The defaults shipped yesterday were wrong the day they shipped, and a real key
proved it in one request. Groq serves neither llama-3.1-8b-instant nor
llama-3.3-70b-versatile any more. Both were chosen from memory, both passed
startup validation, and every agent run would have failed with a 400.
This is the exact failure the claude-* guard was written to catch, arriving from
the side that guard cannot see. A prefix check can reject a vendor this service
cannot call; it has no way to know a provider retired an id last month. That is
not a gap in the check, it is a gap in the class of thing local validation can
know, so the fix is not another guard:
TestConfiguredModelsAreServed asks the provider. It lists /models — part of the
same openai-compatible surface the gateway already speaks, so every supported
provider answers it — and fails if a configured id is absent, printing what is
available. It reads the ids through config.DefaultModels() rather than
repeating them, because a second copy would be the first thing to drift, and
drift is the whole failure. Skipped without a credential like the rest of the
live suite. Verified three ways: it fails on the retired id with the message an
operator needs, skips clean with no key, passes on the new ones.
New defaults, chosen against the live account rather than from memory:
openai/gpt-oss-20b (fast) and openai/gpt-oss-120b (balanced, deep). Tool
calling confirmed on both. groq/compound-mini was ruled out — it cannot do tool
calls at all, which this platform requires.
MODEL_REASONING_EFFORT is now documented as safe here and NOT portable: gpt-oss
accepts low/medium/high, exactly the scale openAIEffort maps onto, while
qwen/qwen3.6-27b on the same account rejects all three and fails the whole
request rather than ignoring the key.
I7 IS NO LONGER UNPROVEN. make eval-live passes all three cases twice against
gpt-oss-120b, the planted-injection case included: answers from the handbook,
cites, refuses the injection, leaks neither the operator-only pay guidance nor
the other tenant's figures. CLAUDE.md §12 and handover.md updated from "urgent"
to measured, dated, and scoped to the one model it is evidence about.
One real defect found on the way. The handbook grounding check failed once on an
answer containing the phrase it wanted — "more than ten minutes" on screen,
strings.Contains false — which leaves an invisible separator as the only
explanation; the same model writes "47 %" and a U+2011 hyphen elsewhere. The
flaky assertion is the small half. THE LEAK ASSERTIONS USED THE SAME MATCH and
fail in the dangerous direction: "attacker@evil.test" with a zero-width space,
or "uplift" with a soft hyphen, would have been reported clean. A permission
test that cannot see the leak it is hunting is worse than none, because it is
believed. normalizeForMatch folds those away, and its test pins that every case
is one plain ToLower MISSES — a case whose naive match already succeeds fails,
so the suite cannot fill with examples that demonstrate nothing. That caught my
own first BOM case, which put the mark where Contains found it regardless.
gofmt clean, vet clean, 15/15 packages pass offline; live suite green twice.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PJvibeSc1JYXjatankqM1g
The krow-2 deploy failed on the ANTHROPIC_API_KEY guard, which is the guard
doing its job. Checking what an operator hits *after* fixing it turned up two
older faults in the files they are told to copy — both predating the Groq
switch, both fatal at boot.
HTTP_WRITE_TIMEOUT shipped as 30s in .env.example, .env.docker.example and the
compose default, while validateWriteTimeout refuses anything at or under the
deep tier's 2m deadline. `cp .env.docker.example .env && docker compose up`
could not start. Now 180s. krow-2 never saw this because someone had already
overridden it in that environment.
.env.docker.example carried no model block at all, so a production stack built
from it is refused for a missing MODEL_API_KEY. Added, with the Groq defaults
and the reasoning-effort note (most non-reasoning models reject the request
rather than ignoring the key).
Neither was subtle. Both survived because the examples were prose to every test
in this package: the validator and the file documenting it had no mechanical
connection, so tightening one silently invalidated the other. That connection
is now TestShippedExampleEnvActuallyBoots, which parses each example and runs
Load() on it under the APP_ENV the file itself declares — production for the
docker one, development for the root one, each internally consistent. Verified
by mutation: reverting the timeout, removing the key line, and restoring a
claude-* id each fail it with the message an operator would see.
Go does not treat these files as test inputs, so an example-only edit can be
served a stale pass from the test cache. Noted in the test; use -count=1.
Also documented the upgrade path in handover.md, including the one thing
startup validation cannot catch: renaming ANTHROPIC_API_KEY to MODEL_API_KEY
without replacing the value boots fine and 401s on every run.
gofmt clean, go vet clean, 15/15 packages pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PJvibeSc1JYXjatankqM1g
CORS
cors.go never set Access-Control-Allow-Credentials, so the
cookie-authenticated API was unreadable from any cross-origin frontend:
the server answered correctly and the browser blocked the page from
reading it. Set for allowlisted origins on both the preflight and the
actual response. Three tests added.
HTTP_COOKIE_SAMESITE (lax|none|strict, default lax) is new. CORS is only
half of what a cross-origin browser call needs; SameSite is judged on
registrable domain, so a frontend on an unrelated domain gets perfect CORS
headers and still no cookie. "none" is the only value that survives that,
and validate() refuses it without the Secure flag.
The "*" rejection now explains itself: browsers refuse Allow-Origin "*"
together with credentials, so it would break every authenticated call
rather than loosen anything.
Transactional endpoints (api-contract.md 12.1)
POST /api/v1/job-applications/{id}/hire
POST /api/v1/job-postings/{id}/assignments
Replaces two client-side loops that wrote several records with no
transaction and no rollback. Each is now one endpoint and one transaction,
built over repo.Repo so org scoping, derived columns, type casts and error
translation are not re-derived. Authorization reuses the existing policy
table rather than adding a parallel one: a workflow is exactly as
privileged as the writes it performs. 13 tests, including both rollback
paths.
Bug fix in the repository layer
repo.bindValue handled int64/int/float64/string but not int32, which is
what pgx returns for a PostgreSQL `int` column. Nothing previously read a
record and wrote one of its fields elsewhere, so it never surfaced; the
hire flow does exactly that and failed with "ai_score must be a number".
Both KindInt and KindFloat now accept the widths pgx actually produces.
Deployment
infrastructure/Dockerfile.api multi-stage, cross-compiling (BUILDPLATFORM
+ GOARCH) so linux/amd64 builds from arm64 are compiled rather than
emulated. Alpine runtime, non-root uid 10001, 22.1 MB. Ships api, seed,
setpassword and migrate, plus the migrations, so a Kubernetes
initContainer can apply the schema from the same image and tag as the
API. HEALTHCHECK keys on status code, not body, so a "degraded" instance
is not pulled from rotation during a migration window.
infrastructure/docker-compose.yml migrations run to completion before the
API starts. Assumes a managed PostgreSQL; the local-db overlay adds one
with TLS enabled so APP_ENV=production is met rather than dodged.
scripts/drop_public_tables.go the one-off used to clear an unrelated
schema from krowdb on 2026-08-24, kept for the record. Build-tagged
ignore and gated on CONFIRM_DROP=yes.
Verified against PostgreSQL: 16/16 new tests pass, and the image was built,
run and exercised end to end (login, CORS preflight, authenticated reads,
transaction rollback).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CmQiGq73Uyfq7J4yR8Vxxw
