Behavision: face recognition for retail, edge to head office
Five components that ship as one product:
- behavision/ the recognition engine. RTSP ingest, YuNet detection, IoU
tracking, ArcFace embeddings, a FAISS/SQLite gallery, and a
FastAPI dashboard. Identity is decided once per TRACK from an
average of at least three embeddings, never per frame.
- agent/ the Go edge agent: supervises the engine, holds a durable
spool, and drains it to MQTT. Nothing is acked before the
broker confirms.
- desktop/ the shop PC application (Wails + React + tray).
- server/ the cloud API, MQTT consumer, reports and assistant.
- web/ platform.loyaly.ai, the head-office app, embedded in the
server binary.
The gallery stores 512-float embeddings and timestamps - no images unless
`app.store_faces` is switched on. Those embeddings are biometric personal
data under GDPR and India's DPDP: template inversion reconstructs a
recognisable face from an ArcFace vector, so data/behavision.db is treated
as a biometric database and DELETE /api/visitors/{id} is a real erasure.
CLAUDE.md carries the reasoning behind every non-obvious decision here,
including the ones that were measured and the ones that were wrong first.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HViLj9gYNRtSr7YVZmW5sn
This commit is contained in:
106
server/internal/secret/secret.go
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106
server/internal/secret/secret.go
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// Package secret encrypts the few values the server must be able to hand back
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// out again — today, each site's broker password.
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//
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// A password that gets given to an enrolling PC cannot be hashed, so the
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// choice is plaintext in a column or encrypted with a key that lives outside
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// the database. Encrypted means a stolen dump is not a set of live broker
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// logins, which is exactly what the plaintext column would be.
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package secret
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import (
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"crypto/aes"
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"crypto/cipher"
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"crypto/rand"
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"encoding/base64"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"os"
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)
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// Box seals and opens values with AES-256-GCM.
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type Box struct{ aead cipher.AEAD }
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var ErrNoKey = errors.New("BEHAVISION_SECRET_KEY is not set")
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// FromEnv builds a Box from a base64 32-byte key.
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//
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// Refuses a short key outright rather than stretching it. A key derived from
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// whatever someone typed into an env var is a key with unknown entropy, and
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// "it worked" would hide that permanently.
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func FromEnv(name string) (*Box, error) {
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raw := os.Getenv(name)
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if raw == "" {
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return nil, ErrNoKey
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}
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key, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(raw)
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if err != nil {
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key, err = base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(raw)
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}
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("%s must be base64: %w", name, err)
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}
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return New(key)
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}
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func New(key []byte) (*Box, error) {
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if len(key) != 32 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("key must be 32 bytes, got %d "+
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"(generate one with: openssl rand -base64 32)", len(key))
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}
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blk, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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aead, err := cipher.NewGCM(blk)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return &Box{aead: aead}, nil
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}
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// NewKey generates a key for provisioning.
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func NewKey() (string, error) {
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var k [32]byte
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if _, err := rand.Read(k[:]); err != nil {
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return "", err
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}
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return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(k[:]), nil
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}
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// Seal returns nonce||ciphertext.
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//
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// `aad` binds the ciphertext to where it is stored — the agent id for a broker
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// password. Without it a row copied from one agent to another decrypts happily,
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// so a database write becomes a way to hand one site another site's
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// credentials.
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func (b *Box) Seal(plain []byte, aad string) ([]byte, error) {
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nonce := make([]byte, b.aead.NonceSize())
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if _, err := rand.Read(nonce); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return b.aead.Seal(nonce, nonce, plain, []byte(aad)), nil
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}
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func (b *Box) Open(sealed []byte, aad string) ([]byte, error) {
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n := b.aead.NonceSize()
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if len(sealed) < n {
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return nil, errors.New("ciphertext is truncated")
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}
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out, err := b.aead.Open(nil, sealed[:n], sealed[n:], []byte(aad))
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if err != nil {
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// Deliberately vague to the caller's caller: whether a value failed to
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// decrypt because of the key or because of tampering is not something
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// to report over HTTP.
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return nil, errors.New("cannot decrypt: wrong key or altered data")
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}
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return out, nil
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}
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func (b *Box) SealString(plain, aad string) ([]byte, error) {
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return b.Seal([]byte(plain), aad)
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}
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func (b *Box) OpenString(sealed []byte, aad string) (string, error) {
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out, err := b.Open(sealed, aad)
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return string(out), err
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}
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