
 * asks for something that does not exist — they type a guess, watch it fail,
 * and only then are told to invent one. The old console avoids that by checking
 * the email before the password field is ever shown, and it is right to.
 *
 * ── How one endpoint answers two questions ───────────────────────────────────
 *
 * There is no lookup endpoint. This posts to `applogin` with no password at
 * all, which `userService.go:64-123` answers in four distinguishable ways:
 *
 *   409 + status false  → no such account          ("Invalid Email")
 *   403                 → account deactivated
 *   409 + status true   → exists, no password set  (carries the userid)
 *   401 + status true   → exists, has a password   ("Password is required")
 *
 * The last one is the whole trick: a password-less attempt against a real
 * account is refused with a DIFFERENT code than a wrong password, so existence
 * can be established without guessing at one.
 *
 * This does tell an anonymous caller whether an email has an account here. That
 * is a real disclosure and worth naming — but the login already answers
 * "Invalid Email" versus "Incorrect password" to any caller who sends a wrong
 * password, so the probe reveals nothing that was not already available with
 * one more field filled in.
 */
export type AccountCheck = { state: 'password' } | { state: 'setup'; userid: number };

export async function checkAccount(email: string): Promise<AccountCheck> {
  const envelope = await api.envelope<{ setup?: boolean; userid?: number }>(
    `${WEB}/users/applogin`,
    { method: 'POST', body: { authname: email.trim(), configid: CONFIG_ID } },
  );

  if (envelope.code === 409 && envelope.details?.setup === true) {
    return { state: 'setup', userid: envelope.details.userid ?? 0 };
  }
  // "Password is required" — the account is real and has one. Exactly what we
  // wanted to learn, arriving as a refusal.
  if (envelope.code === 401) {
    return { state: 'password' };
  }
  throw new Error(loginMessage(envelope.code, envelope.message));
}

/** The backend's floor, enforced here too so the refusal is instant. */
export const MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH = 6;

/**
 * Sets the password on an account that has never had one.
 *
 * `POST /users/setpassword`, which is public — it has to be. This runs when
 * nobody is signed in and cannot be: the account has no password yet, so there
 * is no way to obtain a session first.
 *
 * It used to call `PUT /users/update`, which doubles as a password write but
 * sits behind the session guard. Once `WEB_AUTH_REQUIRED` began defaulting on,
 * that returned "a session token is required; sign in again" to somebody who
 * could not sign in — sign-in needs a password, and setting the password needed
 * a sign-in. Every branch login created with an empty password was unusable.
 *
 * The server refuses this on any account that already HAS a password, which is
 * what makes leaving it open safe. It is a setup call, never a reset — nothing
 * here verifies an old password, because there is no old password.
 *
 * Passwords are stored in clear on this backend. That is not something the
 * console can fix, and it is the reason this flow exists at all rather than an
 * emailed setup link.
 */
export async function setInitialPassword(userid: number, password: string): Promise<void> {
  if (password.length < MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH) {
    throw new Error(`Use at least ${MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH} characters.`);
  }
  await api.post<unknown>(`${WEB}/users/setpassword`, { userid, password });
}

/**
 * The backend's own words, where they are usable, and ours where they are not.
 *
 * "Invalid Email" is technically true and unhelpful — the same answer covers a
 * typo and a till account, because roleids 7 and 8 are excluded from every web
 * login lookup. A cashier is not refused here, they are not found, so the copy
 * must not say "wrong password".
 */
function loginMessage(code: number | undefined, message: string | undefined): string {
  if (code === 409) {
    return 'We do not recognise that email. Till accounts (supervisor or cashier) sign in at the terminal, not here.';
  }
  if (code === 401) {
    return message?.toLowerCase().includes('required')
      ? 'Enter your password.'
      : 'That password is not right.';
  }
  // 403 covers both an inactive account and an inactive store, and the two
  // messages differ — pass the backend's through rather than flattening them.
  if (code === 403) return message ?? 'This account cannot sign in. Contact your administrator.';
  return message ?? 'Sign-in failed';
}

export function persist(session: SessionUser): void {
  sessionStorage.setItem(SESSION_STORAGE_KEY, JSON.stringify(session));
}

export function restore(): SessionUser | null {
  const raw = sessionStorage.getItem(SESSION_STORAGE_KEY);
  if (!raw) return null;
  try {
    const parsed = JSON.parse(raw) as SessionUser;
    // A stored blob is only as trustworthy as the tab it came from; a shape
    // check keeps a corrupted value from crashing the shell on boot.
    if (typeof parsed?.userid !== 'number' || typeof parsed?.role !== 'string') return null;
    // A session without a token is not a session.
    //
    // This used to be restored happily, and the result was the worst state the
    // console can be in: signed in by every visible measure — name in the
    // corner, nav rendered, pages mounted — and unable to make a single
    // authenticated request, because `authHeader()` had nothing to send. Every
    // call came back 401 and nothing on screen explained why. A PUT to
    // `users/update` on 2026-09-25 went out with no `authorization` header at
    // all, which is what sent us looking.
    //
    // It happens whenever login could not mint one: `attachWebSession` logs the
    // failure and returns the user record anyway, which was right while
    // WEB_AUTH_REQUIRED was off and is a broken console now that it defaults on.
    // A stored session predating the token also lands here.
    //
    // Returning null sends them to the sign-in screen, which is a state people
    // know what to do with.
    if (typeof parsed.token !== 'string' || parsed.token.trim() === '') return null;
    return parsed;
  } catch {
    return null;
  }
}

export function clear(): void {
  sessionStorage.removeItem(SESSION_STORAGE_KEY);
}