57c2a52c1ece3020a9f277fd778ba34b05c8153a
15 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 57c2a52c1e |
Refuse an HTTP write timeout that would cut off a legal agent run
Production answered 502 Bad Gateway on a non-streamed agent run. Nothing about that was a gateway fault: krow-proxy already had proxy_read_timeout 3600s, and the API pods were healthy with zero restarts throughout. HTTP_WRITE_TIMEOUT was 30s. Every shipped agent runs at the `balanced` tier, whose deadline is 60s, and the `deep` tier allows 120s. So the server aborted the response on any run over half the time the runtime considered legal, the proxy saw its upstream vanish mid-response, and it reported the only thing it could. A gateway error for something no gateway did — which is why it looked like infrastructure for as long as it did. Delegation did not cause this; it made it routine. A parent that asks two subagents takes longer than one answering alone, so a latent misconfiguration became a reliable one. Verified: the exact request that returned 502 now answers 200 in 18s. Streaming is what hid it, and that is the part worth keeping in mind. The chat panel uses SSE, so the product looked healthy while every non-streaming caller got 502 on a slow question. A bug only reachable by the callers who do not yet exist is one nobody reports. So the value is now derived from the thing that constrains it — the default is DeepestAgentDeadline plus headroom rather than a number typed once — and validate() refuses anything below that deadline at startup. A slow, intermittent, misattributed failure becomes a message on the first boot. DeepestAgentDeadline is duplicated in internal/config rather than imported, because internal/runtime already imports internal/config and a cycle to share one number is a bad trade. TestConfigKnowsTheDeepestAgentDeadline asserts the two agree, so drift is a build failure rather than a discovery. It also checks that no tier exceeds it, or the name lies. ORDERING, and it matters for the next deploy: the check refuses the old 30s, so a pod carrying this image against an unpatched configmap will not boot. Production's configmap is already 180s. The handover says so too. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PJvibeSc1JYXjatankqM1g |
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| 629d97181d |
Rebase Staff too, which was the last thing keeping the chart incomplete
And correct the previous commit's closing claim, which was wrong.
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| c378bc00ed |
Rebase seeded time-series data to now, so the demo stops going quiet
ShiftRecord is generated against now (shifts.go); everything else stayed on the fixed calendar in seed.js while the calendar moved on. Twenty-three days after that file was written the activity agent truthfully reported zero events in the last seven days, and applications were sixteen days stale. Nothing was broken — the data had simply aged out of every window the product reports over, and it gets worse every day nobody reseeds. RebaseToNow moves a set of records so the newest sits at now, keeping every gap exactly as authored. The SHAPE is what every reader of this data is looking at: three hires on one day, a screening the day after, a quiet fortnight before it. Shifting the whole set by one delta preserves all of it. Scaling into a window or scattering events across recent days would invent a rhythm nobody wrote. Applied per entity — UserActivity, JobApplication, AIInterview — because each anchors on its own newest record. One shared anchor would drag the quieter entities by another entity's delta and invent relationships between them. Reference data is untouched: a course's date is a fact about the course, not a position in a window. Rebasing rather than generating, so seed.json stays the single authored source, still deterministic and still comparable byte-for-byte by the drift check. The alternative — excluding these from the fixture the way ShiftRecord is — means a second generator to keep in step with the frontend's copy. The existing TestSeedPreservesSourceValues caught a real bug in the first attempt, and its comment is why: "Applications carry updated_date in the source, and the gap from created_date is what buildHires reads as time-to-hire." I had shifted created_date alone, which turned five-day hires into three-week ones. EVERY timestamp on a record now moves by the same delta, and there is a test on that specifically. That test now asserts the GAP rather than the absolute dates, because for a rebased entity the dates are deliberately different — which is the one reason it is supposed to allow. Its real subject was always the interval. Verified against the database: before, activity was 23 days old with 0 events in the last 7; after, all three entities are current, with 24 applications spread across the last 30 days and 15 activity events inside 30. Not fixed here: the Hiring activity chart on Control Center still renders empty, and it was equally empty before this change. Its bucketing is correct — replaying it in the browser against live data matched all 24 applications into the right days — so the fault is further down in that component, not in the data. Naming it rather than leaving it implied by a chart that still looks wrong. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PJvibeSc1JYXjatankqM1g |
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| 48ab9d1dad |
Give importagents tests, by separating what it decides from what it wires
This command had no tests at all, while carrying the rules that decide whether
a deploy may change a published agent. Everything interesting was inside run(),
which loads configuration, opens its own pool and resolves a tenant from a
slug — none of which a test can supply. So it was untestable by construction
rather than by neglect, and the fix is a seam, not a test-only helper.
