// Package blob puts face images in S3-compatible object storage.
//
// Written against the S3 REST API directly rather than pulling in the AWS SDK:
// this needs four operations, the SDK is tens of megabytes of dependency, and
// SigV4 is a hash chain and a sorted header list. The whole protocol surface
// used here is in this file.
//
// Two rules the rest of the system depends on:
//
//  1. Objects are written PRIVATE, always. The bucket this ships against is
//     world-readable at the bucket level - anonymous listing and anonymous GET
//     both work on it today - so a face image written with a public ACL would
//     be downloadable by anyone who guessed or listed the key. Private objects
//     stay private even in that bucket; measured, not assumed.
//
//  2. Nothing outside this package ever sees a permanent URL. Reads go through
//     a presigned GET that expires. A stored public URL is unrevocable, and
//     these are pictures of customers' faces: "delete my data" has to mean the
//     link stops working, not that we stop linking to it.
package blob

import (
	"bytes"
	"context"
	"crypto/hmac"
	"crypto/sha256"
	"encoding/hex"
	"errors"
	"fmt"
	"io"
	"net/http"
	"net/url"
	"sort"
	"strings"
	"time"
)

type Config struct {
	Region    string // e.g. sgp1
	Endpoint  string // e.g. sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com
	Bucket    string
	AccessKey string
	SecretKey string
	// Prefix namespaces this deployment inside a bucket that may be shared
	// with other applications. The bucket in use already holds an unrelated
	// app's uploads, so writing to the root would mingle two systems'
	// retention and deletion rules.
	Prefix string
}

type Store struct {
	cfg  Config
	host string
	http *http.Client
}

var ErrNotConfigured = errors.New("object storage is not configured")

func New(cfg Config) (*Store, error) {
	for name, v := range map[string]string{
		"region": cfg.Region, "endpoint": cfg.Endpoint, "bucket": cfg.Bucket,
		"access key": cfg.AccessKey, "secret key": cfg.SecretKey,
	} {
		if strings.TrimSpace(v) == "" {
			return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %s is missing", ErrNotConfigured, name)
		}
	}
	if cfg.Prefix == "" {
		cfg.Prefix = "behavision"
	}
	return &Store{
		cfg:  cfg,
		host: cfg.Bucket + "." + cfg.Endpoint,
		// Generous: this is a cross-region upload from a 2 vCPU box, and a
		// deletion that times out is a deletion that did not happen.
		http: &http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second},
	}, nil
}

// Key builds the object key for one visit's face image.
//
// The SERVER builds this, never the agent. The site slug is taken from the
// credential the request authenticated with, so a site physically cannot write
// into another site's prefix - which is the whole reason upload goes through a
// presigned URL rather than by handing shop PCs a bucket key.
//
// Dated path segments are not decoration: retention runs by prefix, so
// "delete everything older than ninety days" is a listing over date prefixes
// rather than a scan of the whole bucket.
func (s *Store) Key(client, site, visitID string, at time.Time) string {
	at = at.UTC()
	return fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s/%s/%04d/%02d/%02d/%s.jpg",
		s.cfg.Prefix, safeSegment(client), safeSegment(site),
		at.Year(), int(at.Month()), at.Day(), safeSegment(visitID))
}

// safeSegment keeps a caller-influenced string from escaping its prefix.
//
// Slugs are already constrained by a CHECK in the schema and visit ids are
// uuids, so this should never change anything - which is exactly why it is
// cheap to keep. A single "../" reaching a key builder is a cross-tenant
// overwrite.
func safeSegment(s string) string {
	var b strings.Builder
	for _, c := range s {
		switch {
		case c >= 'a' && c <= 'z', c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z',
			c >= '0' && c <= '9', c == '-', c == '_':
			b.WriteRune(c)
		default:
			b.WriteByte('-')
		}
	}
	out := b.String()
	if out == "" {
		return "unknown"
	}
	return out
}

// OwnsKey reports whether a key belongs to this deployment's prefix.
//
// The agent sends back the key it was given, and a compromised or buggy one
// could send any string. Without this check the server would hand out
// presigned reads for arbitrary objects in a bucket it shares with another
// application.
func (s *Store) OwnsKey(key string) bool {
	return key != "" &&
		strings.HasPrefix(key, s.cfg.Prefix+"/") &&
		!strings.Contains(key, "..") &&
		!strings.Contains(key, "//")
}

