f7895d3ccf62359172a3b8cc086d1af3bfea86d3
7 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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Suriya
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9e9401215d |
Give a cashier their own till login, not just a PIN behind a supervisor
A PIN cannot open a closed terminal. The PIN route needs a session that already exists, so a PIN-only account works only while somebody else is standing there to unlock the till first. For a supervisor that was an outright deadlock and was fixed last commit. For a cashier it is subtler and just as wrong: the shop cannot open until two people have arrived, and whoever gets in at seven is as often the cashier as the supervisor. So every till account now gets a username and a password, and the role decides the shell rather than the credential deciding it. A cashier signs in exactly the way a supervisor does and is still held to billing only, because that comes from roleid 8 and not from how they got in. The earlier reasoning — that a second password is one more credential to leak for no capability gained — was measuring the wrong thing. It counted the cost of the credential and not the cost of the shop that cannot open without one. CreatePosUser generates both when the request omits them, so provisioning is one call per person and nobody has to invent a naming scheme. An explicit value always wins. A generated name that collides walks to the next free one, because a second cashier at one counter is ordinary rather than an error; a name the caller supplied is refused instead, because silently signing somebody in as another person's address is worse than a message. Uniqueness is checked against authname and email together, since the insert writes the same value to both and app_users_email_unique would otherwise fail the transaction rather than return something anyone can act on. The password comes back exactly once, in the creation response. Listing till users still reports only has_password, so an admin who loses it reissues rather than looks it up — the right shape even while the column behind it is plaintext. The domain is deliberately unroutable. These are till credentials, never a mailbox, and an address that looks deliverable invites somebody to try sending a reset to it. Verified against live rows by scratch/posseparation, which now checks the cashier path too: cashier.1185@pos.nearle.in opens a closed terminal alone and comes back can_manage_staff=false. All five outlets that stock products have both accounts, each proved by an actual sign-in. Also drops a stray `print(queryBuilder.String())` from GetAllUsers, which was writing the whole SQL statement to stderr on every call. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Suriya
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c0a7fbc1b1 |
Stop the till and Nearle Daily from sharing accounts
app_users is the only thing the two products have in common, and the code was treating it as though it were the whole relationship. Both directions leaked. Back-office roles were leaking into the till. PosRoleCanManageStaff returned true for roleid 1 to 6, on the reasoning that somebody who already administers a shop from a browser is not made less privileged by standing at the counter. That sounds fine and is wrong: measured against live data it handed till-supervisor powers to 68 accounts, 59 of them Nearle Daily Super admins, not one of whom is the administrator of anybody's POS. Meanwhile the actual shop accounts carry roleid 0 and were refused, so the mapping was backwards from intent in both halves at once. Till accounts were leaking into the application. GetStaffs is WHERE tenantid with no role filter, so a Counter Cashier appeared in the tenant staff list beside the delivery riders — a row every action on that page would fail against, since a cashier has no app login, no rider shift and no back-office screen. So: eligibility for a till is now granted explicitly by provisioning a Supervisor or a Cashier, never inherited from a back-office role, and roles 7 and 8 are excluded from every Nearle Daily lookup. The exclusion lives in the queries rather than in a check after them, because a check bolted on afterwards has to be repeated at six call sites and is one edit away from being forgotten at one of them — and that one would be the hole. A till account is not rejected by the app login; it is not found. Two things this surfaced that were not visible before. A Supervisor could not open a till. PIN sign-in needs a session that already exists, so once back-office roles were refused, an outlet whose only POS accounts were PIN-only had no way in at all. Supervisors are now provisioned with a username and password as well as a PIN; cashiers deliberately get neither, because they sign on at a counter somebody has already opened and a second password would be one more credential to leak for no capability gained. UpdatePosUser silently dropped authname. It wrote the password, reported success, and left the account unreachable by either lookup — the failure surfaced at a counter as "not recognised" rather than on the screen that caused it. Contactno had the same gap. Verified against live rows rather than asserted, by scratch/posseparation: a provisioned supervisor signs in and gets the supervisor shell; five real back-office accounts including Super admins are refused; the supervisor is invisible to applogin, tenant weblogin and the password-setup lookup; and no till account appears in getallusers, while asking for role 7 by name still returns them so the console can read its own people. All five outlets that stock products now have a Supervisor and a Cashier. Also moves the loose markdown into docs/, which was already staged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Suriya
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cd2459dbb6 |
Let an admin create till staff from the console, through the same code
