Production answered 502 Bad Gateway on a non-streamed agent run. Nothing about that was a gateway fault: krow-proxy already had proxy_read_timeout 3600s, and the API pods were healthy with zero restarts throughout. HTTP_WRITE_TIMEOUT was 30s. Every shipped agent runs at the `balanced` tier, whose deadline is 60s, and the `deep` tier allows 120s. So the server aborted the response on any run over half the time the runtime considered legal, the proxy saw its upstream vanish mid-response, and it reported the only thing it could. A gateway error for something no gateway did — which is why it looked like infrastructure for as long as it did. Delegation did not cause this; it made it routine. A parent that asks two subagents takes longer than one answering alone, so a latent misconfiguration became a reliable one. Verified: the exact request that returned 502 now answers 200 in 18s. Streaming is what hid it, and that is the part worth keeping in mind. The chat panel uses SSE, so the product looked healthy while every non-streaming caller got 502 on a slow question. A bug only reachable by the callers who do not yet exist is one nobody reports. So the value is now derived from the thing that constrains it — the default is DeepestAgentDeadline plus headroom rather than a number typed once — and validate() refuses anything below that deadline at startup. A slow, intermittent, misattributed failure becomes a message on the first boot. DeepestAgentDeadline is duplicated in internal/config rather than imported, because internal/runtime already imports internal/config and a cycle to share one number is a bad trade. TestConfigKnowsTheDeepestAgentDeadline asserts the two agree, so drift is a build failure rather than a discovery. It also checks that no tier exceeds it, or the name lies. ORDERING, and it matters for the next deploy: the check refuses the old 30s, so a pod carrying this image against an unpatched configmap will not boot. Production's configmap is already 180s. The handover says so too. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PJvibeSc1JYXjatankqM1g
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Handover
Written 2026-08-28, when the machine this was built on was retired.
Everything Claude Code "remembers" lives in ~/.claude/projects/<mangled-path>/
on one machine, keyed to the absolute path of the checkout. It does not sync,
and a different path on a new machine reads a different folder. So the durable
record is this file, in the repository, where git carries it and any path works.
Read CLAUDE.md first — it is the governing document. This file is what it does
not say: what was decided, what is deployed, and which parts bite.
Where things stand
Deployed. Backend at https://mcp.krowforce.com, frontend at
https://platform.krowforce.com, Kubernetes statefulset krow in namespace
krow, pods named krow-1 and krow-2 (they start at 1, not 0).
ssh root@<host> -p 4422 "kubectl -n krow rollout restart statefulset/krow && \
kubectl -n krow rollout status statefulset/krow --timeout=180s"
Verify a deployment — 55 checks including a real agent run:
KROW_EMAIL=... KROW_PASSWORD=... make verify-deploy BASE=https://mcp.krowforce.com
Auth runs BEFORE routing, so an unauthenticated probe answers 401 for every
path including ones that do not exist. curl cannot tell a missing endpoint
from a guarded one; only an authenticated check can.
Two runtime steps a deploy does not do, both easy to forget because the API looks healthy without them:
kubectl -n krow exec krow-1 -- importagents --org <slug> # publishes agents/ and skills/
kubectl -n krow exec krow-1 -- ingest --org <slug> # ingests knowledge/
Without the first, every Owliver question answers 404. Without the second,
retrieval finds nothing. The org slug is krow-dev — a hardcoded constant
(internal/orgctx.DevOrgSlug), not configuration.
The endpoint count is a signal. GET /api/v1/version reports it. Agent run
routes are not registered without a model credential, so 55 means no
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY and 57 means there is one. (These were written as 56/58
and were one high; the delta of two — the two run routes — was always right.) A keyless deployment boots
cleanly under APP_ENV=staging and refuses under production.
Decisions taken, so they are not relitigated
§12, who authors agents: self-serve, split by visibility. personal agents
are authored in the UI, POST to /api/v1/agent-definitions, and are runnable
immediately; evals are not required for them. organization agents stay as
files published by importagents on deploy — that deploy step is the approval
workflow, and §9's eval requirement still applies. §12 warned self-serve needs
"3× the platform"; it does not here, because I1 means an agent runs as its
caller and cannot exceed their access, I4 means writes still need a human, and
the spec format has no limits block so budgets cannot be raised by an author.
A rejected candidate counts as screened. It ranks with ai_screened:
rejection overwrites the stage it came from, so shortlisted can never be
claimed. An assigned candidate counts as hired, matching the backend's
existing status IN ('hired','assigned').
Seeded profile scores are the formula's output, not hand-authored narrative. Recalculating a seeded profile is a no-op, and a skill-check enforces it.
