Files
Behavision/desktop/stream_proxy.go
Suriyakumarvijayanayagam 5e544eee3d The camera tiles put a password in the page, and loaded nothing
StreamURL built http://user:pass@127.0.0.1:8010/api/cameras/<id>/
stream.mjpeg and handed it to an <img>, with a comment saying the
credentials were inline "so an <img> tag can load it".

It cannot. Chromium strips credentials from subresource URLs and has
since M59, and WebView2 is Chromium - so on the one platform this
product ships to, every camera tile on a shop counter was a broken
image. Measured against a running engine: the app's Go-side calls
returned stats and people while an <img> on that very URL failed, and
curl proved the URL answered 200. The engine was never the problem.

The password now stays on this side of the process boundary. A loopback
relay attaches Basic auth and streams the engine's bytes back
unchanged - the same reasoning Shot.jsx already follows at head office,
where an <img> equally cannot carry a session.

What the relay is careful about, since it is a door onto the biometric
API with a credential attached:

  - loopback only, on a port the OS picks; a fixed one would collide
    with whatever else a shop PC runs and read as "the cameras broke"
  - a per-run random token in the path. The engine's own credential
    exists so the live face feed is never served open; an
    unauthenticated relay would hand that feed to any other process on
    the PC. Compared in constant time, and a wrong one is 404, not 403
  - an allow-list of stream.mjpeg and frame.jpg. Holding the token does
    not reach the identity list, the gallery, or erasure
  - camera ids validated, not interpolated
  - every chunk flushed; a buffered MJPEG stream is a tile that never
    paints, which looks identical to the bug being fixed

Two of those were written after a test failed, not before:

  - `..` MATCHES the id pattern, because real camera ids contain dots.
    `/api/cameras/../stream.mjpeg` is not the endpoint anyone intended.
    The id can never hold a slash, so `.` and `..` are the whole
    remaining traversal surface and are now refused by name.
  - the serve goroutine read p.srv off the struct while stop() was
    nilling it, so a quick start/stop dereferenced nil and took the
    process down. Captured before launching now.

FrameURL is deliberately not added. No screen asks for a still, and a
bound method nothing calls is the same defect as a capability the UI
cannot reach, only pointing the other way.

Verified: nine unit tests, plus a live test against the real engine and
the real office camera - two MJPEG frames, 90,793 bytes, no credential
in the URL. Windows and darwin both build; vet clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Pcn9asw19WGBfCEaHvNug6
2026-09-10 19:53:28 +05:30

