Files
Behavision/server/internal/api/fake_test.go
Suriyakumarvijayanayagam abcf6aa012 The admin console could list merchants and see nothing inside them
Six read-only routes: merchant detail, its shops, one shop, its cameras,
one camera, and the platform totals. The console drills down
merchant -> store -> camera and every level below the first showed
'Backend integration required'.

They cannot be the tenant routes, and the reason is structural rather
than incidental. Every tenant handler derives the client from the
SESSION - that is what makes cross-tenant access impossible rather than
merely disallowed - and a platform admin has no client at all. The three
workarounds each make it worse: passing a company id to a tenant route
puts a caller-chosen tenant back in the one place this system refuses to
take one, filtering the estate in the browser ships every merchant's
data to render one, and signing in as the owner audits the wrong person.
So the tenant STORE functions are reused with an explicit client id -
they already take one - and the scoping the tenant handlers get from the
session is done in the handler instead.

AdminCamera is a separate type from Camera, for the same reason
AgentCamera is. It cannot carry host, port, path, username or
has_password. A tenant seeing those for their own camera is correct; a
platform admin browsing another company's estate is a different
question, and an RTSP host with a username beside it is most of a live
path into a customer's camera. Blanking fields on a shared struct leaves
'remember to redact, on every path, forever' as the only thing
preventing a leak. The test asserts on the raw JSON, because decoding
into the struct would discard exactly what it is looking for.

An unowned site is 404, never an empty list. The tenant resolver returns
a uuid untouched and lets client_id =  downstream scope it, which is
sound only because that id comes from a session; here the caller names
both halves, so an unowned uuid would reach a query that quietly returns
nothing - 'this shop has no cameras' when the truth is 'not your shop'.
Both resolvers check the whole chain in one statement.

Two things the in-memory fake could not have caught, so neither was left
to it. The fake ignored clientID in SiteHealth and Cameras, which would
have made every cross-merchant test pass while returning another
company's shops; it is client-aware now for these paths. And the SQL was
written to make the documented $2-deduced-as-two-types bug impossible
rather than to be caught by a database later: id::text = $2 in place
of id = $2::uuid, one type per parameter, which also turns a malformed
path segment into the 404 it should be instead of a cast error.

Every read below the merchant list writes an audit row naming the admin
and the merchant - an admin is the one account for which nothing else
here leaves a trace. The counts-only summary does not: a console
refreshes it on a timer, and logging that buries the reads worth
finding. A suspended merchant stays readable, because that is precisely
what an admin opens the console to look at.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KGcjxF1cNLcuwc3DAPcnfj
2026-09-28 16:01:22 +05:30

1235 lines
34 KiB
Go

package api
import (
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
"fmt"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgconn"
"net/http"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
"github.com/loyaly/behavision-server/internal/auth"
)
// fakeStore is an in-memory Store. Handlers are where the security decisions
// live - which tenant, which message on failure, what is echoed back - and
// those are exactly what a real database would make slow and awkward to test.
type fakeStore struct {
// Which tenant and site each camera belongs to. The live relay is keyed on
// a camera id and a hub does not know whose camera it holds, so ownership
// is proved before anything streams - and that is what these tests check.
cameraRefs map[string]cameraRef
// Camera pictures held by the server, for a deployment with no bucket.
// Keyed as written by PutCameraSnapshot (by camera_id) and as read by
// CameraSnapshot ("client/camera"), so a test has to say which it means.
snapshots map[string][]byte
snapshotRejects bool
lastSnapshotClient string
lastSnapshotSite string
mu sync.Mutex
users map[string]UserRecord // by lower-cased email
sessions map[string]*fakeSession
byAccess map[string]string // access hash hex -> session id
byRefresh map[string]string
visitors []Customer
history []VisitRow
footfall []FootfallPoint
totals Totals
sales SalesReport
sites []SiteHealth
// The admin drill-down is the one surface where the fake MUST know which
// merchant owns what. Everywhere else the client id comes from the session
// and every query scopes on it, so a fake that ignores it still exercises
// the handler. Here the client id comes from the PATH and the scoping is
// the thing under test - a fake that ignored it would pass the
// cross-merchant tests while returning another company's shops.
