create employee table

go-api/internal/httpserver/authfixture_test.go

@@ -66,13 +66,26 @@ func setStatus(t *testing.T, pool *pgxpool.Pool, userID, status string) {
 	}
 }
 
-// seededUser is the demo user the fixture loads into the test database.
+// seededUser is the demo ADMINISTRATOR the fixture loads into the test
+// database.
+//
+// The role is now part of the question. The fixture used to hold one account,
+// so "the seeded user" and "the administrator" were the same row and ordering
+// by date was enough to find it. It holds two since the Employer console gained
+// somebody to sign in as, both created on the same seeded date, which left the
+// tiebreak to a deterministic UUID — and picked the employer. Tests that assert
+// an administrator's access were then asserting an employer's, and failed
+// exactly as they should have.
+//
+// So it asks for what it means. Ordering is kept beneath the filter for the
+// case of several administrators.
 func seededUser(t *testing.T, pool *pgxpool.Pool) (id, email string) {
 	t.Helper()
 	if err := pool.QueryRow(context.Background(),
-		`SELECT id::text, email::text FROM users ORDER BY created_date, id LIMIT 1`).
+		`SELECT id::text, email::text FROM users WHERE role = 'admin'
+		 ORDER BY created_date, id LIMIT 1`).
 		Scan(&id, &email); err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("read the seeded user: %v", err)
+		t.Fatalf("read the seeded administrator: %v", err)
 	}
 	return id, email
 }