An admin sets a shop up from a browser; a supervisor adds a cashier at the counter. Both had to be possible, and only the second one was. So the console gets createposuser / updateposuser / getposusers / deleteposuser, under both /v1/web/tenants and /v1/mob/tenants — calling the same service methods `/pos/users` calls. Not a parallel implementation: a supervisor created from a browser is the same row, with the same PIN rules, the same duplicate check and the same identity-column allocation, as one created at a till. Two paths writing one table is precisely how the two stop matching, and this codebase already had that happen once. configid is inferred rather than asked for. It is a number nobody looks up, it varies per tenant — 1087's accounts are spread across 1, 6 and 15 — and getting it wrong creates somebody who cannot sign into the portal their colleagues use and is invisible to half the platform's queries. /posroles is served rather than left to the console to hardcode. A console that knew supervisor was 7 would be wrong the day that changed and would have no way to find out. The outlet is the real difference between the two doors. A terminal proves it with a signed token; the console asserts it, and is checked against the tenant before anything is written. That is weaker, and it is worth being plain about: these mint till credentials on an unauthenticated request, exactly like every other route in the /v1/web and /v1/mob groups, because there is no auth middleware on the web API at all. Documented as the weakest point in the design and flagged to move behind a session guard once the console can hold one. The terminal routes are untouched by it. Proven in a rolled-back transaction against live data: the console creates a supervisor at 1135, that supervisor signs in by PIN with can_manage_staff true, the till's /pos/staff sees them alongside the two created at the counter, and 0451, 1234 and a duplicate PIN are each refused with the same message the terminal gives. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Suriya
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4b27b84b1f |
Let a shop run its own counter: supervisor and cashier, created from the till
A shop had no way to add the people who work in it. The terminal fell back to
three names and three PINs compiled into the app — the same three on every
install — because there was nothing for it to fall back *from*.
Two roles now exist in `app_roles`: Supervisor (7) runs the terminal and creates
staff, Cashier (8) bills. Fixed ids, written by hand, because that table has no
sequence and every id in it was assigned the same way. configid is left NULL
rather than duplicated per portal: a till is a till whichever portal a tenant
uses, and Admin already appears twice in that table for exactly that reason.
`/pos/users` is CRUD over them, and `/pos/login/pin` signs a cashier on at a
terminal a supervisor has already opened.
The rule every one of these follows: **tenant and outlet come from the caller's
token, never from the request.** There is no location field on the create body
to get wrong. A supervisor at Selvapuram cannot create staff at R mart, for the
same reason a till cannot bill into another shop's books — it is the same
inversion applied to people instead of sales.
PIN sign-in is deliberately behind the guard. Four digits is ten thousand
guesses, which is no barrier to an anonymous caller; requiring a session means a
real password opened the terminal first and the guesses are confined to one
outlet's own staff. The session it mints is fresh rather than derived, so a
cashier taking over from a supervisor drops their permissions instead of
inheriting them.
Three things the schema forced:
- A PIN cannot start with zero. `app_users.pin` is a bigint, so "0451" stores as
451 and reads back as three digits — a cashier would type four and be refused
for ever. Live data already holds one such account. Rendering refuses to show
a PIN it cannot represent, rather than showing a short one nobody can type.
- `app_users` has no sequence either, so the next id is read and written inside
one transaction behind an advisory lock. Two supervisors creating staff at the
same moment would otherwise compute the same id and one insert would lose.
- 1234, 1111 and friends are refused outright. Live data has 1234 on eleven
accounts and 1111 on nine.
Proven against outlet 1135, which had zero staff and was the reason the built-in
PINs were still load-bearing:
created 9188 Store Supervisor Supervisor can_manage_staff=true
created 9189 Counter Cashier Cashier can_manage_staff=false
/pos/staff now returns 2 an unknown PIN is refused
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Suriya
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c4dfcd5387 |
Serve a shop's own staff to the till, so the built-in PINs can retire
The terminal shipped with three names and three PINs compiled into it. Same three on every install, readable by anyone with the APK, and permanent — nothing anywhere could replace them. `/pos/staff` answers with the people the back office says may ring a bill at an outlet, and the same list rides down with the session so a till is ready to trade the moment it signs in. The terminal writes them over its own and deactivates whatever it had, which is what actually kills the seeded logins. Two sources are unioned because the schema has two and neither is complete. `tenantstaffs` is the table built for this and holds 12 rows on the entire platform; `app_users.locationid` is where staff actually ended up. Either alone returns nothing for almost every shop. The endpoint takes no location parameter. The answer carries PINs, so the outlet comes from the caller's token and a request without one is refused whatever POS_AUTH_REQUIRED says — a till must not be able to ask who works at the shop next door. Rows with no PIN are dropped rather than sent: a name on screen nobody can sign in as reads as a broken terminal rather than as an unfinished setup. Duplicate PINs are dropped too, keeping the first — live data has 1234 on eleven accounts and 1111 on nine, and two people sharing one would make the till attribute a bill to whichever row it checked first. The PIN travels in the clear over TLS, deliberately. Four digits are brute-forceable in microseconds however they are wrapped, so hashing here would buy the appearance of strength and not the substance — while costing something real, since the terminal salts every PIN with its own salt before storing it and could never verify a hash computed here. A PIN is shift attribution, not a security boundary; the boundary is the session token. Verified against live data, and it says the fallback still matters: outlet 1135 — the one the POS actually uses — has zero staff, and the only staff row found anywhere is a delivery rider on PIN 1111. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Suriya