Three functions come out of run(), each doing one thing:
validateSpecs the parse and status checks. Pure.
validateGraph §3's DAG check over the whole set. Pure.
importInto the write phase, taking a transaction the caller owns and
returning what it did.
run() is now the wiring around them. importInto does not commit — the caller
does — so a refused rewrite leaves the caller's deferred rollback to undo the
writes that already happened, which is the behaviour that was there before and
is now visible in the signature rather than implied by where the code sat.
Six tests, four of them against a real database:
- every problem is reported, not the first: two bad specs produce two
messages and a good one produces none;
- a chain is not a cycle, and a cycle names the edge to cut;
- a first import records versions, and a second over unchanged specs
records none — the counter that used to say nine every deploy;
- a changed spec at the same version is refused AND nothing is committed,
checked by reading the row back;
- a lowered version is refused and the live row is still at the higher one;
- a raised version is accepted and leaves two rows in the history.
The author is resolved through resolveAuthor rather than passed as a literal,
so the tests exercise that path too and fail loudly on an organization with no
active admin — a real deployment condition. The first draft passed "" and got
`invalid input syntax for type uuid`, which is what a literal buys you.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PJvibeSc1JYXjatankqM1g
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| 377948708b |
Enforce §3's monotonic version and its DAG requirement at publish
Two rules §3 states and nothing checked.
MONOTONIC. The rewrite guard added earlier compares content at ONE version
number, so republishing an OLDER number with the text originally published
under it looked like a no-op: nothing conflicted, nothing was refused, and the
live row silently reverted. The agent then reads v1 in the UI while the newest
thing anybody approved was v2. The test publishes v1, publishes v2, republishes
v1 byte-for-byte, and asserts both the refusal and that the live row is still
v2. Without the guard it answers 200 and the row goes back to version 1.
DAG. §3 says cycle detection runs at publish; only the runtime depth cap
existed. That cap means a cycle was never a safety problem — it was a budget
one. Every run entering the loop spends its whole allowance delegating in a
circle before terminating, and the author learns about it from a bill rather
than from the publish that created it.
definition.FindSubagentCycle is a pure function over id -> subagent ids, so it
is tested directly: chains, diamonds, self-reference, loops not involving the
first agent walked, and a 5000-long chain that would matter if this were
written to recurse carelessly. It REPORTS the cycle ("a -> b -> c -> a")
rather than merely detecting one, because an operator otherwise has to find it
by hand across a set of specs. The report is deterministic — a test runs it
fifty times over a graph with two cycles and requires the same answer, since Go
randomises map iteration and an error message that changes between identical
runs is one nobody trusts.
Wired into both publish paths. importagents has every spec in hand, which is
the only place that is cheaply true. The API builds the graph from
organization-visible agents plus the incoming definition standing in for its
stored self — otherwise an edit that CREATES a cycle is checked against the
version that did not have one and passes. Personal agents are excluded: they
are invisible to everyone else so cannot complete anyone else's loop, and
reading them would mean reading other people's drafts to validate your own.
An edge to an agent that is not in the set is ignored rather than reported.
That is a different failure with a different message
(runtime.unknown_subagent), and conflating them prints "cycle detected" for
what is actually a typo.
