A merchant can create a salesperson's login and hand it over

The flow this product is sold on is three tiers: the platform admin
registers a merchant, the merchant registers their sales staff, the
staff sign in on a phone. Tier 1 handed the new owner a password. Tier 2
could not - a manager could only mint an invitation code, which the
salesperson had to redeem themselves, on their own phone, choosing their
own password. Good practice, and no use to a manager setting somebody up
before their first shift with a card and a pen.

POST /api/team/members mirrors POST /api/admin/clients: generated
password unless one is given, returned exactly once, bcrypt-hashed on
the way in and not recoverable after. Same permission shape as an
invitation - manager and above, only an owner mints an owner, admin
refused - so a manager cannot do through one door what they are refused
at the other. The invitation path stays; it is the better one whenever
the salesperson has their phone.

POST /api/team/{id}/password is the everyday case on a shop floor:
they forgot it. It sets a new one AND revokes every session they hold,
in one transaction, because the other reason a manager resets a
password is a lost phone, and a reset that left that phone signed in
would look complete while fixing nothing. Tenant-scoped in the UPDATE
itself; another company's user id is 404, never 403. No self-service
and no reset-by-email, deliberately: a floor account often has no
mailbox anyone checks, and the person who can vouch for the salesperson
standing in front of them is their manager.

RandomPassword moves from a private helper in the store to auth, so the
admin path, the merchant path and the reset all mint the same 80-bit
credential - rather than someone later writing a shorter one for the
"less important" account.

Verified: eight handler tests, and two against a real Postgres for the
things a fake cannot see - the RETURNING list scans on a row with no
last_login_at, the tenant scope holds, and the sessions row is actually
revoked. The tenant cleanup from yesterday held throughout.

API.md now documents the chain with both paths, and the note saying a
merchant could not create a login directly is gone because it is no
longer true.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KGcjxF1cNLcuwc3DAPcnfj

server/internal/store/api_team_live_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+package store
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/loyaly/behavision-server/internal/api"
+	"github.com/loyaly/behavision-server/internal/auth"
+)
+
+// The in-memory fake agrees with whatever SQL I wrote. These run the two new
+// statements against Postgres: the RETURNING list has to scan, the tenant
+// scope has to hold, and a reset has to actually revoke the sessions row.
+
+func TestLiveAManagerCreatedLoginRoundTrips(t *testing.T) {
+	st := liveStore(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	clientID, _ := seedTenant(t, st, "mem"+stamp(), 0, false)
+
+	hash, err := auth.HashPassword("a-perfectly-good-password")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	m, err := st.CreateMember(ctx, clientID, api.NewMemberInput{
+		Email: "priya@" + stamp() + ".test", FullName: "Priya R", Role: "staff",
+	}, hash)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("create: %v", err)
+	}
+	if m.ID == "" || !m.Active || m.Role != "staff" || m.CreatedAt == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("member not as created: %+v", m)
+	}
+	// LastLoginAt is RETURNED as '' for a brand-new row; it must scan into a
+	// string, not fail as an untyped literal.
+	if m.LastLoginAt != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("a new member has never logged in, got %q", m.LastLoginAt)
+	}
+
+	// Findable by the login path, in the right tenant, with the hash intact.
+	rec, err := st.UserByEmail(ctx, m.Email)
+	if err != nil || !rec.Found {
+		t.Fatalf("new member not findable: %v found=%v", err, rec.Found)
+	}
+	if rec.ClientID != clientID || !auth.VerifyPassword(rec.PasswordHash, "a-perfectly-good-password") {
+		t.Fatalf("landed wrong: client=%s verify=%v", rec.ClientID, auth.VerifyPassword(rec.PasswordHash, "a-perfectly-good-password"))
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLiveAResetIsTenantScopedAndRevokesSessions(t *testing.T) {
+	st := liveStore(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	mine, _ := seedTenant(t, st, "rsa"+stamp(), 0, false)
+	theirs, _ := seedTenant(t, st, "rsb"+stamp(), 0, false)
+
+	oldHash, _ := auth.HashPassword("old-password-here")
+	m, err := st.CreateMember(ctx, mine, api.NewMemberInput{
+		Email: "sam@" + stamp() + ".test", FullName: "Sam", Role: "staff"}, oldHash)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("create: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Give them a live session to lose.
+	if _, err := st.pool.Exec(ctx, `
+		INSERT INTO sessions (user_id, client_id, access_hash, refresh_hash,
+		                      access_expires_at, refresh_expires_at, device)
+		VALUES ($1::uuid, $2::uuid, $3, $4, now() + interval '1 hour',
+		        now() + interval '30 days', 'lost phone')`,
+		m.ID, mine, []byte("a"+stamp()), []byte("r"+stamp())); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("seed session: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Another tenant's manager cannot reset them, and it reads as no such row.
+	newHash, _ := auth.HashPassword("new-password-here")
+	if _, err := st.ResetMemberPassword(ctx, theirs, m.ID, newHash); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("a reset from another tenant should find nobody")
+	}
+
+	// Their own tenant can, and it takes the session with it.
+	if _, err := st.ResetMemberPassword(ctx, mine, m.ID, newHash); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("reset: %v", err)
+	}
+	var live int
+	if err := st.pool.QueryRow(ctx, `
+		SELECT count(*) FROM sessions WHERE user_id = $1::uuid AND revoked_at IS NULL`,
+		m.ID).Scan(&live); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if live != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("%d session(s) survived a password reset", live)
+	}
+	rec, _ := st.UserByEmail(ctx, m.Email)
+	if !auth.VerifyPassword(rec.PasswordHash, "new-password-here") ||
+		auth.VerifyPassword(rec.PasswordHash, "old-password-here") {
+		t.Fatal("the hash did not change to the new password")
+	}
+}