The /web endpoints have never had authentication. The console keeps its
login record in per-tab sessionStorage and sends no Authorization header,
so every endpoint under /v1/web read `tenantid` off the query string and
believed it — one number in a URL reached another merchant's orders,
stock, staff and takings. `createposuser` under /v1/web/tenants minted
till credentials on the strength of an unauthenticated request, which the
route file already flagged in as many words.
Closed the same way posauth.go closed it for the terminals, in the same
order: the caller holds a token this server signed, and the tenant they
name is the tenant inside that token.
- utils/webtoken.go same HMAC construction as the POS token, 12h TTL,
a `w1.` prefix so the two kinds cannot verify as
each other
- middleware/webauth.go verifies the token, pins the tenant, and checks
a named branch belongs to it; reads the tenant from
the query, the body, and inside a JSON array, since
createdeliveries posts one
- login now issues the token; the console sends it as Bearer
Platform access rides on issuperadmin and nothing else. Not the role —
app_roles calls roleid 1 "Super admin" and tenant onboarding wrote 1 for
every shop owner, so a role test would promote every merchant on the
platform. Not a zero tenant either, or a user row with the field unset
becomes the one session that reads everything. Both near-misses have
tests.
WEB_AUTH_REQUIRED defaults to off. The console in production does not
send a token yet, and enforcing before it does would lock every merchant
out of a working product. A token that IS sent is always verified, and
one naming the wrong tenant is always refused; the flag only decides what
happens to a request carrying none. This should be a short-lived state.
Still trusting the caller: partnerid, customerid and appuserid, which
some list endpoints also scope on. Noted in the middleware header.
25 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The POS surface was open. A till named its own outlet — `store_id` in a query
or in an ingest batch — and was believed, so one number changed in Settings
read another tenant's catalogue or posted bills into their books. There was no
middleware in the codebase at all, and the `JWT_SECRET_KEY` in the config was
read and never used.
Products were never mis-scoped: `resolvePosStore` already derived the tenant
from the location and the catalogue query already filtered on both. The tenant
was never taken from the wire. What was missing was any check that the caller
was entitled to the location they named.
So the outlet now comes *out* of a sign-in rather than going *in* from the
till. `POST /pos/login` authenticates against the same `app_users` rows the web
console uses — one account store, so deactivating a leaver closes both doors —
and answers with the outlets that account may reach, sealed in an HMAC-SHA256
token the terminal cannot edit.
Two checks then guard everything else, in order: the token verifies, and the
outlet named in the request belongs to the token's tenant. The second is the
one that matters — a valid token is a licence to name *your* outlets, not any.
Notes on the awkward parts:
- The guard reads the outlet from the body as well as the query. The two routes
that write carry `store_id` in a JSON batch and never in the URL, so a
query-only check would have left exactly the dangerous call unguarded.
- Three spellings of one thing survive — `store_id`, `locationid`,
`location_id`. All three are read rather than normalised, because renaming
them breaks terminals already in the field.
- `POS_AUTH_REQUIRED` defaults to false. Tills are billing real customers
against the open endpoints right now and enforcing at deploy would stop every
one mid-trade. A token is still verified when sent, and a wrong-tenant token
still refused; the flag only governs requests carrying none.
- `POS_TOKEN_SECRET` has no baked-in fallback and fails loudly. A development
secret in source is the same as no signature at all.
- `configid` is inferred when the till does not send it, because a person at a
counter has no way to know theirs. `authname` is not unique in this schema —
live data has one address twice under one configid — so an ambiguous match is
refused rather than resolved by LIMIT 1, which could bill into the wrong
tenant's books.
Verified against live data: 58 accounts across 34 tenants can open a till, an
account pinned to a location resolves to it alone, a tenant-level account gets
all six of its outlets, and a cross-tenant outlet request is refused.
Passwords are still plaintext platform-wide. Flagged at the comparison site;
fixing it is a migration touching every login path, not this endpoint.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
