Production Login page passcode updates
This commit is contained in:
@@ -63,12 +63,39 @@ class SourceProductOut(BaseModel):
|
||||
# Health
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
class AuthConfigOut(BaseModel):
|
||||
"""
|
||||
The effective auth configuration, reported by /api/health.
|
||||
|
||||
Unauthenticated on purpose. The failure this exists to diagnose is "nobody
|
||||
can sign in", so anything gated behind an admin token is unreachable
|
||||
exactly when it is needed. Nothing here is a secret: the admin username is
|
||||
already the documented one, allow_any_login=true is a fact an operator
|
||||
urgently needs (and an attacker discovers with a single login attempt
|
||||
anyway), and the fingerprint is a truncated hash of a salted digest, not a
|
||||
password. What it buys is a one-command answer to "is this deployment
|
||||
running the config I think it is?" - compare the fingerprint here against
|
||||
the one printed by scripts/make_auth_secrets.py --fingerprint.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
enabled: bool
|
||||
allow_any_login: bool
|
||||
admin_username: str
|
||||
password_hash_valid: bool
|
||||
password_hash_iterations: Optional[int] = None
|
||||
password_hash_fingerprint: str
|
||||
# "process-env" | "env-file" | "default" - which one actually won.
|
||||
admin_username_source: str
|
||||
password_hash_source: str
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class HealthOut(BaseModel):
|
||||
status: str
|
||||
database: bool
|
||||
ollama: bool
|
||||
ollama_model: str
|
||||
embeddings_model: str
|
||||
auth: AuthConfigOut
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user