// Camera ownership already has a home: cameraRefs, read through the
// cameraOwner method below.
siteOwner map[string]string // site id -> client id
clientRows map[string]ClientDetail
enrolment map[string]Enrolment
// Recorded calls, so a test can assert what the handler asked for rather
// than only what it returned.
lastReport ReportQuery
lastProfile Profile
lastProfileClient string
lastPurchase PurchaseInput
audits []AuditEntry
// arrivals is the whole table; arrivalQ records what the handler asked for
// so a test can assert on the keyset window rather than only its output.
arrivals []Arrival
arrivalQ ArrivalQuery
arrivalsErr error
arrivalCalls int
pendingChecks []AgentCheckJob
checkResults []AgentCheckResult
releasedStale int
lastCodeActor string
lastCodeTTL time.Duration
lastCheckKind string
lastCheckSeconds int
// Invitations, and the faces this server holds itself.
invites map[string]*fakeInvite // by code hash hex
faces map[string][]byte // "client/id"
lastFaceClient string
lastFaceSite string
deletedFaces []string
faceDeleteErr error
cameras []Camera
agentCameras []AgentCamera
lastCameraReport AgentCameraReport
lastReportClient string
lastReportSite string
saveCameraErr error
lastSaved CameraInput
clients []ClientRow
lastNewClient NewClientInput
newClientErr error
loginTouched []string
profileErr error
purchaseErr error
forgetErr error
nextID int
agentTokens map[string]AgentPrincipal
imageKeys map[string]string
forgotten []string
}
type fakeSession struct {
id string
p auth.Principal
accessExp, refreshExp time.Time
device string
revoked bool
}
func newFakeStore() *fakeStore {
return &fakeStore{
users: map[string]UserRecord{},
sessions: map[string]*fakeSession{},
byAccess: map[string]string{},
byRefresh: map[string]string{},
enrolment: map[string]Enrolment{},
agentTokens: map[string]AgentPrincipal{},
imageKeys: map[string]string{},
}
}
func (f *fakeStore) addUser(email, password string, rec UserRecord) {
hash, err := auth.HashPassword(password)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
rec.Email = email
rec.PasswordHash = hash
rec.Found = true
if rec.ID == "" {
rec.ID = "user-" + email
}
if rec.Role == "" {
rec.Role = "manager"
}
f.users[auth.NormalizeEmail(email)] = rec
}
func (f *fakeStore) UserByEmail(_ context.Context, email string) (UserRecord, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
u, ok := f.users[email]
if !ok {
return UserRecord{Found: false}, nil
}
return u, nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) TouchUserLogin(_ context.Context, id string) error {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
f.loginTouched = append(f.loginTouched, id)
return nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) CreateSession(_ context.Context, n NewSession) error {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
f.nextID++
// uuid-SHAPED, because the handlers validate the shape of an id before
// spending a database round trip on it. A fake that mints "sess-1" would
// make every id-addressed session route 404 in tests and pass in
// production, which is the wrong way round.
id := fmt.Sprintf("00000000-0000-4000-8000-%012d", f.nextID)
var rec UserRecord
for _, u := range f.users {
if u.ID == n.UserID {
rec = u
}
}
s := &fakeSession{
id: id,
p: auth.Principal{
UserID: n.UserID, SessionID: id, ClientID: n.ClientID,
ClientName: rec.ClientName, Email: rec.Email,
FullName: rec.FullName, Role: rec.Role,
},
accessExp: n.AccessExpiry, refreshExp: n.RefreshExp,
device: n.Device,
}
f.sessions[id] = s
f.byAccess[hex.EncodeToString(n.AccessHash)] = id
f.byRefresh[hex.EncodeToString(n.RefreshHash)] = id
return nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) lookup(index map[string]string, hash []byte, refresh bool) (
auth.Principal, time.Time, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
id, ok := index[hex.EncodeToString(hash)]
if !ok {
return auth.Principal{}, time.Time{}, auth.ErrNoSession
}
s := f.sessions[id]
if s == nil || s.revoked {
return auth.Principal{}, time.Time{}, auth.ErrNoSession
}
if refresh {
return s.p, s.refreshExp, nil
}
return s.p, s.accessExp, nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) SessionByAccess(_ context.Context, h []byte) (auth.Principal, time.Time, error) {
return f.lookup(f.byAccess, h, false)
}
func (f *fakeStore) SessionByRefresh(_ context.Context, h []byte) (auth.Principal, time.Time, error) {
return f.lookup(f.byRefresh, h, true)
}
func (f *fakeStore) RotateSession(_ context.Context, id string, n NewSession) error {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
s := f.sessions[id]
if s == nil || s.revoked {
return auth.ErrNoSession
}
// Mirrors the real store: the old hashes stop resolving the moment the new
// ones are written.