go-api/internal/httpserver/employee_roles_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+package httpserver_test
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// Employee roles: what a worker declares they do.
+//
+// The properties here are the ones the conversational flow depends on and that
+// no amount of frontend testing can establish, because they are decided by a
+// SQL predicate and a derived column:
+//
+//	THE OPERATOR IS NOT THE WORKER. An employer records a role for somebody
+//	else. If the subject were derived from the session — as created_by
+//	legitimately is — every role would be filed against whoever was signed in.
+//
+//	A WORKER HOLDS MANY ROLES. There is deliberately no uniqueness on the
+//	worker, so a second declaration is a second row and a role already marked
+//	`placed` survives the worker declaring the same category again. The panel
+//	promises exactly this in its review step: "The worker can hold more than one
+//	role — recording this does not replace an existing one."
+
+func createEmployeeRole(t *testing.T, r *rbac, act actor, body map[string]any) map[string]any {
+	t.Helper()
+	got := r.as(act, "POST", "/api/v1/employee-roles", body)
+	if got.code != http.StatusCreated {
+		t.Fatalf("%s create employee role: %d (%v)", act.name, got.code, got.body)
+	}
+	return got.body["data"].(map[string]any)
+}
+
+// The subject comes from the request; only the audit column comes from the
+// session. This is the test that fails if anyone ever derives worker_email the
+// way job-applications derives it for a talent caller.
+func TestEmployeeRoleRecordsTheWorkerNotTheOperator(t *testing.T) {
+	r := newRBAC(t)
+
+	rec := createEmployeeRole(t, r, r.empA, map[string]any{
+		"worker_email":  "someone-else@example.test",
+		"worker_name":   "Someone Else",
+		"role_category": "Bartender",
+	})
+
+	if rec["worker_email"] == r.empA.email {
+		t.Fatal("the operator became the worker")
+	}
+	if got := rec["worker_email"]; got != "someone-else@example.test" {
+		t.Errorf("worker_email = %v, want the worker's", got)
+	}
+	if got := rec["created_by"]; got != r.empA.id {
+		t.Errorf("created_by = %v, want the operator %v", got, r.empA.id)
+	}
+}
+
+// created_by is ReadOnly in the descriptor, so a caller cannot attribute a role
+// to somebody else. The body's value is dropped, not honoured.
+func TestEmployeeRoleCreatedByIsNotClientSettable(t *testing.T) {
+	r := newRBAC(t)
+	rec := createEmployeeRole(t, r, r.empA, map[string]any{
+		"worker_email": "worker@example.test", "role_category": "Server",
+		"created_by": r.admin.id,
+	})
+	if got := rec["created_by"]; got != r.empA.id {
+		t.Errorf("created_by = %v, want the caller %v — the body must not set it", got, r.empA.id)
+	}
+}
+
+// The promise the review step makes, tested against the database.
+func TestAWorkerHoldsManyRolesAndNoneReplaceAnother(t *testing.T) {
+	r := newRBAC(t)
+	const worker = "many-roles@example.test"
+
+	first := createEmployeeRole(t, r, r.empA, map[string]any{
+		"worker_email": worker, "worker_name": "Many Roles",
+		"role_category": "Bartender", "status": "placed",
+	})
+	second := createEmployeeRole(t, r, r.empA, map[string]any{
+		"worker_email": worker, "worker_name": "Many Roles", "role_category": "Server",
+	})
+	// The same category again while the first is still placed: a worker who
+	// finished a Bartender placement and is seeking Bartender work again.
+	third := createEmployeeRole(t, r, r.empA, map[string]any{
+		"worker_email": worker, "worker_name": "Many Roles", "role_category": "Bartender",
+	})
+
+	ids := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, rec := range []map[string]any{first, second, third} {
+		id := rec["id"].(string)
+		if ids[id] {
+			t.Fatalf("duplicate id %s — a role replaced another", id)
+		}
+		ids[id] = true
+	}
+
+	got := r.ids(t, r.empA, "/api/v1/employee-roles?worker_email="+worker)
+	for id := range ids {
+		if !got[id] {
+			t.Errorf("role %s is missing — it was overwritten or filtered away", id)
+		}
+	}
+	if len(got) != 3 {
+		t.Errorf("%d roles for one worker, want 3", len(got))
+	}
+	if first["status"] != "placed" {
+		t.Errorf("the first role's status = %v, want placed to survive", first["status"])
+	}
+}
+
+// Every field the conversation collects survives the round trip. Named from the
+// payload the panel actually sends, so a column the flow fills and the API drops
+// fails here rather than silently arriving empty.
+func TestEmployeeRoleKeepsEveryCollectedField(t *testing.T) {
+	r := newRBAC(t)
+
+	rec := createEmployeeRole(t, r, r.admin, map[string]any{
+		"worker_email": "full@example.test", "worker_name": "Full Record",
+		"role_category": "Picker", "experience_years": 3,
+		"english_level": "native", "certifications": []string{"TIPS Certified"},
+		"desired_pay_min": 30, "desired_pay_max": 40,
+		"availability": []string{"Weekdays"}, "notes": "recorded by the panel",
+		"status": "seeking",
+	})
+
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		field string
+		want  any
+	}{
+		{"role_category", "Picker"},
+		{"experience_years", float64(3)},
+		{"english_level", "native"},
+		{"desired_pay_min", float64(30)},
+		{"desired_pay_max", float64(40)},
+		{"notes", "recorded by the panel"},
+		{"status", "seeking"},
+	} {
+		if got := rec[tc.field]; got != tc.want {
+			t.Errorf("%s = %#v, want %#v", tc.field, got, tc.want)
+		}
+	}
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		field string
+		want  string
+	}{{"certifications", "TIPS Certified"}, {"availability", "Weekdays"}} {
+		list, _ := rec[tc.field].([]any)
+		if len(list) != 1 || list[0] != tc.want {
+			t.Errorf("%s = %#v, want [%q]", tc.field, rec[tc.field], tc.want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// Cross-tenant isolation stands on its own: an ADMIN in another organization
+// gets 404, not 403, and never sees the row in a listing.
+func TestEmployeeRolesAreInvisibleAcrossOrganizations(t *testing.T) {
+	r := newRBAC(t)
+
+	rec := createEmployeeRole(t, r, r.admin, map[string]any{
+		"worker_email": "inside@example.test", "role_category": "Bartender",
+	})
+	id := rec["id"].(string)
+
+	if got := r.as(r.outsider, "GET", "/api/v1/employee-roles/"+id, nil); got.code != http.StatusNotFound {
+		t.Errorf("outside admin GET = %d, want 404", got.code)
+	}
+	if r.ids(t, r.outsider, "/api/v1/employee-roles")[id] {
+		t.Error("a role leaked into another organization's listing")
+	}
+	if got := r.as(r.outsider, "PATCH", "/api/v1/employee-roles/"+id,
+		map[string]any{"notes": "n"}); got.code != http.StatusNotFound {
+		t.Errorf("outside admin PATCH = %d, want 404", got.code)
+	}
+}
+
+// A talent caller reads only their own declared roles, and cannot create.
+func TestTalentSeesOnlyItsOwnEmployeeRoles(t *testing.T) {
+	r := newRBAC(t)
+
+	mine := createEmployeeRole(t, r, r.empA, map[string]any{
+		"worker_email": r.talA.email, "role_category": "Bartender",
+	})
+	theirs := createEmployeeRole(t, r, r.empA, map[string]any{
+		"worker_email": r.talB.email, "role_category": "Server",
+	})
+
+	seen := r.ids(t, r.talA, "/api/v1/employee-roles")
+	if !seen[mine["id"].(string)] {
+		t.Error("talent cannot see its own declared role")
+	}
+	if seen[theirs["id"].(string)] {
+		t.Error("talent A can see talent B's declared role")
+	}
+	if got := r.as(r.talA, "GET", "/api/v1/employee-roles/"+theirs["id"].(string), nil); got.code != http.StatusNotFound {
+		t.Errorf("GET another talent's role = %d, want 404 — absent, not refused", got.code)
+	}
+}