250 lines
8.3 KiB
Go

package main
// streamProxy serves the engine's camera feeds to this app's own webview
// without putting a credential in the page.
//
// What this replaces: StreamURL used to build
// http://user:pass@127.0.0.1:8010/api/cameras/<id>/stream.mjpeg and hand it
// to an <img>, with a comment saying the credentials were inline "so an <img>
// tag can load it". It cannot. Chromium strips credentials from subresource
// URLs and has since M59, and WebView2 is Chromium - so on the one platform
// this product ships to, every camera tile on the shop floor renders as a
// broken image. Measured against the same running engine: the app's Go-side
// calls returned stats and people while an <img> on the very same URL failed,
// and curl proved the URL itself answered 200. The engine was never the
// problem; the browser was throwing the password away before it asked.
//
// So the password stays on this side of the process boundary. The webview
// asks this loopback listener, the listener attaches Basic auth and relays
// the engine's bytes back unchanged. It is the same reasoning the head-office
// web app already follows in Shot.jsx, where an <img> equally cannot carry a
// session and the bytes are fetched and handed over as an object URL.
import (
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"regexp"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
)
// A camera id reaches this from the engine and from a person typing into the
// Add Camera form. Validated rather than interpolated: without this a `..`
// would climb out of the two paths below and turn a camera relay into a proxy
// for any engine endpoint, with the credential helpfully attached.
var safeCameraIDChars = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,64}$`)
// safeCameraID is the character check AND the two names that pass it and still
// mean something to a path resolver.
//
// The pattern allows `.` because real camera ids contain them - which means it
// also allows exactly `.` and `..`, and `/api/cameras/../stream.mjpeg` is not
// the endpoint anyone intended. The id can never contain a slash (the path is
// split on them before we get here), so these two strings are the entire
// remaining traversal surface. Found by the test, not by reading the regex.
func safeCameraID(id string) bool {
if id == "." || id == ".." {
return false
}
return safeCameraIDChars.MatchString(id)
}
type streamProxy struct {
mu sync.RWMutex
ln net.Listener
srv *http.Server
client *http.Client
token string
target string // engine origin, e.g. http://127.0.0.1:8010
user string
pass string
}
func newStreamProxy() *streamProxy { return &streamProxy{} }
// start binds a loopback listener and begins relaying. Calling it again while
// running is a no-op, so a restarted engine cannot leave two listeners behind.
func (p *streamProxy) start(base, user, pass string) error {
p.mu.Lock()
defer p.mu.Unlock()
if p.srv != nil {
return nil
}
if !strings.HasPrefix(base, "http://") && !strings.HasPrefix(base, "https://") {
base = "http://" + base
}
if _, err := url.Parse(base); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("engine base %q: %w", base, err)
}
// The engine's own credential exists precisely so that the live face feed
// is never served open - CLAUDE.md is explicit that an unauthenticated
// listener would expose it. An unauthenticated loopback relay would hand
// that same feed to any other process on this PC, which on a shop counter
// is not a theoretical set. A per-run token, minted here and given only to
// this app's own webview, keeps the relay as private as the engine is.
raw := make([]byte, 32)
if _, err := rand.Read(raw); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("proxy token: %w", err)
}
// Port 0: the OS picks a free one. A fixed port would collide with
// whatever else a shop PC happens to be running, and the failure would be
// "the cameras stopped working" with nothing pointing at the cause.
ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("stream proxy listen: %w", err)
}
p.ln = ln
p.token = hex.EncodeToString(raw)
p.target = strings.TrimRight(base, "/")
p.user, p.pass = user, pass
// No client timeout: an MJPEG stream is endless by design and any deadline
// would cut the picture off mid-shift. The request context ends it when
// the webview navigates away or the tile is replaced.
p.client = &http.Client{
Transport: &http.Transport{
DialContext: (&net.Dialer{Timeout: 5 * time.Second}).DialContext,
TLSHandshakeTimeout: 5 * time.Second,
},
}
srv := &http.Server{Handler: http.HandlerFunc(p.handle)}
p.srv = srv
// srv and ln are captured, not read off the struct inside the goroutine:
// stop() sets both to nil, so a serve loop that reached for them after a
// quick start/stop would dereference nil and take the whole app down. The
// test that stops the relay found exactly that.
go func() { _ = srv.Serve(ln) }()
return nil
}
func (p *streamProxy) stop() {
p.mu.Lock()
srv, ln := p.srv, p.ln
p.srv, p.ln, p.token = nil, nil, ""
p.mu.Unlock()
if srv != nil {
_ = srv.Close()
}
if ln != nil {
_ = ln.Close()
}
}
// urlFor returns the loopback URL for one camera resource, or "" when the
// proxy is not running so the caller can fall back.
func (p *streamProxy) urlFor(cameraID, file string) string {
p.mu.RLock()
defer p.mu.RUnlock()
if p.ln == nil || p.token == "" || !safeCameraID(cameraID) {
return ""
}
return fmt.Sprintf("http://%s/s/%s/%s/%s",
p.ln.Addr().String(), p.token, cameraID, file)
}
func (p *streamProxy) handle(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
p.mu.RLock()
token, target, user, pass, client := p.token, p.target, p.user, p.pass, p.client
p.mu.RUnlock()
if token == "" || client == nil {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
// /s/<token>/<camera>/<file>
parts := strings.Split(strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/"), "/")
if len(parts) != 4 || parts[0] != "s" {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
// Constant time: the token is the only thing standing between another
// local process and a live view of customers' faces.
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(parts[1]), []byte(token)) != 1 {
// 404 rather than 403. There is nothing here to tell an unwelcome
// caller they have found the right door with the wrong key.
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
cameraID := parts[2]
if !safeCameraID(cameraID) {
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
// An allow-list, not a prefix match. Everything else the engine serves -
// the identity list, the gallery, erasure - stays unreachable through here
// even for a caller holding the token.
//
// frame.jpg is listed although no screen asks for one yet. It is reachable
// only through urlFor, which is internal, so it adds no bound API nobody
// calls; it is here so that adding a still later is a change to a screen
// rather than a change to the one file where a mistake is a credentialed
// proxy onto the biometric API.
var enginePath string
switch parts[3] {
case "stream.mjpeg":
enginePath = "/api/cameras/" + cameraID + "/stream.mjpeg"
case "frame.jpg":
enginePath = "/api/cameras/" + cameraID + "/frame.jpg"
default:
http.NotFound(w, r)
return
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(r.Context(), http.MethodGet, target+enginePath, nil)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "bad upstream request", http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
// frame.jpg takes width and quality; the engine re-encodes on demand.
req.URL.RawQuery = r.URL.RawQuery
if user != "" {
req.SetBasicAuth(user, pass)
}
resp, err := client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
http.Error(w, "engine unreachable", http.StatusBadGateway)
return
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
for _, h := range []string{"Content-Type", "Cache-Control", "Pragma", "Expires"} {
if v := resp.Header.Get(h); v != "" {
w.Header().Set(h, v)
}
}
w.WriteHeader(resp.StatusCode)
// Copied by hand rather than with io.Copy so every chunk is flushed. An
// MJPEG stream never ends, so anything buffered waiting for a full buffer
// is a tile that stays blank forever - which is the same symptom as the
// bug this file exists to fix, and would look like it had not worked.
flusher, _ := w.(http.Flusher)
buf := make([]byte, 32*1024)
for {
n, rerr := resp.Body.Read(buf)
if n > 0 {
if _, werr := w.Write(buf[:n]); werr != nil {
return // webview went away
}
if flusher != nil {
flusher.Flush()
}
}
if rerr != nil {
return
}
}
}