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12165d5e58 |
Give the POS a real sign-in, and stop believing the store id on the wire
The POS surface was open. A till named its own outlet — `store_id` in a query or in an ingest batch — and was believed, so one number changed in Settings read another tenant's catalogue or posted bills into their books. There was no middleware in the codebase at all, and the `JWT_SECRET_KEY` in the config was read and never used. Products were never mis-scoped: `resolvePosStore` already derived the tenant from the location and the catalogue query already filtered on both. The tenant was never taken from the wire. What was missing was any check that the caller was entitled to the location they named. So the outlet now comes *out* of a sign-in rather than going *in* from the till. `POST /pos/login` authenticates against the same `app_users` rows the web console uses — one account store, so deactivating a leaver closes both doors — and answers with the outlets that account may reach, sealed in an HMAC-SHA256 token the terminal cannot edit. Two checks then guard everything else, in order: the token verifies, and the outlet named in the request belongs to the token's tenant. The second is the one that matters — a valid token is a licence to name *your* outlets, not any. Notes on the awkward parts: - The guard reads the outlet from the body as well as the query. The two routes that write carry `store_id` in a JSON batch and never in the URL, so a query-only check would have left exactly the dangerous call unguarded. - Three spellings of one thing survive — `store_id`, `locationid`, `location_id`. All three are read rather than normalised, because renaming them breaks terminals already in the field. - `POS_AUTH_REQUIRED` defaults to false. Tills are billing real customers against the open endpoints right now and enforcing at deploy would stop every one mid-trade. A token is still verified when sent, and a wrong-tenant token still refused; the flag only governs requests carrying none. - `POS_TOKEN_SECRET` has no baked-in fallback and fails loudly. A development secret in source is the same as no signature at all. - `configid` is inferred when the till does not send it, because a person at a counter has no way to know theirs. `authname` is not unique in this schema — live data has one address twice under one configid — so an ambiguous match is refused rather than resolved by LIMIT 1, which could bill into the wrong tenant's books. Verified against live data: 58 accounts across 34 tenants can open a till, an account pinned to a location resolves to it alone, a tenant-level account gets all six of its outlets, and a cross-tenant outlet request is refused. Passwords are still plaintext platform-wide. Flagged at the comparison site; fixing it is a migration touching every login path, not this endpoint. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Suriya
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e3459a0f1c |
Ingest counter sales from the POS terminals, over MQTT and HTTP
A till holds every bill in its own SQLite database and keeps it for seven days after we acknowledge it, marking one synced only when its id comes back in an ack. Everything here follows from that. Silence is not acceptance, so a failing ingest publishes nothing at all and the terminal simply sends again. A duplicate is a success, because at-least-once delivery means a lost ack legitimately re-delivers bills we already hold, and calling those failures would strand a day of takings on the till. Deduplication is a unique index on the terminal's UUID plus an advisory lock held for the transaction. Bills land in pos_orders / pos_order_items rather than orders: a counter bill carries a cashier, a terminal, a rounding adjustment, promos, loyalty movement and a payment split that orders has nowhere to put, and forcing one into the other loses whatever does not fit. Stock is *not* split — a counter sale writes the same productstocks rows an app order does, through helpers extracted from createOrderTx so the rule that prevents overselling has one implementation rather than two. GetRevenueSummary and GetSalesSummary were extended to union the new table in; any new report has to remember the same. Terminal health goes to Redis under a 90-second TTL, sharing the instance the express backend uses. A heartbeat is a fact with an expiry date: a till that loses power stops refreshing and ages off the board by itself, where a Postgres row would need ~288k writes a day and a reaper. Proven end to end against the live estate before commit: a bill over HTTP and one over the real Mosquitto broker, the same bill three times producing one row and one stock movement, and a heartbeat arriving on the health endpoint. All probe data was removed afterwards. Four things that only surfaced against real data. An unset jsonb column failed the very first bill. Product SKUs are unusable as barcodes — 6,245 products share 93 SKUs and "1" covers 5,794 of them — against the till's unique index, so barcodes fall back to the product id. A taxpercent of -1 exists and would have put negative GST in a filed slab. And a product with id 0 exists, which can never be billed and is now skipped. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |