Let an admin create till staff from the console, through the same code
An admin sets a shop up from a browser; a supervisor adds a cashier at the counter. Both had to be possible, and only the second one was. So the console gets createposuser / updateposuser / getposusers / deleteposuser, under both /v1/web/tenants and /v1/mob/tenants — calling the same service methods `/pos/users` calls. Not a parallel implementation: a supervisor created from a browser is the same row, with the same PIN rules, the same duplicate check and the same identity-column allocation, as one created at a till. Two paths writing one table is precisely how the two stop matching, and this codebase already had that happen once. configid is inferred rather than asked for. It is a number nobody looks up, it varies per tenant — 1087's accounts are spread across 1, 6 and 15 — and getting it wrong creates somebody who cannot sign into the portal their colleagues use and is invisible to half the platform's queries. /posroles is served rather than left to the console to hardcode. A console that knew supervisor was 7 would be wrong the day that changed and would have no way to find out. The outlet is the real difference between the two doors. A terminal proves it with a signed token; the console asserts it, and is checked against the tenant before anything is written. That is weaker, and it is worth being plain about: these mint till credentials on an unauthenticated request, exactly like every other route in the /v1/web and /v1/mob groups, because there is no auth middleware on the web API at all. Documented as the weakest point in the design and flagged to move behind a session guard once the console can hold one. The terminal routes are untouched by it. Proven in a rolled-back transaction against live data: the console creates a supervisor at 1135, that supervisor signs in by PIN with can_manage_staff true, the till's /pos/staff sees them alongside the two created at the counter, and 0451, 1234 and a duplicate PIN are each refused with the same message the terminal gives. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -489,3 +489,22 @@ func (r *posRepository) StaffPinAvailable(tenantID, locationID int, pin int64, e
|
||||
taken, err := posPinTaken(r.db, tenantID, locationID, pin, exceptUser)
|
||||
return !taken, err
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// PosConfigidFor returns the configid an outlet's people already use.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// The console cannot sensibly be asked for this. It is a number nobody looks
|
||||
// up, it varies per tenant — live data has tenant 1087 spread across 1, 6 and
|
||||
// 15 — and getting it wrong creates an account that cannot sign into the portal
|
||||
// its colleagues use and is invisible to half the platform's queries.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// So it is inferred from whichever value that tenant's existing accounts most
|
||||
// commonly carry. Returns 0 for a tenant with no accounts at all, which is
|
||||
// simply what a fresh tenant looks like.
|
||||
func (r *posRepository) PosConfigidFor(tenantID int) int {
|
||||
var configID int
|
||||
r.db.Raw(`SELECT COALESCE(configid, 0) FROM app_users
|
||||
WHERE tenantid = ? AND COALESCE(configid, 0) > 0
|
||||
GROUP BY configid ORDER BY COUNT(*) DESC, configid LIMIT 1`,
|
||||
tenantID).Scan(&configID)
|
||||
return configID
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user