A merchant can create a salesperson's login and hand it over

The flow this product is sold on is three tiers: the platform admin
registers a merchant, the merchant registers their sales staff, the
staff sign in on a phone. Tier 1 handed the new owner a password. Tier 2
could not - a manager could only mint an invitation code, which the
salesperson had to redeem themselves, on their own phone, choosing their
own password. Good practice, and no use to a manager setting somebody up
before their first shift with a card and a pen.

POST /api/team/members mirrors POST /api/admin/clients: generated
password unless one is given, returned exactly once, bcrypt-hashed on
the way in and not recoverable after. Same permission shape as an
invitation - manager and above, only an owner mints an owner, admin
refused - so a manager cannot do through one door what they are refused
at the other. The invitation path stays; it is the better one whenever
the salesperson has their phone.

POST /api/team/{id}/password is the everyday case on a shop floor:
they forgot it. It sets a new one AND revokes every session they hold,
in one transaction, because the other reason a manager resets a
password is a lost phone, and a reset that left that phone signed in
would look complete while fixing nothing. Tenant-scoped in the UPDATE
itself; another company's user id is 404, never 403. No self-service
and no reset-by-email, deliberately: a floor account often has no
mailbox anyone checks, and the person who can vouch for the salesperson
standing in front of them is their manager.

RandomPassword moves from a private helper in the store to auth, so the
admin path, the merchant path and the reset all mint the same 80-bit
credential - rather than someone later writing a shorter one for the
"less important" account.

Verified: eight handler tests, and two against a real Postgres for the
things a fake cannot see - the RETURNING list scans on a row with no
last_login_at, the tenant scope holds, and the sessions row is actually
revoked. The tenant cleanup from yesterday held throughout.

API.md now documents the chain with both paths, and the note saying a
merchant could not create a login directly is gone because it is no
longer true.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KGcjxF1cNLcuwc3DAPcnfj

server/internal/store/api_admin.go

@@ -2,10 +2,7 @@ package store
 
 import (
 	"context"
-	"crypto/rand"
-	"encoding/base32"
 	"fmt"
-	"strings"
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/loyaly/behavision-server/internal/api"
@@ -28,7 +25,7 @@ func (s *Store) CreateClientWithOwner(ctx context.Context, in api.NewClientInput
 	if password == "" {
 		// Generated rather than defaulted. An operator inventing a password for
 		// somebody else invents a weak one and then sends it over chat.
-		p, err := randomPassword()
+		p, err := auth.RandomPassword()
 		if err != nil {
 			return out, err
 		}
@@ -107,11 +104,3 @@ func (s *Store) ListClients(ctx context.Context) ([]api.ClientRow, error) {
 // base32 without padding, matching the rest of this system's generated
 // secrets: it gets read down a phone line and pasted into a form, and base64's
 // + / = survive neither.
-func randomPassword() (string, error) {
-	b := make([]byte, 10) // 80 bits -> 16 characters
-	if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
-		return "", err
-	}
-	return strings.ToLower(base32.StdEncoding.
-		WithPadding(base32.NoPadding).EncodeToString(b)), nil
-}