for k, v := range f.byAccess {
if v == id {
delete(f.byAccess, k)
}
}
for k, v := range f.byRefresh {
if v == id {
delete(f.byRefresh, k)
}
}
f.byAccess[hex.EncodeToString(n.AccessHash)] = id
f.byRefresh[hex.EncodeToString(n.RefreshHash)] = id
s.accessExp, s.refreshExp = n.AccessExpiry, n.RefreshExp
return nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) RevokeSession(_ context.Context, id string) error {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
if s := f.sessions[id]; s != nil {
s.revoked = true
}
return nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) Footfall(_ context.Context, q ReportQuery) ([]FootfallPoint, Totals, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
f.lastReport = q
return f.footfall, f.totals, nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) Conversion(_ context.Context, q ReportQuery) (SalesReport, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
f.lastReport = q
return f.sales, nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) CreateSite(_ context.Context, clientID, slug, name, tz string) (NewSite, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
for _, s := range f.sites {
if s.Slug == slug {
return NewSite{}, &pgconn.PgError{Code: "23505"}
}
}
id := "site-" + slug
f.sites = append(f.sites, SiteHealth{SiteID: id, Slug: slug, Name: name, Timezone: tz})
return NewSite{SiteID: id, Slug: slug, Name: name, Timezone: tz, Username: "acme." + slug, Password: "pw-" + slug}, nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) DeleteNewSite(_ context.Context, _ string, siteID string) error {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
kept := f.sites[:0]
for _, s := range f.sites {
if s.SiteID != siteID {
kept = append(kept, s)
}
}
f.sites = kept
return nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) SiteHealth(_ context.Context, clientID string) ([]SiteHealth, error) {
// Scoped only when a test has declared ownership; otherwise every existing
// tenant test would have to grow a fixture it does not care about.
if f.siteOwner == nil {
return f.sites, nil
}
var out []SiteHealth
for _, s := range f.sites {
if f.siteOwner[s.SiteID] == clientID {
out = append(out, s)
}
}
return out, nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) ClientDetail(_ context.Context, clientID string) (ClientDetail, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
return f.clientRows[clientID], nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) AdminSiteID(_ context.Context, clientID, ref string) (string, error) {
for _, s := range f.sites {
if s.SiteID != ref && s.Slug != ref {
continue
}
if f.siteOwner != nil && f.siteOwner[s.SiteID] != clientID {
return "", nil // owned by somebody else: a miss, not a match
}
return s.SiteID, nil
}
return "", nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) AdminCameraID(_ context.Context, clientID, siteID, ref string) (string, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
for _, c := range f.cameras {
if c.ID != ref && c.CameraID != ref {
continue
}
if c.SiteID != siteID {
return "", nil
}
if f.cameraRefs != nil && f.cameraOwner(c.ID) != clientID {
return "", nil
}
return c.ID, nil
}
return "", nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) PlatformSummary(_ context.Context) (PlatformSummary, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
return PlatformSummary{
CamerasTotal: len(f.cameras), MerchantsActive: len(f.clientRows),
SitesTotal: len(f.sites), AsOf: "2026-09-28T00:00:00Z",
}, nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) SearchVisitors(_ context.Context, clientID, q string, limit int) (
[]Customer, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
f.lastReport = ReportQuery{ClientID: clientID}
if limit < len(f.visitors) {
return f.visitors[:limit], nil
}
return f.visitors, nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) VisitorHistory(_ context.Context, _, _ string, _ int) ([]VisitRow, error) {
return f.history, nil
}
// Arrivals fakes the keyset window in memory: rows are held oldest-first, a
// cursor slices past it, and no cursor returns the newest Limit - the same
// contract the SQL implements, so a handler test that passes here is testing
// the handler and not a stub that is easier than the real thing.
func (f *fakeStore) Arrivals(_ context.Context, q ArrivalQuery) ([]Arrival, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
f.arrivalQ = q
f.arrivalCalls++
if f.arrivalsErr != nil {
return nil, f.arrivalsErr
}
rows := make([]Arrival, 0, len(f.arrivals))
for _, a := range f.arrivals {
if q.SiteID != "" && a.SiteID != q.SiteID {
continue
}
if q.AfterSeq != nil && a.Seq <= *q.AfterSeq {
continue
}
rows = append(rows, a)
}
if q.AfterSeq == nil && len(rows) > q.Limit {
// No cursor: the newest window, matching the real query.