go-api/internal/httpserver/worker_identity_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+package httpserver_test
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// Who counts as the same person.
+//
+// The rule is the schema's and it is worth stating plainly, because the whole
+// duplicate question turns on it: `worker_profiles` carries
+// UNIQUE (org_id, email) and `email` is `citext`. So identity is the pair
+// (organization, email), compared case-insensitively, and `full_name` carries
+// NO uniqueness at all — an organization may employ any number of people with
+// the same name, and they are different people.
+//
+// These are database guarantees rather than application checks, which is what
+// makes them hold under concurrency: two simultaneous creates of the same
+// identity cannot both win, whatever the callers checked first.
+
+func createWorker(t *testing.T, r *rbac, act actor, name, email string) response {
+	t.Helper()
+	return r.as(act, "POST", "/api/v1/worker-profiles", map[string]any{
+		"full_name": name, "email": email,
+	})
+}
+
+// A name is not an identity. Two people who share one are two records.
+func TestWorkersMayShareAName(t *testing.T) {
+	r := newRBAC(t)
+	const shared = "Shared Name"
+
+	first := createWorker(t, r, r.admin, shared, "shared-name-1@example.test")
+	second := createWorker(t, r, r.admin, shared, "shared-name-2@example.test")
+
+	for i, got := range []response{first, second} {
+		if got.code != http.StatusCreated {
+			t.Fatalf("create %d: %d (%v) — sharing a name must not block creation", i+1, got.code, got.body)
+		}
+	}
+	a := first.body["data"].(map[string]any)
+	b := second.body["data"].(map[string]any)
+	if a["id"] == b["id"] {
+		t.Fatal("two people sharing a name collapsed into one record")
+	}
+	if a["email"] == b["email"] {
+		t.Error("the second worker took the first one's email")
+	}
+}
+
+// The same identity cannot be created twice, whoever it claims to be, and the
+// refusal is a conflict a caller can act on rather than a 500.
+func TestTheSameIdentityCannotBeCreatedTwice(t *testing.T) {
+	r := newRBAC(t)
+	const email = "one-identity@example.test"
+
+	if got := createWorker(t, r, r.admin, "Person One", email); got.code != http.StatusCreated {
+		t.Fatalf("first create: %d (%v)", got.code, got.body)
+	}
+
+	for _, tc := range []struct{ name, who, email string }{
+		{"a different name on the same email", "Person Two", email},
+		{"the same email in another case", "Person Three", "ONE-IDENTITY@EXAMPLE.TEST"},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			got := createWorker(t, r, r.admin, tc.who, tc.email)
+			if got.code != http.StatusConflict {
+				t.Errorf("= %d, want 409 — the identity is already taken", got.code)
+			}
+			if got.errCode(t) != "conflict" {
+				t.Errorf("error code = %q, want conflict", got.errCode(t))
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// The identity is scoped to the organization, so the same email in another
+// tenant is another person and is allowed.
+func TestTheSameEmailInAnotherOrganizationIsAnotherPerson(t *testing.T) {
+	r := newRBAC(t)
+	const email = "cross-tenant-identity@example.test"
+
+	if got := createWorker(t, r, r.admin, "Inside", email); got.code != http.StatusCreated {
+		t.Fatalf("create inside: %d (%v)", got.code, got.body)
+	}
+	if got := createWorker(t, r, r.outsider, "Outside", email); got.code != http.StatusCreated {
+		t.Errorf("create in another organization = %d, want 201 — identity is (org, email)", got.code)
+	}
+}