The cycle test bumps the version on the loop-closing edit. Without that the
rewrite guard refuses it for changing published text, the test passes for the
wrong reason, and it would keep passing with cycle detection deleted — which
is how it was first written, and what running it without the guard showed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PJvibeSc1JYXjatankqM1g
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| 6849363a37 |
Implement delegation, so an agent's subagents are more than decoration
krow-workforce-agent has declared five subagents since it was written and
answered every question by itself. Everything for §6 existed except the
delegation: the parser read `subagents:`, runtime.Agent carried them, the
loader populated them, agent_runs had a parent_run_id column with a
self-reference and a no-self-parent constraint, and budget.go's comments
already described sharing a budget with subagents. Nothing called any of it.
A subagent is offered to the parent's model as a tool, because §6 says that is
what delegation is from the parent's side. Three rules are enforced rather than
assumed, each with a test that fails if it stops holding:
I1 The subagent runs as the ORIGINAL caller. It cannot read anything the
person could not read directly.
§6 It SHARES the parent's budget. The test sets MaxSteps to 1, spends it in
the parent, and asserts the child terminates BudgetExceeded — an
assertion that only passes when the budget is shared, and that a fresh
budget would quietly turn green.
§3 Depth is capped at 2. At the cap no subagent is loaded or offered, so a
cycle reaching run time is bounded rather than unbounded.
I4 survives too: a write a SUBAGENT wants approved still stops the whole run
and asks a person, rather than being performed because it happened one level
down.
Two bugs found by running it rather than by reading it:
- delegate() read the error before the result. finish returns a non-nil
error for every termination that is not Completed, INCLUDING
ConfirmationPending — which is not a failure but a run that stopped to ask
a question. Reading the error first discarded the result and with it the
confirmation, so a subagent's write silently never happened and nobody was
asked.
- Delegated trajectories were never persisted at all. parent_run_id is a
foreign key and a subagent finishes BEFORE the run that delegated to it,
so every child insert named a parent row that did not exist yet. The
database refused it; finish deliberately does not fail a run over a sink
error; and the entry recording that the trajectory could not be saved was
itself in the trajectory that was not saved. Children are now buffered and
written by finish after the parent's own row, each arriving with its
descendants already ordered behind it, so one pass writes a whole tree
parent-first. The regression test asserts on save ORDER, because a
MemorySink has no foreign key and will pass either way.
Verified end to end against a live model: an agent with no tools of its own and
one subagent produced
delegation-probe run=run_16622d7de6 parent=(root)
talent-pool-agent run=run_64160684b1 parent=run_16622d7de6
with the subagent's answer reaching the parent's model. Full suite green, only
TestLive* skipped.
Not addressed: §3's publish-time cycle detection, which needs the whole agent
set in hand. The depth cap is what holds without it, and is the half that
matters at run time.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PJvibeSc1JYXjatankqM1g
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| a1e91f776d |
Compare definitions by meaning, and stop miscounting what was recorded
Two problems found by deploying the previous commits to production.
FIRST: the rewrite guard compared raw Markdown, so it refused a publish over
formatting. The authoring UI re-serialises a definition when somebody saves it
— writing `webSearch: false` where the hand-authored file omitted the key, and
ordering the frontmatter its own way — and the parser reads absent and false
identically (agent.go: `data["webSearch"] == true`). A definition nobody
meaningfully changed stopped a deploy. Refusing a change that is not a change
is still a bug, even though it fails safe.
definition.SameAgent and SameSkill compare the parsed definition instead, and
are deliberately conservative, because the two ways of being wrong are not
equally bad. A false difference blocks a deploy: visible, recoverable. A false
SAMENESS lets a changed agent overwrite an approved version silently, which is
the thing versioning exists to prevent. So:
- The body is compared verbatim. Agent.Body carries `json:"-"`, so a
comparison that only marshalled the struct would call a completely
rewritten system prompt "unchanged". There is a test that fails loudly on
exactly that, because it is the mistake this design invites.
- List ORDER stays significant. loader.go resolves Skills in order and that
order reaches prompt assembly, so two definitions listing the same skills
differently are still different. A deploy that only reorders still has to
raise its version. That is a limit, recorded in a test rather than left to
be discovered: loosening it needs somebody to decide skill order cannot
matter, which is not a decision to bury in a comparison function.