rows = rows[len(rows)-q.Limit:]
} else if len(rows) > q.Limit {
rows = rows[:q.Limit]
}
return rows, nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) SaveProfile(_ context.Context, clientID string, p Profile, _ string) error {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
f.lastProfile, f.lastProfileClient = p, clientID
return f.profileErr
}
func (f *fakeStore) RecordPurchase(_ context.Context, _ string, p PurchaseInput, _ string) error {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
f.lastPurchase = p
return f.purchaseErr
}
func (f *fakeStore) RedeemEnrolment(_ context.Context, hash []byte) (Enrolment, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
en, ok := f.enrolment[hex.EncodeToString(hash)]
if !ok {
return Enrolment{}, errors.New("unknown token")
}
// Single use, like the real UPDATE.
delete(f.enrolment, hex.EncodeToString(hash))
return en, nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) Cameras(_ context.Context, _, siteID string) ([]Camera, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
var out []Camera
for _, c := range f.cameras {
if siteID == "" || c.SiteID == siteID {
out = append(out, c)
}
}
return out, nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) CameraByID(_ context.Context, _, id string) (Camera, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
for _, c := range f.cameras {
if c.ID == id {
return c, nil
}
}
return Camera{}, errors.New("no rows in result set")
}
func (f *fakeStore) SaveCamera(_ context.Context, _, siteID, cameraID string,
in CameraInput) (Camera, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
f.lastSaved = in
if f.saveCameraErr != nil {
return Camera{}, f.saveCameraErr
}
// A real-shaped uuid: the handlers check the shape before touching SQL, so
// a placeholder id would exercise the 404 path instead of the one under
// test.
cam := Camera{ID: fakeCameraUUID(cameraID), SiteID: siteID, CameraID: cameraID,
Port: 554, Path: "/", MaxWidth: 1280, Enabled: true, Revision: 1}
if in.Label != nil {
cam.Label = *in.Label
}
if in.Host != nil {
cam.Host = *in.Host
}
if in.Username != nil {
cam.Username = *in.Username
}
cam.HasPassword = in.Password != nil && *in.Password != ""
f.cameras = append(f.cameras, cam)
return cam, nil
}
// fakeCameraUUID derives a stable uuid-shaped id from a camera name so tests
// can address a camera they just created without reading the response.
func fakeCameraUUID(cameraID string) string {
sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(cameraID))
h := hex.EncodeToString(sum[:16])
return h[0:8] + "-" + h[8:12] + "-" + h[12:16] + "-" + h[16:20] + "-" + h[20:32]
}
func (f *fakeStore) DeleteCamera(_ context.Context, _, id string) (Camera, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
for i, c := range f.cameras {
if c.ID == id {
f.cameras = append(f.cameras[:i], f.cameras[i+1:]...)
return c, nil
}
}
return Camera{}, errors.New("no rows in result set")
}
func (f *fakeStore) AgentCameras(_ context.Context, _ string) ([]AgentCamera, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
return f.agentCameras, nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) ApplyAgentReport(_ context.Context, clientID, siteID string,
rep AgentCameraReport) error {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
f.lastCameraReport = rep
f.lastReportClient, f.lastReportSite = clientID, siteID
return nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) IssueEnrolmentCode(_ context.Context, clientID, siteID,
actorID, label string, ttl time.Duration) (EnrolmentCode, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
for _, si := range f.sites {
if si.SiteID == siteID {
f.lastCodeActor, f.lastCodeTTL = actorID, ttl
return EnrolmentCode{
Code: "ABCDEF-123456-GHIJKL-789012", SiteID: siteID,
SiteName: si.Name, Label: label,
ExpiresAt: time.Now().Add(ttl).UTC(),
}, nil
}
}
return EnrolmentCode{}, pgx.ErrNoRows
}
func (f *fakeStore) RequestCheck(_ context.Context, _, id, kind string, seconds int) error {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
for i := range f.cameras {
if f.cameras[i].ID == id {
f.cameras[i].Check = CameraCheck{Kind: kind, Seconds: seconds, State: "requested"}
f.lastCheckKind, f.lastCheckSeconds = kind, seconds
return nil
}
}
return errors.New("no rows in result set")
}
func (f *fakeStore) ClaimChecks(_ context.Context, _ string) ([]AgentCheckJob, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
out := f.pendingChecks
f.pendingChecks = nil // claimed once, like the real UPDATE ... RETURNING
return out, nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) RecordCheckResult(_ context.Context, _ string, res AgentCheckResult) error {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
f.checkResults = append(f.checkResults, res)
return nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) ReleaseStaleChecks(_ context.Context, _ time.Duration) error {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
f.releasedStale++
return nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) SetClientActive(_ context.Context, clientID string, active bool) (ClientRow, int, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
for i := range f.clients {
if f.clients[i].ID != clientID {
continue
}
f.clients[i].Active = active
revoked := 0
if !active {
for _, sess := range f.sessions {
if sess.p.ClientID == clientID && !sess.revoked {
sess.revoked = true
revoked++
}
}
}
return f.clients[i], revoked, nil
}
return ClientRow{}, 0, pgx.ErrNoRows
}
func (f *fakeStore) ClientOwners(_ context.Context, clientID string) ([]TeamMember, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
var out []TeamMember
for _, u := range f.users {
if u.ClientID == clientID && u.Role == "owner" && u.Active {
out = append(out, TeamMember{ID: u.ID, Email: u.Email, FullName: u.FullName, Role: u.Role, Active: u.Active})
}
}
return out, nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) ClientImageKeys(_ context.Context, _ string) ([]string, error) { return nil, nil }
func (f *fakeStore) DeleteClient(_ context.Context, clientID string) (ClientRow, []string, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
for i, c := range f.clients {
if c.ID != clientID {
continue
}
if c.Active {
return c, nil, errors.New("client is active")
}
f.clients = append(f.clients[:i], f.clients[i+1:]...)
