Add CORS credentials, transactional endpoints, and container deployment

CORS
  cors.go never set Access-Control-Allow-Credentials, so the
  cookie-authenticated API was unreadable from any cross-origin frontend:
  the server answered correctly and the browser blocked the page from
  reading it. Set for allowlisted origins on both the preflight and the
  actual response. Three tests added.

  HTTP_COOKIE_SAMESITE (lax|none|strict, default lax) is new. CORS is only
  half of what a cross-origin browser call needs; SameSite is judged on
  registrable domain, so a frontend on an unrelated domain gets perfect CORS
  headers and still no cookie. "none" is the only value that survives that,
  and validate() refuses it without the Secure flag.

  The "*" rejection now explains itself: browsers refuse Allow-Origin "*"
  together with credentials, so it would break every authenticated call
  rather than loosen anything.

Transactional endpoints (api-contract.md 12.1)
  POST /api/v1/job-applications/{id}/hire
  POST /api/v1/job-postings/{id}/assignments

  Replaces two client-side loops that wrote several records with no
  transaction and no rollback. Each is now one endpoint and one transaction,
  built over repo.Repo so org scoping, derived columns, type casts and error
  translation are not re-derived. Authorization reuses the existing policy
  table rather than adding a parallel one: a workflow is exactly as
  privileged as the writes it performs. 13 tests, including both rollback
  paths.

Bug fix in the repository layer
  repo.bindValue handled int64/int/float64/string but not int32, which is
  what pgx returns for a PostgreSQL `int` column. Nothing previously read a
  record and wrote one of its fields elsewhere, so it never surfaced; the
  hire flow does exactly that and failed with "ai_score must be a number".
  Both KindInt and KindFloat now accept the widths pgx actually produces.

Deployment
  infrastructure/Dockerfile.api  multi-stage, cross-compiling (BUILDPLATFORM
    + GOARCH) so linux/amd64 builds from arm64 are compiled rather than
    emulated. Alpine runtime, non-root uid 10001, 22.1 MB. Ships api, seed,
    setpassword and migrate, plus the migrations, so a Kubernetes
    initContainer can apply the schema from the same image and tag as the
    API. HEALTHCHECK keys on status code, not body, so a "degraded" instance
    is not pulled from rotation during a migration window.

  infrastructure/docker-compose.yml  migrations run to completion before the
    API starts. Assumes a managed PostgreSQL; the local-db overlay adds one
    with TLS enabled so APP_ENV=production is met rather than dodged.

  scripts/drop_public_tables.go  the one-off used to clear an unrelated
    schema from krowdb on 2026-08-24, kept for the record. Build-tagged
    ignore and gated on CONFIRM_DROP=yes.

Verified against PostgreSQL: 16/16 new tests pass, and the image was built,
run and exercised end to end (login, CORS preflight, authenticated reads,
transaction rollback).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CmQiGq73Uyfq7J4yR8Vxxw