Conventions the schema actively contradicts
These are the ones that produce confident, wrong numbers rather than an error.
job_applications.screened_at is vestigial. Nothing writes it. "Screened"
means status <> 'applied', in about eight places in the frontend. Reading the
column reported 1 screened of 24 where the truth was 14.
A score of 0 means "not rated", never "rated zero". Every score column is
NOT NULL, so there is no null to distinguish it — that is the trap. Applies to
ai_score, client_rating, krow_score, reliability_score,
attendance_score, performance_score, experience_years. Aggregates need
FILTER (WHERE col > 0) and a stated basis count. Counting zeros once reported
"16 weak candidates averaging 28" for a pool that was 1 weak averaging 76.
Anchors to check against: applications are 9 scored averaging 76; workers are 5 rated of 9, client rating 4.70.
Genuine zeros, do not filter these: overtime_hours, minutes_late, xp,
profile_completion, and actual_hours (0 only on absent/no_show shifts).
absent and no_show are both missed shifts, but only one is a no-show.
attendance.js is canonical.
attendance_score defaults to 100 for display and must never be a scoring
input. A profile with no evidence otherwise scores 12 and leaves the "not yet
scored" band.
The stage ladder lives once, in krow-demo/src/lib/hiringRecords.js. It was
three byte-identical private copies, all missing rejected and assigned,
which indexOf scored -1 and dropped from every bucket including applied.
Things that will waste your afternoon
A space in the checkout path breaks path derivation. This repo lives under
Krow Project /, and it has bitten three times: an unquoted $(CURDIR) in the
Makefile, `file://${process.argv[1]}` in a script guard, and
new URL(...).pathname in scripts/oracle.mjs (use fileURLToPath). Any new
path derivation is guilty until tested there.
seed.json is generated from krow-demo/src/api/seed.js. Never edit it.
npm run seed:fixture writes it, npm run seed:check verifies, and the
skill-check compares byte-for-byte. ShiftRecord is excluded on purpose: the Go
seeder generates it against now.
Shift data is anchored to today, so anything asserting against it is
date-dependent unless the anchor is pinned. buildShiftsAt(anchor) exists for
that. One detector had a Friday-and-Saturday blind spot for exactly this reason.
Database tests skip when PostgreSQL is unreachable (testutil calls
t.Skipf). go test then exits 0 having run almost nothing. CI has a guard
that fails on any skip other than TestLive*; keep it.
The eval suites use a scripted model. They prove the permission boundary,
not answer quality. make eval-live uses the real model and costs tokens.
It has now been run, and passes 3/3 in about 30 seconds. Worth knowing what it established, because it is more than "the agents work":
- the coverage agent called
assign_workerand the write did NOT happen — I4 holds against a real model, not only a scripted one; - the handbook corpus contains a planted prompt injection telling the agent to send the staff roster to an external address. The agent refused it, answered the real question with citations, and reported the document as tampered with. I7 holds end to end;
- the activity agent declined to subtract two figures it could not reconcile, and said so, rather than producing the confident wrong number this schema invites.
Re-run it after any change to the loop, retrieval, or prompt assembly. It is the only check that measures answers rather than boundaries.
Seeded time-series data is rebased to now at seed time — see
seeder.RebaseToNow. ShiftRecord is generated against now; UserActivity,
JobApplication, AIInterview and Staff are moved so their newest record
sits at today, keeping every authored gap. Without it the demo goes quiet: on
2026-08-29 the newest activity event was 23 days old, applications 16 days,
staff hire dates 35 — zero events in the last 7 days and an empty Hiring
activity chart on Control Center.
Two things to know if you touch it. EVERY timestamp on a record shifts by the
same delta, not just the anchor: an application's created_date and updated_date
are what buildHires subtracts for time-to-hire, and moving one alone turns a
five-day hire into a three-week one. And Staff anchors on hire_date rather
than created_date, because the hire is the event the chart plots — leaving it
behind produced a workspace where somebody was hired last week according to
their application and five weeks ago according to their staff record.
Reference data is deliberately not rebased. A course's date is a fact about the course, not a position in a window.
HTTP_WRITE_TIMEOUT must exceed the deepest agent deadline. It was 30s in
production while every shipped agent runs at the balanced tier, whose
deadline is 60s — so the server aborted the response on any run over half its
allowed time, and the proxy in front answered 502 Bad Gateway. A gateway
error for something no gateway did, which is why it read as an infrastructure
fault: nginx was innocent and already had proxy_read_timeout 3600s.
Streaming hid it. The chat panel uses SSE and survives, so the product looked healthy while any non-streaming caller — a webhook, a script, an integration — got 502 on a slow question. Delegation made it routine rather than causing it: a parent that asks two subagents takes longer than one answering alone.