return c, []string{c.Slug + ".shop1"}, nil
}
return ClientRow{}, nil, pgx.ErrNoRows
}
func (f *fakeStore) UpdateSite(_ context.Context, _ string, siteID string, in SiteUpdate) (SiteHealth, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
for i := range f.sites {
if f.sites[i].SiteID == siteID {
if in.Name != nil {
f.sites[i].Name = *in.Name
}
if in.Timezone != nil {
f.sites[i].Timezone = *in.Timezone
}
return f.sites[i], nil
}
}
return SiteHealth{}, pgx.ErrNoRows
}
func (f *fakeStore) DeleteEmptySite(_ context.Context, _ string, siteID string) (string, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
for _, c := range f.cameras {
if c.SiteID == siteID {
return "", ErrSiteInUse
}
}
for i, s := range f.sites {
if s.SiteID == siteID {
f.sites = append(f.sites[:i], f.sites[i+1:]...)
return "acme." + s.Slug, nil
}
}
return "", pgx.ErrNoRows
}
func (f *fakeStore) ListClients(_ context.Context) ([]ClientRow, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
return f.clients, nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) CreateClientWithOwner(_ context.Context, in NewClientInput) (
NewClientResult, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
f.lastNewClient = in
if f.newClientErr != nil {
return NewClientResult{}, f.newClientErr
}
pw := in.Password
if pw == "" {
pw = "generated-password"
}
return NewClientResult{ClientID: "new-client-id", Slug: in.Slug,
OwnerEmail: in.OwnerEmail, Password: pw}, nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) Audit(_ context.Context, e AuditEntry) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
f.audits = append(f.audits, e)
}
func itoa(n int) string {
if n == 0 {
return "0"
}
var b []byte
for n > 0 {
b = append([]byte{byte('0' + n%10)}, b...)
n /= 10
}
return string(b)
}
// -- images and agents ------------------------------------------------------
func (f *fakeStore) SetAgentAPIToken(_ context.Context, agentID string, hash []byte) error {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
if f.agentTokens == nil {
f.agentTokens = map[string]AgentPrincipal{}
}
f.agentTokens[hex.EncodeToString(hash)] = AgentPrincipal{
AgentID: agentID, ClientID: "client-acme", SiteID: "site-1",
Slug: "acme.store1", Client: "acme", Site: "store1",
}
return nil
}
// addAgent registers a plaintext agent token, hashed the way the middleware
// will look it up.
func (f *fakeStore) addAgent(token string, ap AgentPrincipal) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
f.agentTokens[hex.EncodeToString(auth.HashToken(token))] = ap
}
func (f *fakeStore) AgentByToken(_ context.Context, hash []byte) (AgentPrincipal, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
ap, ok := f.agentTokens[hex.EncodeToString(hash)]
if !ok {
return AgentPrincipal{}, errors.New("no such agent")
}
return ap, nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) VisitorImageKey(_ context.Context, _, visitorID string) (string, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
return f.imageKeys[visitorID], nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) VisitorImageKeys(_ context.Context, _, visitorID string) ([]string, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
if k := f.imageKeys[visitorID]; k != "" {
return []string{k}, nil
}
return nil, nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) ForgetVisitor(_ context.Context, _, visitorID string) error {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
if f.forgetErr != nil {
return f.forgetErr
}
f.forgotten = append(f.forgotten, visitorID)
delete(f.imageKeys, visitorID)
return nil
}
// fakeBlob records what the handlers asked storage to do. Deleting is the part
// worth recording: an erasure that reports success without removing the object
// is the failure this whole path exists to prevent.