What it absorbs is exactly what the round trip produces: frontmatter key order,
whitespace, and a defaulted value written out in full.
SECOND: importagents reported "9 agent version(s) recorded" on a run that
recorded nothing. The counter incremented on every successful Snapshot call,
and Snapshot returns nil for the idempotent no-op as well as for a real insert.
The skill counter was already honest; the agent one was not. snapshotAgent now
distinguishes recorded / conflict / already-present, and only the first counts.
Verified locally: 1 on the run that added activity-agent v2, 0 on the re-run,
where it previously said 9. A number that says nine every time is one nobody
checks on the day it matters.
Full suite green against PostgreSQL, only TestLive* skipped.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PJvibeSc1JYXjatankqM1g
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Suriyakumarvijayanayagam
|
0cda877cd6 |
Version skills too, numbered by the server rather than by their author
repo.KindSkill existed with nothing writing it. Migration 000010 says "agents
and skills version identically", the table has always accepted kind='skill',
and no path on either side ever recorded one — so an edit to a skill left no
record of what it used to say. Agents name their skills and the runtime refuses
to load one whose skill is missing, so a skill changing under a pinned agent is
the same class of problem the last two commits fixed, one layer down.
Skills are numbered differently, and not by preference. An agent's frontmatter
carries `version:`, so its author decides when a change is a new version and can
be refused for rewriting an old one. definition.Skill has no such field, the
skill_definitions table has no such column, and the vocabulary is active |
inactive rather than draft | published. Giving skills an authored version would
mean a migration, a parser change on BOTH sides of the conformance test in
internal/definition — which replays a capture of the real frontend module graph
— and an edit to all 23 shipped skills. That is a feature, not this fix.
So the server assigns it: one after whatever was last published. This is not an
invention. repo.VersionsRepo.LatestVersion was written for exactly this and
says so — "the next published version has to follow what was actually published
rather than what somebody wrote in the frontmatter" — and had no callers
outside its own test.
Because the author never names a version, there is nothing to refuse: an edit
is always a new version. What needs care instead is the opposite — a save that
changed nothing must NOT be one, or every deploy would add a version to all 23
skills and the number would stop meaning anything. Each publish is compared
against the last recorded copy first. Inactive skills are not recorded at all;
inactive is this vocabulary's draft.
Verified against a live stack:
- first import over 23 unversioned skills: 23 skill version(s) recorded
- second import, files unchanged: 0 recorded, total still 23
- one skill edited: 1 recorded, that skill at v1, v2; v1 still holds the
original text and v2 the edit
The test fails without the change — "after create: 0 version(s), want 1" — and
covers the three behaviours that matter: an edit versions, an identical save
does not, and an inactive skill is not recorded.
Both races noted on the agent path apply here as well: two simultaneous edits
can compute the same next number, and the loser's snapshot is dropped rather
than failing the author's save.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PJvibeSc1JYXjatankqM1g
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Suriyakumarvijayanayagam
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6b3dda8e5a |
Record versions when importagents publishes, and refuse a silent rewrite
The previous commit closed this hole on the authoring path. This is the other
half, and the larger one: every organization agent is published by this
command, so until now none of them were versioned at all. definition_versions
was empty on a fully deployed system, and each deploy rewrote v1 in place with
whatever the files happened to say.
Versions are now recorded through the same transaction as the definitions, so
the history and the row it describes cannot disagree — either both land or
neither does. repo.VersionsRepo.Snapshot is what refuses a spec whose content
changed without its `version:` being raised, and that refusal now stops the
import rather than being absent.
Every offending spec is collected instead of the first being returned, matching
how the parse errors above it already behave: an operator who forgot to bump
three files should see three. That is safe here because the refusal comes from
comparing a row this code read, not from a failed statement — the INSERT is ON
CONFLICT DO NOTHING, so the transaction stays healthy and the remaining specs
can still be checked.
The header comment claimed "it does not create versions" as a deliberate
omission, deferring immutability to Phase 3. Phase 3 shipped; the comment is
updated rather than left to describe a decision that has been reversed.