go-api/internal/httpserver/worker_with_role_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+package httpserver_test
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// Recording a NEW person and their first declared role, atomically.
+//
+// The flow this endpoint exists for is a CREATION: HR is adding somebody the
+// organization does not have yet. So the properties under test are about
+// creation, not lookup — no worker id is accepted, no name is searched, and the
+// email the caller states is the identity the row is keyed on.
+
+func createWorkerWithRole(t *testing.T, r *rbac, act actor, body map[string]any) response {
+	t.Helper()
+	return r.as(act, "POST", "/api/v1/worker-profiles/with-role", body)
+}
+
+// The happy path, and the two records it must leave behind.
+func TestCreateWorkerWithRoleCreatesBoth(t *testing.T) {
+	r := newRBAC(t)
+	const email = "new-person@example.test"
+
+	got := createWorkerWithRole(t, r, r.empA, map[string]any{
+		"full_name": "New Person", "email": email,
+		"role": map[string]any{
+			"role_category": "Bartender", "experience_years": 3,
+			"english_level": "fluent", "certifications": []string{"A Certification"},
+			"desired_pay_min": 30, "desired_pay_max": 40,
+			"availability": []string{"Weekdays"}, "notes": "recorded by the panel",
+		},
+	})
+	if got.code != http.StatusCreated {
+		t.Fatalf("= %d, want 201 (%v)", got.code, got.body)
+	}
+
+	data := got.body["data"].(map[string]any)
+	worker := data["worker"].(map[string]any)
+	role := data["role"].(map[string]any)
+
+	if worker["id"] == nil || worker["id"] == "" {
+		t.Fatal("no worker id came back")
+	}
+	// The whole point: the role points at the worker this call created.
+	if role["worker_profile_id"] != worker["id"] {
+		t.Errorf("role.worker_profile_id = %v, want the new worker %v", role["worker_profile_id"], worker["id"])
+	}
+	if role["worker_email"] != worker["email"] {
+		t.Errorf("role.worker_email = %v, want %v", role["worker_email"], worker["email"])
+	}
+	// The operator is the author, never the subject.
+	if role["created_by"] != r.empA.id {
+		t.Errorf("created_by = %v, want the operator %v", role["created_by"], r.empA.id)
+	}
+	if worker["email"] == r.empA.email {
+		t.Fatal("the operator became the worker")
+	}
+	// The role's own fields survived, and did not land on the worker.
+	if role["role_category"] != "Bartender" {
+		t.Errorf("role_category = %v", role["role_category"])
+	}
+	if _, leaked := worker["role_category"]; leaked {
+		t.Error("a role field landed on the worker record")
+	}
+
+	// Both are readable afterwards, under the caller's own org predicate.
+	if !r.ids(t, r.empA, "/api/v1/worker-profiles")[worker["id"].(string)] {
+		t.Error("the new worker is missing from the worker listing")
+	}
+	if !r.ids(t, r.empA, "/api/v1/employee-roles")[role["id"].(string)] {
+		t.Error("the new role is missing from the role listing")
+	}
+}
+
+// A name is not an identity: same name, different emails, two people.
+func TestCreateWorkerWithRoleAllowsARepeatedName(t *testing.T) {
+	r := newRBAC(t)
+	const name = "Repeated Name"
+
+	first := createWorkerWithRole(t, r, r.admin, map[string]any{
+		"full_name": name, "email": "repeat-1@example.test",
+		"role": map[string]any{"role_category": "Server"},
+	})
+	second := createWorkerWithRole(t, r, r.admin, map[string]any{
+		"full_name": name, "email": "repeat-2@example.test",
+		"role": map[string]any{"role_category": "Chef"},
+	})
+
+	for i, got := range []response{first, second} {
+		if got.code != http.StatusCreated {
+			t.Fatalf("create %d = %d (%v) — a shared name must not block creation", i+1, got.code, got.body)
+		}
+	}
+	a := first.body["data"].(map[string]any)["worker"].(map[string]any)
+	b := second.body["data"].(map[string]any)["worker"].(map[string]any)
+	if a["id"] == b["id"] {
+		t.Fatal("two people sharing a name collapsed into one record")
+	}
+}
+
+// The identity is the email, and the database decides. A repeat is refused and
+// leaves NOTHING behind — no worker, no role.
+func TestCreateWorkerWithRoleRollsBackOnDuplicateIdentity(t *testing.T) {
+	r := newRBAC(t)
+	const email = "taken-identity@example.test"
+
+	if got := createWorkerWithRole(t, r, r.admin, map[string]any{
+		"full_name": "First Person", "email": email,
+		"role": map[string]any{"role_category": "Server"},
+	}); got.code != http.StatusCreated {
+		t.Fatalf("first create: %d (%v)", got.code, got.body)
+	}
+
+	before := len(r.ids(t, r.admin, "/api/v1/employee-roles"))
+
+	got := createWorkerWithRole(t, r, r.admin, map[string]any{
+		"full_name": "Second Person", "email": email,
+		"role": map[string]any{"role_category": "Chef"},
+	})
+	if got.code != http.StatusConflict {
+		t.Fatalf("duplicate identity = %d, want 409 (%v)", got.code, got.body)
+	}
+	if after := len(r.ids(t, r.admin, "/api/v1/employee-roles")); after != before {
+		t.Errorf("%d roles after a refused create, want %d — the transaction did not roll back", after, before)
+	}
+}
+
+// A role cannot be recorded for nobody, and an email is never invented for a
+// name that arrived without one.
+func TestCreateWorkerWithRoleRequiresBothNameAndEmail(t *testing.T) {
+	r := newRBAC(t)
+
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name string
+		body map[string]any
+	}{
+		{"no email", map[string]any{"full_name": "Nameless Email", "role": map[string]any{"role_category": "Server"}}},
+		{"blank email", map[string]any{"full_name": "Blank", "email": "   ", "role": map[string]any{"role_category": "Server"}}},
+		{"no name", map[string]any{"email": "no-name@example.test", "role": map[string]any{"role_category": "Server"}}},
+		{"neither", map[string]any{"role": map[string]any{"role_category": "Server"}}},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			got := createWorkerWithRole(t, r, r.admin, tc.body)
+			if got.code == http.StatusCreated {
+				t.Fatalf("accepted a worker with %s: %v", tc.name, got.body)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// Talent cannot record workers, and another organization cannot see the ones
+// this one records.
+func TestCreateWorkerWithRoleIsScopedAndAuthorized(t *testing.T) {
+	r := newRBAC(t)
+
+	if got := createWorkerWithRole(t, r, r.talA, map[string]any{
+		"full_name": "Not Allowed", "email": "not-allowed@example.test",
+		"role": map[string]any{"role_category": "Server"},
+	}); got.code != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Errorf("talent create = %d, want 403", got.code)
+	}
+
+	made := createWorkerWithRole(t, r, r.admin, map[string]any{
+		"full_name": "Inside Only", "email": "inside-only@example.test",
+		"role": map[string]any{"role_category": "Server"},
+	})
+	if made.code != http.StatusCreated {
+		t.Fatalf("create: %d (%v)", made.code, made.body)
+	}
+	roleID := made.body["data"].(map[string]any)["role"].(map[string]any)["id"].(string)
+	if r.ids(t, r.outsider, "/api/v1/employee-roles")[roleID] {
+		t.Error("a role leaked into another organization")
+	}
+}