type fakeBlob struct {
mu sync.Mutex
deleted []string
presigns []string
failNext error
}
func (b *fakeBlob) Key(client, site, objectID string, at time.Time) string {
return fmt.Sprintf("behavision/%s/%s/%04d/%02d/%02d/%s.jpg",
client, site, at.Year(), int(at.Month()), at.Day(), objectID)
}
func (b *fakeBlob) PresignPut(key string, _ time.Duration) (string, http.Header, error) {
h := http.Header{}
h.Set("x-amz-acl", "private")
h.Set("Content-Type", "image/jpeg")
return "https://bucket.example.com/" + key + "?X-Amz-Signature=fake", h, nil
}
func (b *fakeBlob) PresignGet(key string, _ time.Duration) (string, error) {
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
b.presigns = append(b.presigns, key)
return "https://bucket.example.com/" + key + "?X-Amz-Signature=fake", nil
}
func (b *fakeBlob) Delete(_ context.Context, key string) error {
b.mu.Lock()
defer b.mu.Unlock()
if b.failNext != nil {
err := b.failNext
b.failNext = nil
return err
}
b.deleted = append(b.deleted, key)
return nil
}
// ------------------------------------------------------- camera snapshots --
func (f *fakeStore) PutCameraSnapshot(_ context.Context,
clientID, siteID, cameraID string, jpeg []byte) error {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
if f.snapshots == nil {
f.snapshots = map[string][]byte{}
}
if f.snapshotRejects {
return ErrNoSnapshot
}
f.lastSnapshotClient, f.lastSnapshotSite = clientID, siteID
f.snapshots[cameraID] = append([]byte(nil), jpeg...)
return nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) CameraSnapshot(_ context.Context, clientID, cameraID string) (
[]byte, time.Time, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
img, ok := f.snapshots[clientID+"/"+cameraID]
if !ok {
return nil, time.Time{}, ErrNoSnapshot
}
return img, time.Unix(1756900000, 0).UTC(), nil
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------ live relay --
func (f *fakeStore) CameraRef(_ context.Context, clientID, cameraID string) (string, string, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
ref, ok := f.cameraRefs[cameraID]
if !ok || ref.client != clientID {
return "", "", ErrNoSnapshot
}
return ref.site, ref.engineID, nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) CameraRefBySite(_ context.Context, siteID, cameraID string) (string, string, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
ref, ok := f.cameraRefs[cameraID]
if !ok || ref.site != siteID {
return "", "", ErrNoSnapshot
}
return ref.site, ref.engineID, nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) SiteCameraIDs(_ context.Context, siteID string) ([]string, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
var out []string
for id, ref := range f.cameraRefs {
if ref.site == siteID {
out = append(out, id)
}
}
return out, nil
}
// addCameraRef registers a camera so ownership checks have something to check.
func (f *fakeStore) addCameraRef(id, client, site, engineID string) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
if f.cameraRefs == nil {
f.cameraRefs = map[string]cameraRef{}
}
f.cameraRefs[id] = cameraRef{client: client, site: site, engineID: engineID}
}
type cameraRef struct{ client, site, engineID string }
// ==================================== team, invitations, sessions, faces ====
//
// These behave rather than merely satisfy the interface: single use, tenant
// scoping and "the role comes from the invitation" are the properties the
// handlers are trusted for, so a fake that always says yes would make the tests
// that check them meaningless.