// PresignPut returns a URL the agent can PUT one image to, and nothing else.
//
// The shop PC never holds bucket credentials. A stolen or resold machine
// therefore gives up at most a few minutes of write access to one key, instead
// of read and write over a bucket that also holds another application's data.
//
// The ACL is signed into the URL, so the agent cannot choose to make the object
// public: it must send the matching header or the signature fails.
func (s *Store) PresignPut(key string, ttl time.Duration) (string, http.Header, error) {
	if !s.OwnsKey(key) {
		return "", nil, fmt.Errorf("refusing to presign a key outside %s/", s.cfg.Prefix)
	}
	hdr := http.Header{}
	hdr.Set("x-amz-acl", "private")
	hdr.Set("Content-Type", "image/jpeg")
	u, err := s.presign(http.MethodPut, key, ttl, map[string]string{
		"x-amz-acl":    "private",
		"content-type": "image/jpeg",
	})
	return u, hdr, err
}

// PresignGet returns a short-lived read URL.
//
// Short because it ends up in a browser's history, a screenshot and a support
// ticket. Fifteen minutes is long enough to look at a page and too short to be
// worth passing on.
func (s *Store) PresignGet(key string, ttl time.Duration) (string, error) {
	if !s.OwnsKey(key) {
		return "", errors.New("not an object this deployment owns")
	}
	return s.presign(http.MethodGet, key, ttl, nil)
}

// Delete removes an object. Used by the erasure path, where it is the whole
// point: a GDPR/DPDP deletion that leaves the face image in a bucket has not
// deleted anything.
//
// A missing object is success. Erasure must be idempotent - a retry after a
// half-finished deletion has to be able to finish, not fail forever on the
// object that already went.
func (s *Store) Delete(ctx context.Context, key string) error {
	if !s.OwnsKey(key) {
		return errors.New("not an object this deployment owns")
	}
	code, body, err := s.do(ctx, http.MethodDelete, key, nil, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if code == http.StatusNoContent || code == http.StatusOK || code == http.StatusNotFound {
		return nil
	}
	return fmt.Errorf("delete %s: HTTP %d: %s", key, code, snippet(body))
}

// Put uploads directly. The agent uses a presigned URL instead; this exists for
// the server's own writes and for the connectivity self-test, so a
// misconfiguration is found at deploy time rather than by a shop PC at 9am.
func (s *Store) Put(ctx context.Context, key string, body []byte, contentType string) error {
	if !s.OwnsKey(key) {
		return errors.New("not an object this deployment owns")
	}
	if contentType == "" {
		contentType = "application/octet-stream"
	}
	code, resp, err := s.do(ctx, http.MethodPut, key, body, map[string]string{
		"x-amz-acl":    "private",
		"content-type": contentType,
	})
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	if code != http.StatusOK && code != http.StatusCreated {
		return fmt.Errorf("put %s: HTTP %d: %s", key, code, snippet(resp))
	}
	return nil
}

// Check proves the credentials work and, more importantly, that an object
// written here is NOT publicly readable.
//
// The second half is the one worth running: the bucket this ships against is
// world-readable at the bucket level, so "the upload worked" and "the face
// image is safe" are completely different questions.
func (s *Store) Check(ctx context.Context) error {
	key := s.cfg.Prefix + "/_selftest/reachability"
	if err := s.Put(ctx, key, []byte("behavision self-test"), "text/plain"); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("cannot write to the bucket: %w", err)
	}
	defer s.Delete(context.WithoutCancel(ctx), key) //nolint:errcheck

	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet,
		"https://"+s.host+"/"+key, nil)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	resp, err := s.http.Do(req)
	if err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("cannot reach the bucket: %w", err)
	}
	defer resp.Body.Close()
	io.Copy(io.Discard, io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<10)) //nolint:errcheck
	if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusOK {
		return errors.New("objects written here are readable with NO credentials - " +
			"face images must not go in this bucket until that is fixed")
	}
	return nil
}

// -- signing ---------------------------------------------------------------

func (s *Store) do(ctx context.Context, method, key string, body []byte,
	extra map[string]string) (int, []byte, error) {

	path := "/" + key
	now := time.Now().UTC()
	amzDate := now.Format("20060102T150405Z")
	dateStamp := now.Format("20060102")
	payloadHash := hex.EncodeToString(sha256sum(body))

	headers := map[string]string{
		"host":                 s.host,
		"x-amz-content-sha256": payloadHash,
		"x-amz-date":           amzDate,
	}
	for k, v := range extra {
		headers[strings.ToLower(k)] = v
	}
	signed := sortedKeys(headers)
	var canonHeaders strings.Builder
	for _, k := range signed {
		canonHeaders.WriteString(k + ":" + headers[k] + "\n")
	}
	signedList := strings.Join(signed, ";")
	canon := method + "\n" + escapePath(path) + "\n\n" +
		canonHeaders.String() + "\n" + signedList + "\n" + payloadHash