go-api/internal/httpserver/workflows.go

@@ -86,7 +86,50 @@ func errUnregisteredResource(path string) error { return unregisteredResourceErr
 func (s *Server) routeWorkflows(mux *http.ServeMux) int {
 	mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/job-applications/{id}/hire", s.handleHire)
 	mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/job-postings/{id}/assignments", s.handleAssign)
-	return 2
+	mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/worker-profiles/with-role", s.handleCreateWorkerWithRole)
+	return 3
+}
+
+// handleCreateWorkerWithRole records a NEW person and their first declared role
+// in one transaction.
+//
+// Under `worker-profiles` rather than `employee-roles` because the worker is
+// what the request creates; the role comes with it. A more specific literal
+// than the generated `POST /api/v1/worker-profiles`, so the mux prefers it and
+// neither route shadows the other.
+//
+// This is a CREATION flow. It takes a name and an email and never a worker id,
+// and nothing in it searches for an existing person — an organization may
+// employ many people who share a name, so a name cannot select anybody.
+// Recording a second role for someone who already exists is
+// POST /api/v1/employee-roles, unchanged.
+func (s *Server) handleCreateWorkerWithRole(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	ident, ok := s.authorizeAll(w, r,
+		requirement{"worker-profiles", domain.OpCreate},
+		requirement{"employee-roles", domain.OpCreate},
+	)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+
+	body, err := decodeBody(r)
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, s.log, err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	result, err := s.workflows.CreateWorkerWithRole(r.Context(), ident, body)
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, s.log, err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	/* The worker's identity is not logged: an email is the person, and §10 puts
+	   record content at DEBUG behind a per-tenant flag rather than at INFO. */
+	s.log.Info("worker recorded with a declared role", "user_id", ident.UserID,
+		"worker_profile_id", result.Worker["id"], "employee_role_id", result.Role["id"])
+
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, envelope{Data: result})
 }
 
 // handleHire moves an application to `hired` and creates the staff record in