type fakeInvite struct {
id, clientID, email, fullName, role string
expires time.Time
used, revoked bool
}
func (f *fakeStore) CreateInvitation(_ context.Context, in NewInvitation) (Invitation, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
if f.invites == nil {
f.invites = map[string]*fakeInvite{}
}
f.nextID++
id := fmt.Sprintf("00000000-0000-4000-9000-%012d", f.nextID)
f.invites[hex.EncodeToString(in.CodeHash)] = &fakeInvite{
id: id, clientID: in.ClientID, email: in.Email,
fullName: in.FullName, role: in.Role, expires: in.ExpiresAt,
}
return Invitation{
ID: id, Email: in.Email, FullName: in.FullName, Role: in.Role,
ExpiresAt: in.ExpiresAt.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
}, nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) PendingInvitations(_ context.Context, clientID string) ([]Invitation, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
var out []Invitation
for _, v := range f.invites {
if v.clientID != clientID || v.used || v.revoked {
continue
}
out = append(out, Invitation{ID: v.id, Email: v.email,
FullName: v.fullName, Role: v.role,
ExpiresAt: v.expires.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)})
}
return out, nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) RevokeInvitation(_ context.Context, clientID, id string) error {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
for _, v := range f.invites {
if v.id == id && v.clientID == clientID && !v.used && !v.revoked {
v.revoked = true
return nil
}
}
return errors.New("no such pending invitation")
}
func (f *fakeStore) InvitationByCode(_ context.Context, hash []byte) (InvitationPreview, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
v, ok := f.invites[hex.EncodeToString(hash)]
if !ok || v.used || v.revoked || time.Now().After(v.expires) {
return InvitationPreview{}, errors.New("that invitation is not valid")
}
return InvitationPreview{Client: "Fake Co", Email: v.email,
FullName: v.fullName, Role: v.role}, nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) RedeemInvitation(_ context.Context, hash []byte,
fullName, passwordHash string) (UserRecord, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
v, ok := f.invites[hex.EncodeToString(hash)]
if !ok || v.used || v.revoked || time.Now().After(v.expires) {
return UserRecord{}, errors.New("that invitation is not valid")
}
if _, taken := f.users[v.email]; taken {
return UserRecord{}, errors.New("app_users_email_idx")
}
// Marked spent BEFORE the account exists, mirroring the real store's one
// transaction: a test that redeems the same code twice must get one user.
v.used = true
f.nextID++
rec := UserRecord{
ID: fmt.Sprintf("00000000-0000-4000-a000-%012d", f.nextID),
// From the INVITATION, never from the request - which is the property
// worth having a fake at all for.
ClientID: v.clientID, ClientName: "Fake Co", Email: v.email,
FullName: fullName, Role: v.role, Active: true, Found: true,
PasswordHash: passwordHash,
}
if rec.FullName == "" {
rec.FullName = v.fullName
}
f.users[v.email] = rec
return rec, nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) Team(_ context.Context, clientID string) ([]TeamMember, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
var out []TeamMember
for _, u := range f.users {
if u.ClientID != clientID {
continue
}
out = append(out, TeamMember{ID: u.ID, Email: u.Email,
FullName: u.FullName, Role: u.Role, Active: u.Active})
}
return out, nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) UpdateTeamMember(_ context.Context, clientID, userID string,
up TeamUpdate) (TeamMember, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
for email, u := range f.users {
if u.ID != userID || u.ClientID != clientID {
continue
}
if up.Role != nil {
u.Role = *up.Role
}
if up.Active != nil {
u.Active = *up.Active
if !u.Active {
// The real store revokes in the same transaction; the fake
// does it here so a test can prove "they have left" actually
// signs them out rather than waiting twelve hours.
for _, s := range f.sessions {
if s.p.UserID == userID {
s.revoked = true
}
}
}
}
f.users[email] = u
return TeamMember{ID: u.ID, Email: u.Email, FullName: u.FullName,
Role: u.Role, Active: u.Active}, nil
}
return TeamMember{}, errors.New("no such team member")
}
func (f *fakeStore) UserSessions(_ context.Context, userID string) ([]DeviceSession, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
var out []DeviceSession
for _, s := range f.sessions {
if s.p.UserID != userID || s.revoked {
continue
}
out = append(out, DeviceSession{ID: s.id, Device: s.device,
ExpiresAt: s.refreshExp.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339)})
}
return out, nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) RevokeUserSession(_ context.Context, userID, sessionID string) error {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
s, ok := f.sessions[sessionID]
// Scoped by user id, exactly as the real UPDATE is: a session id travels in
// a list and is not a secret, so it must not sign anybody else out.
if !ok || s.p.UserID != userID || s.revoked {
return errors.New("no such session")
}
s.revoked = true
return nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) RevokeOtherSessions(_ context.Context, userID, keep string) (int, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
n := 0
for _, s := range f.sessions {
if s.p.UserID == userID && s.id != keep && !s.revoked {
s.revoked = true
n++
}
}
return n, nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) PutVisitFace(_ context.Context, clientID, siteID string,
jpeg []byte) (string, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
if f.faces == nil {
f.faces = map[string][]byte{}
}
f.nextID++
id := fmt.Sprintf("00000000-0000-4000-b000-%012d", f.nextID)
f.faces[clientID+"/"+id] = jpeg
f.lastFaceClient, f.lastFaceSite = clientID, siteID
return "db:" + id, nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) VisitFace(_ context.Context, clientID, key string) ([]byte, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
img, ok := f.faces[clientID+"/"+strings.TrimPrefix(key, "db:")]
if !ok {
return nil, errors.New("no such face image")
}
return img, nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) DeleteVisitFaces(_ context.Context, clientID string, keys []string) error {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
if f.faceDeleteErr != nil {
return f.faceDeleteErr
}
for _, k := range keys {
delete(f.faces, clientID+"/"+strings.TrimPrefix(k, "db:"))
f.deletedFaces = append(f.deletedFaces, k)
}
return nil
}
// ============================================ public reference resolution ===
//
// These behave rather than merely satisfy the interface. The properties the
// handlers are trusted for - a reference resolves only within the caller's own
// tenant, and an ambiguous camera name resolves to nothing rather than to
// whichever row came first - are exactly what a fake that always said yes would
// stop any test from checking.