Verified against a live stack:
- first run over nine unversioned agents: 9 version(s) recorded
- second run, files unchanged: still 9, not 18 — republishing is a no-op
- a spec edited without a bump: refused by name, exit 1, and the live row
did NOT contain the edit; the whole transaction rolled back
- the same spec with version: 2: exit 0, v1 and v2 both in history, live
row at v2
Not addressed, and visible while testing this: the command does not enforce
monotonicity. A file whose version is LOWERED still overwrites the live row,
because the upsert writes whatever the frontmatter says. History is unharmed —
the older version is already recorded and matches — but the deployed
definition silently goes backwards. That wants its own change.
cmd/importagents still has no test files, which predates this. The refusal
itself is covered by repo/versions_test.go; what is untested here is the
collecting and rollback around it, and run() opens its own pool from config,
so making it testable is a refactor rather than an addition.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PJvibeSc1JYXjatankqM1g
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|
Suriyakumarvijayanayagam
|
80ba57ace3 |
Refuse an edit that would rewrite an already-published version
§3 says a published version is immutable and editing publishes a new one.
The machinery for that was all present — an append-only definition_versions
table, a trigger, and repo.VersionsRepo.Snapshot, which already refuses to
store a version number whose content differs from what is stored.
Nothing acted on that refusal. snapshotIfPublished's error was discarded at
both call sites (`_ = s.snapshotIfPublished(...)`), and deliberately so: the
comment there explains that losing an author's work to protect a record of it
is the wrong trade. That is right for a recording failure and wrong for
exactly one case. A conflict is not the history failing to record; it is the
invariant firing.
The effect was silent. Editing a published agent without raising the
frontmatter version answered 200: the live row took the new text, the history
kept the old, and two different definitions were both called v1. Because
runtime.LoadAgentVersion resolves a pin by returning the CURRENT definition
whenever the pinned number equals the current one, a conversation pinned to v1
then ran the rewritten instructions while the audit trail showed the
originals. Verified against a live stack before the fix: PATCH answered 200,
agent_definitions held "SILENTLY CHANGED" and definition_versions still held
the published text, both labelled v2.
So the conflict is now detected before anything is written, where refusing
costs the author nothing but a version bump. The post-write snapshot keeps its
original contract for every other kind of failure, and republishing a version
unchanged stays the no-op it was. Drafts are untouched: they carry no promise,
and are still rewritten in place.
Not addressed here, and each its own change:
- cmd/importagents never creates versions at all (documented at main.go:10),
so the nine file-published organization agents are outside this entirely
and every deploy still mutates v1 in place.
- skill definitions never snapshot, so KindSkill exists with nothing writing
it. Fixing that changes skill authoring behaviour and wants its own pass.
- a concurrent publish of one version number with differing content can still
pass this check and be caught by the unique index afterwards, where it is
swallowed as before. That is the pre-existing behaviour, narrowed rather
than removed.
Tests: the new case fails without the fix — the live row takes the rewritten
text at version 1 — and passes with it. Full suite green against PostgreSQL,
with only TestLive* skipped, which is what CI allows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PJvibeSc1JYXjatankqM1g
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| a222dcd3e4 |
Add evals for every shipped agent, a policy corpus, and CI
§9 says no agent ships without evals. Eight of the nine had none: the two
other suites in evals/ are harness fixtures rather than agents in the
registry, so the rule was being met by one agent in nine.
Evals — 40 new cases, five per agent, every one carrying mustNotLeak:
- the agent is loaded from its real spec in agents/*.md rather than
written out again in Go. A hand-copied agent tests the copy: it keeps
passing after somebody edits the spec, which is the moment it most
needed to fail.
- callNamed calls the tool a case names. toolThenAnswer always called
tools[0], so seven of positions-agent's eight tools were unreachable,
and a boundary nothing calls is a boundary nothing tests.
- seedWorkspace fills BOTH tenants. A leak test against an empty second
tenant cannot fail.
