An admin sets a shop up from a browser; a supervisor adds a cashier at the counter. Both had to be possible, and only the second one was. So the console gets createposuser / updateposuser / getposusers / deleteposuser, under both /v1/web/tenants and /v1/mob/tenants — calling the same service methods `/pos/users` calls. Not a parallel implementation: a supervisor created from a browser is the same row, with the same PIN rules, the same duplicate check and the same identity-column allocation, as one created at a till. Two paths writing one table is precisely how the two stop matching, and this codebase already had that happen once. configid is inferred rather than asked for. It is a number nobody looks up, it varies per tenant — 1087's accounts are spread across 1, 6 and 15 — and getting it wrong creates somebody who cannot sign into the portal their colleagues use and is invisible to half the platform's queries. /posroles is served rather than left to the console to hardcode. A console that knew supervisor was 7 would be wrong the day that changed and would have no way to find out. The outlet is the real difference between the two doors. A terminal proves it with a signed token; the console asserts it, and is checked against the tenant before anything is written. That is weaker, and it is worth being plain about: these mint till credentials on an unauthenticated request, exactly like every other route in the /v1/web and /v1/mob groups, because there is no auth middleware on the web API at all. Documented as the weakest point in the design and flagged to move behind a session guard once the console can hold one. The terminal routes are untouched by it. Proven in a rolled-back transaction against live data: the console creates a supervisor at 1135, that supervisor signs in by PIN with can_manage_staff true, the till's /pos/staff sees them alongside the two created at the counter, and 0451, 1234 and a duplicate PIN are each refused with the same message the terminal gives. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
110 lines
4.8 KiB
Go
110 lines
4.8 KiB
Go
package routes
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import (
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"nearle/facade"
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"nearle/middleware"
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"github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2"
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)
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// Routes for the Nearle POS terminal.
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//
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// The paths are fixed by the till, which appends `/orders`, `/customers` and
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// `/catalogue` to whatever base URL a shop enters in Settings. Set that base to
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// this group — `https://your-host/live/api/v1/pos` — and the three line up.
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//
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// Kept in their own group rather than folded into the order routes because a
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// terminal authenticates as a device, not as a signed-in user, and because
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// these answer with a bare ack rather than the web app's response envelope.
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func RegisterPosRoutes(api fiber.Router, f *facade.Facade) {
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pos := api.Group("/v1/pos")
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// Sign-in, and the only route on this group that runs before the guard —
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// it is where a session comes from. A till posts the same `app_users`
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// credentials the web console takes, and gets back a token plus the outlet
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// that account is entitled to. The store id it will bill under is decided
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// here, from the user's record, instead of being typed into Settings and
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// taken on trust.
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pos.Post("/login", f.PosController.Login)
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// Everything past this point carries the session.
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//
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// The guard verifies the token and refuses a request naming an outlet the
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// token's tenant does not own. Until `POS_AUTH_REQUIRED=true` is set it
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// lets an unauthenticated request through, so the terminals already
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// trading do not stop the day this deploys — see middleware.PosAuth.
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pos.Use(middleware.PosAuth(f.PosService()))
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pos.Get("/session", f.PosController.Session)
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// Who may ring a bill here. Deliberately takes no location parameter — the
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// answer carries PINs, so the outlet comes from the caller's own token.
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pos.Get("/staff", f.PosController.Staff)
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// Signing on by PIN, once a supervisor has opened the terminal with a real
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// password. Sits behind the guard on purpose — see PinLogin.
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pos.Post("/login/pin", f.PosController.PinLogin)
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// The shop's own counter staff. A supervisor creates their cashiers; the
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// outlet is always the caller's own, read from their token.
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pos.Get("/users", f.PosController.ListPosUsers)
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pos.Post("/users", f.PosController.CreatePosUser)
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pos.Put("/users", f.PosController.UpdatePosUser)
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pos.Delete("/users", f.PosController.DeletePosUser)
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pos.Post("/orders", f.PosController.IngestOrders)
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pos.Post("/customers", f.PosController.IngestCustomers)
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pos.Get("/catalogue", f.PosController.Catalogue)
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// The 30-second heartbeat, for tills on the HTTP route. The broker carries
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// the same payload for tills on MQTT; both land in the same Redis record,
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// so the fleet board cannot tell them apart and does not need to.
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pos.Post("/health", f.PosController.IngestHealth)
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// Counter sales, read back out. The ingest above only ever writes; without
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// these a committed bill is unreachable from every screen in the product.
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pos.Get("/sales", f.PosController.GetSales)
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pos.Get("/sales/detail", f.PosController.GetSaleDetail)
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pos.Get("/sales/summary", f.PosController.GetSalesSummary)
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// Terminal presence, read from Redis. What the rider app's POS board and a
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// support call both hit — the tills themselves publish health over the
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// broker rather than posting it here.
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pos.Get("/health/terminal", f.PosController.TerminalHealth)
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pos.Get("/health/location", f.PosController.LocationHealth)
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registerPosStaffConsoleRoutes(api, f)
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}
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// Till staff, managed from the web console rather than from a counter.
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//
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// Under `/web` and `/mob` rather than `/pos`, because the callers are the back
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// office and the daily app — neither holds a terminal session, and putting them
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// behind the terminal guard would lock out the very screen an admin uses to set
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// a shop up in the first place.
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//
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// They run the same service calls as `/pos/users`. A supervisor created here is
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// the same row, with the same rules applied, as one created at a till.
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//
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// The outlet is asserted rather than proved, which is the real difference and
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// the weaker half: a terminal signs its outlet, a console just names one. It is
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// checked against the tenant before anything is written, and these should move
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// behind a session guard as soon as the console can hold one — until then, this
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// mints till credentials on the strength of an unauthenticated request, exactly
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// like every other route in this group.
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func registerPosStaffConsoleRoutes(api fiber.Router, f *facade.Facade) {
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for _, group := range []string{"/v1/web/tenants", "/v1/mob/tenants"} {
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g := api.Group(group)
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// Served rather than hardcoded, so a console offering the choice does
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// not have to know that supervisor is 7.
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g.Get("/posroles", f.PosController.WebPosRoles)
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g.Get("/getposusers", f.PosController.WebListPosUsers)
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g.Post("/createposuser", f.PosController.WebCreatePosUser)
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g.Put("/updateposuser", f.PosController.WebUpdatePosUser)
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g.Delete("/deleteposuser", f.PosController.WebDeletePosUser)
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}
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}
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