func (f *fakeStore) SiteIDBySlug(_ context.Context, clientID, slug string) (string, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
for _, s := range f.sites {
// An owner of "" is a site the fake was not told about, which is the
// ordinary case: SiteHealth carries no client id, and most tests seed
// one tenant. Tests that assert cross-tenant resolution seed a camera,
// which is what gives a site an owner here.
if owner := f.siteClient(s.Slug, s.SiteID); s.Slug == slug &&
(owner == "" || owner == clientID) {
return s.SiteID, nil
}
}
return "", nil
}
// siteClient answers which tenant a site belongs to. SiteHealth carries no
// client id of its own - it is already scoped by the query that returns it - so
// the fake reads ownership from the cameras it was seeded with.
func (f *fakeStore) siteClient(_, siteID string) string {
for _, ref := range f.cameraRefs {
if ref.site == siteID {
return ref.client
}
}
for _, c := range f.cameras {
if c.SiteID == siteID {
return f.cameraOwner(c.ID)
}
}
return ""
}
func (f *fakeStore) cameraOwner(id string) string {
if ref, ok := f.cameraRefs[id]; ok {
return ref.client
}
return ""
}
func (f *fakeStore) CameraIDByRef(_ context.Context, clientID, ref string) (string, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
var found []string
for _, c := range f.cameras {
if c.CameraID != ref {
continue
}
if owner := f.cameraOwner(c.ID); owner != "" && owner != clientID {
continue
}
found = append(found, c.ID)
}
// A camera id is unique per site, not per tenant. Two shops may each have
// an "Office1", and acting on whichever sorted first would edit the wrong
// shop's camera, so ambiguity is no match.
if len(found) != 1 {
return "", nil
}
return found[0], nil
}
func (f *fakeStore) VisitorIDByNumber(_ context.Context, clientID string, number int64) (string, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
want := VisitorRef(number)
for _, v := range f.visitors {
if v.Ref == want {
return v.ID, nil
}
}
return "", nil
}
// CreateMember behaves like the real store on the two things the handler
// branches on: the account lands in the caller's tenant and nowhere else, and
// an address that already exists anywhere is a conflict named the way Postgres
// names it, so conflictMessage recognises it.
func (f *fakeStore) CreateMember(_ context.Context, clientID string,
in NewMemberInput, hash string) (TeamMember, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
if _, taken := f.users[in.Email]; taken {
return TeamMember{}, errors.New(`duplicate key value violates unique constraint "app_users_email_idx"`)
}
// The real UserByEmail joins clients for the name; this fake reads it off
// the record, so copy it from a tenant-mate or a login as the new member
// comes back with no company name and looks like it landed nowhere.
clientName := ""
for _, u := range f.users {
if u.ClientID == clientID && u.ClientName != "" {
clientName = u.ClientName
break
}
}
id := "member-" + itoa(len(f.users)+1)
f.users[in.Email] = UserRecord{
ID: id, ClientID: clientID, ClientName: clientName,
Email: in.Email, FullName: in.FullName,
Role: in.Role, Active: true, PasswordHash: hash, Found: true,
}
return TeamMember{ID: id, Email: in.Email, FullName: in.FullName,
Role: in.Role, Active: true}, nil
}
// ResetMemberPassword mirrors the real one: tenant-scoped, and every session
// the member holds is revoked with it.
func (f *fakeStore) ResetMemberPassword(_ context.Context, clientID, userID,
hash string) (TeamMember, error) {
f.mu.Lock()
defer f.mu.Unlock()
for email, u := range f.users {
if u.ID != userID || u.ClientID != clientID {
continue
}
u.PasswordHash = hash
f.users[email] = u
for _, s := range f.sessions {
if s.p.UserID == userID {
s.revoked = true
}
}
return TeamMember{ID: u.ID, Email: u.Email, FullName: u.FullName,
Role: u.Role, Active: u.Active}, nil
}
return TeamMember{}, errors.New("no such team member")
}