Verified by breaking workersByScore's org predicate: six cases across four
agents fail with LEAKED "RIVAL".
Knowledge — six policy documents, taking the corpus from 2 to 8 (34
chunks). Three restricted to admin and employer, five tenant-wide. They
cover what the tools cannot: a tool reports how many shifts went unworked,
a policy says what cover costs inside 24 hours.
corpus_test.go treats those documents as product rather than fixtures. The
first version was tautological — it read audience: from a file and checked
that file's audience was enforced, so opening a restricted document passed.
mustNotBeTenantWide now holds that judgement apart from the files, with the
reason recorded for each.
CI — the checks this repository already had, made unskippable. testutil
calls t.Skipf on an unreachable database, so a dead service container would
produce a green build over a suite that ran almost nothing. Simulated: go
test exits 0 with 74 tests skipped, including every tenant-isolation test.
The guard exits 1 and names them, while still allowing TestLive* to skip
without a model key.
This CI tests; it does not deploy. The README's claim that migrations are
run by CI against the target database remains aspirational.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0186JgqQUCDS8ZwGmyw3ymWu
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| f7df96c973 | agent build | |||
| b6f8655909 | aravind changes | |||
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Suriyakumarvijayanayagam
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954ba9076f |
Add CORS credentials, transactional endpoints, and container deployment
CORS
cors.go never set Access-Control-Allow-Credentials, so the
cookie-authenticated API was unreadable from any cross-origin frontend:
the server answered correctly and the browser blocked the page from
reading it. Set for allowlisted origins on both the preflight and the
actual response. Three tests added.
HTTP_COOKIE_SAMESITE (lax|none|strict, default lax) is new. CORS is only
half of what a cross-origin browser call needs; SameSite is judged on
registrable domain, so a frontend on an unrelated domain gets perfect CORS
headers and still no cookie. "none" is the only value that survives that,
and validate() refuses it without the Secure flag.
The "*" rejection now explains itself: browsers refuse Allow-Origin "*"
together with credentials, so it would break every authenticated call
rather than loosen anything.
Transactional endpoints (api-contract.md 12.1)
POST /api/v1/job-applications/{id}/hire
POST /api/v1/job-postings/{id}/assignments
Replaces two client-side loops that wrote several records with no
transaction and no rollback. Each is now one endpoint and one transaction,
built over repo.Repo so org scoping, derived columns, type casts and error
translation are not re-derived. Authorization reuses the existing policy
table rather than adding a parallel one: a workflow is exactly as
privileged as the writes it performs. 13 tests, including both rollback
paths.
Bug fix in the repository layer
repo.bindValue handled int64/int/float64/string but not int32, which is
what pgx returns for a PostgreSQL `int` column. Nothing previously read a
record and wrote one of its fields elsewhere, so it never surfaced; the
hire flow does exactly that and failed with "ai_score must be a number".
Both KindInt and KindFloat now accept the widths pgx actually produces.
Deployment
infrastructure/Dockerfile.api multi-stage, cross-compiling (BUILDPLATFORM
+ GOARCH) so linux/amd64 builds from arm64 are compiled rather than
emulated. Alpine runtime, non-root uid 10001, 22.1 MB. Ships api, seed,
setpassword and migrate, plus the migrations, so a Kubernetes
initContainer can apply the schema from the same image and tag as the
API. HEALTHCHECK keys on status code, not body, so a "degraded" instance
is not pulled from rotation during a migration window.
infrastructure/docker-compose.yml migrations run to completion before the
API starts. Assumes a managed PostgreSQL; the local-db overlay adds one
with TLS enabled so APP_ENV=production is met rather than dodged.
scripts/drop_public_tables.go the one-off used to clear an unrelated
schema from krowdb on 2026-08-24, kept for the record. Build-tagged
ignore and gated on CONFIRM_DROP=yes.
Verified against PostgreSQL: 16/16 new tests pass, and the image was built,
run and exercised end to end (login, CORS preflight, authenticated reads,
transaction rollback).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CmQiGq73Uyfq7J4yR8Vxxw
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| 7d12ebef3d | first commit |