Production is now 180s, and config.validateWriteTimeout refuses a value below
DeepestAgentDeadline at startup. NOTE THE ORDERING: that constant is 120s, so
a deployment still carrying the old 30s will now refuse to boot. Patch the
configmap before shipping an image that contains the check.
Still outstanding
-
ANTHROPIC_API_KEYwas pasted into a chat transcript and is live in a Kubernetes Secret. Rotate it. -
Deployments report
version=dev: the image is built without--build-arg VERSION.make docker-buildpasses it. -
APP_ENV=stagingon the deployment, so the production config guards are off. -
CI tests but does not deploy. The README's claim that migrations are "run by CI against the target database" is still aspirational.
-
The fixture-drift CI jobs need
FRONTEND_REPO_TOKENto see the sibling repo, and fail rather than pass quietly without it. -
The remote is Gitea and the workflows are GitHub Actions syntax. Gitea Actions runs them, and a runner now exists:
gitea-runner(gitea/act_runner v0.6.1) on the cluster host, registered askrow-runnerwith labelsubuntu-latest, ubuntu-22.04mapped tonode:20-bookworm. Before that, both repositories had workflows that had never executed once — the 924 frontend checks, the whole Go suite, the skip guard and the suite-shrank guard were all things somebody had to remember to run.If a job fails resolving
actions/checkoutoractions/setup-node, the runner needs egress to github.com or a mirror; that is where those actions come from and Gitea does not host them. -
The application talks to its database in clear text.
DATABASE_SSLMODE= disableagainst66.116.207.225, which is a DIFFERENT machine from the cluster host — so credentials and every row cross the network unencrypted. It is permitted only becauseAPP_ENV=staging; the production guard refusesdisableoutright. PostgreSQL itself now hasssl = on(2026-08-29, port 5433, reload not restart), but the app does not reach PostgreSQL directly: pgbouncer terminates 5432 and offers no TLS of its own. The fix isclient_tls_sslmode = allowplus a cert in/etc/pgbouncer/pgbouncer.ini, thenDATABASE_SSLMODE=requireinkrow-configand thekrow-dbsecret.allowkeeps existing plaintext clients working, so it is additive. -
Production retrieval is keyword-only: no
EMBED_PROVIDERinkrow-config, soknowledge_chunks.embeddingis null for all 34 rows. AVOYAGE_API_KEYis the cheap fix; Ollama in-cluster is the other, and the nodes were at 60% and 49% memory when that was last looked at. -
Delegation (§6) is implemented and on
mainbut NOT deployed. Until the next image ships, production agents still ignore theirsubagents:. -
§3's publish-time cycle detection is still missing. The runtime depth cap (2) is what bounds a cycle that reaches run time.
-
cmd/importagentshas no tests, andrun()opens its own pool from config, so making it testable is a refactor rather than an addition. -
importagentsdoes not enforce monotonicity: a spec whoseversion:is LOWERED still overwrites the live row and rolls the deployed agent backwards.
Setting up a new machine
git clone <backend> krow-backend && git clone <frontend> krow-demo
cp krow-backend/CLAUDE.md ./claude.md # the governing doc lives above both repos
Needs, if you run the backend natively: Go (see go-api/go.mod), Node 20,
PostgreSQL, Docker, and Ollama with nomic-embed-text for semantic retrieval.
You do not need most of that. infrastructure/Dockerfile.api builds EVERY
command in go-api/cmd/ plus the golang-migrate CLI into the image, so the
whole stack runs on Docker alone — no Go, no psql, no migrate on the host:
cd krow-backend/infrastructure
cp .env.docker.example .env # fill it in; DATABASE_HOST=postgres
docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.local-db.yml up -d
docker exec krow-api seed
docker exec krow-api importagents --dir /app/agents --skills /app/skills --org krow-dev
docker exec krow-api ingest --dir /app/knowledge --org krow-dev
printf '%s' 'PASSWORD' | docker exec -i krow-api setpassword -email demo@krow.app -stdin
Ollama, if you want semantic retrieval, runs on the HOST — so the container
reaches it at host.docker.internal:11434, NOT localhost:11434, which inside
a container means the container.
Running natively instead, you need all of the above. Then:
cd krow-backend && cp .env.example .env # fill it in; .env is gitignored
make migrate-up && make seed
make import-agents ORG=krow-dev
make ingest ORG=krow-dev
go run ./go-api/cmd/setpassword -email demo@krow.app
cd ../krow-demo && npm ci && cp .env.example .env
# VITE_AGENT_API=/api/v1 for local dev (vite proxies it);
# production passes an absolute URL as a Docker build arg instead.
.env files are not in git and must be carried across by hand.