pos gap fix

routes/posroutes.go

@@ -77,6 +77,28 @@ func RegisterPosRoutes(api fiber.Router, f *facade.Facade) {
 	registerPosStaffConsoleRoutes(api, f)
 	registerPosReadConsoleRoutes(api, f)
 	registerLiveRoutes(api, f)
+	registerPosAdoptionRoute(api, f)
+}
+
+// How much of the till fleet has adopted the session token.
+//
+// The number that decides when `POS_AUTH_REQUIRED` can be switched on. Nothing
+// was recording it — an untokened request was waved through in silence — so the
+// only way to judge the risk of flipping the flag was to flip it and watch.
+//
+// ── Why it is on /v1/web and only /v1/web ───────────────────────────────────
+//
+// It names the outlets still calling without a token, which is a list of the
+// shops that would stop trading if enforcement went on today. That is exactly
+// the list an attacker would want, so it sits behind `middleware.WebAuth` and
+// NOT on the unauthenticated health endpoint, where the rest of "is this
+// deployment wired up" lives.
+//
+// Registered on its own rather than inside registerPosReadConsoleRoutes,
+// because that function deliberately mirrors every route onto `/v1/mob/pos`
+// as well — which has no guard at all.
+func registerPosAdoptionRoute(api fiber.Router, f *facade.Facade) {
+	api.Group("/v1/web/pos").Get("/authadoption", f.PosController.AuthAdoption)
 }
 
 // The same counter-sales reads, for callers that are not a terminal.