	scope := dateStamp + "/" + s.cfg.Region + "/s3/aws4_request"
	toSign := "AWS4-HMAC-SHA256\n" + amzDate + "\n" + scope + "\n" +
		hex.EncodeToString(sha256sum([]byte(canon)))
	sig := hex.EncodeToString(hmacSHA256(s.signingKey(dateStamp), toSign))

	var rdr io.Reader
	if body != nil {
		rdr = bytes.NewReader(body)
	}
	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, method, "https://"+s.host+escapePath(path), rdr)
	if err != nil {
		return 0, nil, err
	}
	for k, v := range headers {
		if k == "host" {
			continue
		}
		req.Header.Set(k, v)
	}
	req.Header.Set("Authorization", fmt.Sprintf(
		"AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 Credential=%s/%s, SignedHeaders=%s, Signature=%s",
		s.cfg.AccessKey, scope, signedList, sig))

	resp, err := s.http.Do(req)
	if err != nil {
		return 0, nil, err
	}
	defer resp.Body.Close()
	out, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 64<<10))
	return resp.StatusCode, out, nil
}

func (s *Store) presign(method, key string, ttl time.Duration,
	signedHeaders map[string]string) (string, error) {

	if ttl <= 0 || ttl > 12*time.Hour {
		// A presigned URL is a bearer token for one object. A day-long one
		// forwarded in an email outlives every reason it was issued for.
		ttl = 15 * time.Minute
	}
	path := escapePath("/" + key)
	now := time.Now().UTC()
	amzDate := now.Format("20060102T150405Z")
	dateStamp := now.Format("20060102")
	scope := dateStamp + "/" + s.cfg.Region + "/s3/aws4_request"

	headers := map[string]string{"host": s.host}
	for k, v := range signedHeaders {
		headers[strings.ToLower(k)] = v
	}
	signed := sortedKeys(headers)
	var canonHeaders strings.Builder
	for _, k := range signed {
		canonHeaders.WriteString(k + ":" + headers[k] + "\n")
	}
	signedList := strings.Join(signed, ";")

	q := url.Values{}
	q.Set("X-Amz-Algorithm", "AWS4-HMAC-SHA256")
	q.Set("X-Amz-Credential", s.cfg.AccessKey+"/"+scope)
	q.Set("X-Amz-Date", amzDate)
	q.Set("X-Amz-Expires", fmt.Sprintf("%d", int(ttl.Seconds())))
	q.Set("X-Amz-SignedHeaders", signedList)
	canonQuery := q.Encode()

	canon := method + "\n" + path + "\n" + canonQuery + "\n" +
		canonHeaders.String() + "\n" + signedList + "\nUNSIGNED-PAYLOAD"
	toSign := "AWS4-HMAC-SHA256\n" + amzDate + "\n" + scope + "\n" +
		hex.EncodeToString(sha256sum([]byte(canon)))
	sig := hex.EncodeToString(hmacSHA256(s.signingKey(dateStamp), toSign))

	return "https://" + s.host + path + "?" + canonQuery + "&X-Amz-Signature=" + sig, nil
}

func (s *Store) signingKey(dateStamp string) []byte {
	k := hmacSHA256([]byte("AWS4"+s.cfg.SecretKey), dateStamp)
	k = hmacSHA256(k, s.cfg.Region)
	k = hmacSHA256(k, "s3")
	return hmacSHA256(k, "aws4_request")
}

func hmacSHA256(key []byte, msg string) []byte {
	m := hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
	m.Write([]byte(msg))
	return m.Sum(nil)
}

func sha256sum(b []byte) []byte {
	h := sha256.New()
	h.Write(b)
	return h.Sum(nil)
}

func sortedKeys(m map[string]string) []string {
	out := make([]string, 0, len(m))
	for k := range m {
		out = append(out, k)
	}
	sort.Strings(out)
	return out
}

// escapePath encodes each segment but keeps the separators. url.PathEscape on
// the whole path would turn every "/" into %2F and address one object with a
// very strange name.
func escapePath(p string) string {
	parts := strings.Split(p, "/")
	for i, s := range parts {
		parts[i] = url.PathEscape(s)
	}
	return strings.Join(parts, "/")
}

func snippet(b []byte) string {
	s := strings.TrimSpace(string(b))
	if len(s) > 300 {
		return s[:300]
	}
	return s
}