Every other thing in this product a person refers to already had a
readable reference: a shop is chennai, a camera cam1, a customer V-42, a
person their email. An audit of every list response found exactly one
gap, and it was the row people look at most - the arrivals feed showed a
visit as 36 hex characters.
012 argued no route takes a visit id so none was needed. That is true of
routing and false of everything else: it is what the feed shows, what a
support conversation quotes, and what somebody reading an API response
judges the product by.
Migration 014 mirrors the visitor scheme exactly - per client, so it
discloses no platform-wide volume, and beside the uuid rather than
instead of it. A stored counter is affordable on the busiest table
because visits from one tenant are already serialised by the consumer's
SetOrderMatters(true), so it adds no contention that was not already
there. A derived reference was the alternative and does not work:
several people through one door share occurred_at to the microsecond,
which is the collision 004 exists to handle.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KGcjxF1cNLcuwc3DAPcnfj
Every id in the schema is a uuid and stays one. What was wrong was
putting one in front of a person: RecordVisit named every new customer
'Visitor ' || left(id::text, 8), so the arrivals feed, the shop PC and
the mobile app all read "Visitor 3446ec35" - the string a shop assistant
reads to a colleague and types into a search box. label is a stored
column staff can overwrite and SearchVisitors matches on, so formatting
around it in a front end would have left the data wrong on three
surfaces.
Migration 012 adds a per-client visitors.number, taken from a counter on
clients with UPDATE ... RETURNING inside the visit transaction. Per
client rather than global: a global sequence would tell any customer who
signs up how many people the whole platform has ever seen, from their
own first visitor number. The backfill numbers existing rows by
first_seen_at and relabels only the eight-hex pattern the old statement
produced, so a human-typed name is never overwritten.
Three of the four things anyone addresses by URL already had a human
name and the API simply refused it - a site has a slug, a camera has the
id the engine knows it by. refs.go accepts either form anywhere an id is
taken; a uuid resolves with no lookup, so every URL a client already
stored keeps working.
- An ambiguous camera name resolves to nothing, never to a guess: two
shops may each have an "Office1" and acting on the first row would
edit the wrong shop's camera.
- 404 on a path, 400 on a query filter. /api/visits answered fine and it
was the filter that was wrong.
- site and site_id are both accepted everywhere now. They differed per
endpoint, and an unknown query parameter is silently ignored, so
getting it the wrong way round returned the whole estate.
- The search matches V-13, which is what the product now shows.
Two bugs found by running it rather than testing it:
- 'Visitor ' || $2::text beside number = $2 makes Postgres deduce two
types for one parameter and refuse the insert. It compiled and passed
every in-memory test; the first real database rejected it, along with
the existing face tests that share the path.
- The fallback avatar said "V1" for Visitor 13, Visitor 10 and Visitor
15 alike, and read as the V-1 reference for a fourth person. It shows
the number now. The prop is customerRef, not ref - React reserves
that name and it would never have arrived.
Verified on the live database and through the running API: 13 hex labels
became Visitor 1-13 in first-seen order, two typed names left alone, and
the same customer reachable by uuid, V-13 and 13.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HViLj9gYNRtSr7YVZmW5sn
A tenant had exactly the users somebody had created with a command on the
server. That is not a missing screen: a shop with an owner and four staff
either shared one password or raised a ticket per person, and a phone app
for the shop floor could not exist while there was one account to sign in
as.
Registration is by invitation, never open signup - the same line already
drawn around creating a company. The code carries the address and the role
and the request carries only a password, so a code that gets forwarded
cannot become somebody else's account, and a staff invitation cannot be
redeemed as an owner. Single use lives in the UPDATE and the account is
created in the same transaction.
Deactivating a member revokes their sessions in that transaction too. An
access token lives twelve hours, so without it "remove their access"
removed it sometime tomorrow. The session list and revoke that go with it
are the benefit of opaque tokens the product had been paying for and never
collecting: nothing could say what was signed in, let alone stop one.
Face images now work on a deployment with no object storage, which was
every local install and every self-hosted site - the arrivals feed said
"not storing customer photos" for every customer forever, on the screen
whose whole job is to show a face. Bounded to one row per visitor, so it
grows with the customer base and not with footfall; the bucket stays
primary wherever one exists.
Image.auth says whether a URL needs the session, because a browser img
cannot load one that does, a mobile image view can, and a webview can do
neither - the desktop client resolves those to a data URI in Go.
Found by running it, not by tests:
* UPDATE ... RETURNING gives the value AFTER the update, so the prune
read back empty keys, deleted nothing, and the table grew with
footfall exactly as if it were not there. The fake agreed with either
version; only the live Postgres test caught it.
* Trusting only the auth flag broke every shop card, because Sites.jsx
rebuilt a partial snapshot object and dropped it. A relative URL is
now sufficient on its own.
* ago() renders a future time as "just now", so a code valid for a week
read "expires just now".
Verified live against real Postgres: invite, preview, escalation refused,
register into a session, replay 404, staff forbidden, device revoked and
401 at once, last owner refused, and a 92,405-byte camera JPEG stored,
served to its owner, 401 with no session, 404 to another tenant, and
rendered in a browser.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HViLj9gYNRtSr7YVZmW5sn
Migrations were run by hand and nothing recorded which had run, so
re-running the setup script against an existing database failed on the
first CREATE TABLE, and shipping a new migration gave an operator no way
to know whether an estate had it. A missed migration is not a startup
error - it is a query referencing a column that is not there, surfacing
later on whichever endpoint touches it first.
server/internal/migrate applies pending migrations at boot and refuses to
start against a schema it does not match. One transaction per file
holding both the DDL and the row that records it; an advisory lock so two
servers starting at once cannot both apply 008; checksums so an edited
migration is refused by name rather than silently skipped; numeric
ordering so 010 does not run before 009. `migrate -baseline N` adopts a
database built before any of this existed, because "the clients table
exists" does not say whether 007's index does.
Verified on the live database: adopted 001-007, applied 008.
008 adds two indexes on `purchases`, found by asking the database which
foreign keys had nothing behind them and then checking what queries the
table. The conversion report filters client_id + occurred_at, which is
exactly the estate-wide case with no site to narrow it.
run-local.sh had two bugs, both found by running it rather than reading
it: it reused a broker container whose bind mount pointed at a directory
that no longer existed, and it discarded stderr on the mosquitto_passwd
call, so under `set -e` it exited at step 5 with no output at all.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HViLj9gYNRtSr7YVZmW5sn
Five components that ship as one product:
- behavision/ the recognition engine. RTSP ingest, YuNet detection, IoU
tracking, ArcFace embeddings, a FAISS/SQLite gallery, and a
FastAPI dashboard. Identity is decided once per TRACK from an
average of at least three embeddings, never per frame.
- agent/ the Go edge agent: supervises the engine, holds a durable
spool, and drains it to MQTT. Nothing is acked before the
broker confirms.
- desktop/ the shop PC application (Wails + React + tray).
- server/ the cloud API, MQTT consumer, reports and assistant.
- web/ platform.loyaly.ai, the head-office app, embedded in the
server binary.
The gallery stores 512-float embeddings and timestamps - no images unless
`app.store_faces` is switched on. Those embeddings are biometric personal
data under GDPR and India's DPDP: template inversion reconstructs a
recognisable face from an ArcFace vector, so data/behavision.db is treated
as a biometric database and DELETE /api/visitors/{id} is a real erasure.
CLAUDE.md carries the reasoning behind every non-obvious decision here,
including the ones that were measured and the ones that were wrong first.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HViLj9gYNRtSr7YVZmW5sn