go-api/internal/httpserver/workflows.go

@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+package httpserver
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+
+	"github.com/krow/krow-backend/go-api/internal/authctx"
+	"github.com/krow/krow-backend/go-api/internal/domain"
+	"github.com/krow/krow-backend/go-api/internal/service"
+)
+
+// The multi-record endpoints from api-contract.md §12.1.
+//
+// These are the first routes that are not a plain CRUD projection of a table,
+// and they are shaped as verbs on the record they act on — `.../{id}/hire`,
+// `.../{id}/assignments` — rather than as new collections. The action is the
+// thing being requested, and it has no independent existence to GET.
+//
+// AUTHORIZATION REUSES THE POLICY TABLE RATHER THAN ADDING TO IT.
+//
+// A workflow is exactly as privileged as the writes it performs, so each one
+// is gated on the operations it will actually carry out — hire needs UPDATE on
+// job-applications and CREATE on staff; assign needs CREATE on assignments and
+// UPDATE on job-applications. Inventing a separate `hire` permission would
+// create a second place where the answer to "who may do this" lives, and the
+// two would eventually disagree. Every pair below resolves to `operators`
+// today, which is the intended answer: a talent user cannot hire themselves or
+// place themselves on a shift.
+
+// requirement is one (resource, operation) pair a workflow depends on.
+type requirement struct {
+	path string
+	op   domain.Op
+}
+
+// authorizeAll refuses unless the caller may perform every listed operation.
+//
+// All-or-nothing, checked before any transaction opens: a caller who may update
+// an application but not create staff must not get halfway through a hire and
+// be rolled back. The refusal is the same 403 a single-operation handler gives,
+// and names no resource — see domain.Forbidden.
+func (s *Server) authorizeAll(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request,
+	reqs ...requirement) (authctx.Identity, bool) {
+
+	ident, err := authctx.MustFrom(r.Context())
+	if err != nil {
+		// Unreachable: the middleware refuses an unauthenticated request before
+		// the router sees it. A missing identity here is a wiring bug.
+		writeError(w, s.log, domain.Internal(err))
+		return authctx.Identity{}, false
+	}
+
+	role, known := domain.ParseRole(ident.Role)
+	if !known {
+		s.log.Warn("workflow refused: unknown role",
+			"user_id", ident.UserID, "role", ident.Role, "path", r.URL.Path)
+		writeError(w, s.log, domain.Forbidden())
+		return authctx.Identity{}, false
+	}
+
+	for _, req := range reqs {
+		svc, ok := s.api.Get(req.path)
+		if !ok {
+			writeError(w, s.log, domain.Internal(
+				errUnregisteredResource(req.path)))
+			return authctx.Identity{}, false
+		}
+		if !svc.Resource().Policy.Allows(req.op, role) {
+			s.log.Warn("workflow authorization refused",
+				"user_id", ident.UserID, "role", ident.Role,
+				"required_resource", req.path, "path", r.URL.Path)
+			writeError(w, s.log, domain.Forbidden())
+			return authctx.Identity{}, false
+		}
+	}
+	return ident, true
+}
+
+type unregisteredResourceError string
+
+func (e unregisteredResourceError) Error() string {
+	return "httpserver: workflow depends on unregistered resource " + string(e)
+}
+
+func errUnregisteredResource(path string) error { return unregisteredResourceError(path) }
+
+func (s *Server) routeWorkflows(mux *http.ServeMux) int {
+	mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/job-applications/{id}/hire", s.handleHire)
+	mux.HandleFunc("POST /api/v1/job-postings/{id}/assignments", s.handleAssign)
+	return 2
+}
+
+// handleHire moves an application to `hired` and creates the staff record in
+// one transaction. Replaces the two-call sequence at krowHooks.js:302-303.
+func (s *Server) handleHire(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	ident, ok := s.authorizeAll(w, r,
+		requirement{"job-applications", domain.OpUpdate},
+		requirement{"staff", domain.OpCreate},
+		requirement{"user-activity", domain.OpCreate},
+	)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+
+	body, err := decodeBody(r)
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, s.log, err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	result, err := s.workflows.Hire(r.Context(), ident, r.PathValue("id"), body)
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, s.log, err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	s.log.Info("candidate hired", "user_id", ident.UserID,
+		"application_id", r.PathValue("id"), "staff_id", result.Staff["id"])
+
+	// 201: the request created a staff record. The application it also updated
+	// is returned alongside so the caller can render the new state without a
+	// second read.
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, envelope{Data: result})
+}
+
+// handleAssign places workers on a posting in one transaction. Replaces the 3n
+// sequential round-trips at krowHooks.js:421/449/466.
+func (s *Server) handleAssign(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	ident, ok := s.authorizeAll(w, r,
+		requirement{"assignments", domain.OpCreate},
+		requirement{"job-applications", domain.OpUpdate},
+		requirement{"user-activity", domain.OpCreate},
+	)
+	if !ok {
+		return
+	}
+
+	var req service.AssignRequest
+	if err := decodeInto(r, &req); err != nil {
+		writeError(w, s.log, err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	result, err := s.workflows.Assign(r.Context(), ident, r.PathValue("id"), req)
+	if err != nil {
+		writeError(w, s.log, err)
+		return
+	}
+
+	s.log.Info("workers assigned", "user_id", ident.UserID,
+		"job_posting_id", r.PathValue("id"), "count", result.Count)
+
+	writeJSON(w, http.StatusCreated, envelope{Data: result})
+}