Merge pull request #667 from Oloodi/codex/feat-m5-backend-hardening-sweep

fix(backend): harden runtime config and verification access

backend/command-api/src/app.js

@@ -6,10 +6,12 @@ import { errorHandler, notFoundHandler } from './middleware/error-handler.js';
 import { healthRouter } from './routes/health.js';
 import { createCommandsRouter } from './routes/commands.js';
 import { createMobileCommandsRouter } from './routes/mobile.js';
+import { assertSafeRuntimeConfig } from './lib/runtime-safety.js';
 
 const logger = pino({ level: process.env.LOG_LEVEL || 'info' });
 
 export function createApp(options = {}) {
+  assertSafeRuntimeConfig();
   const app = express();
 
   app.use(requestContext);

backend/command-api/src/lib/runtime-safety.js

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+function runtimeEnvName() {
+  return `${process.env.APP_ENV || process.env.NODE_ENV || ''}`.trim().toLowerCase();
+}
+
+function isProtectedEnv() {
+  return ['staging', 'prod', 'production'].includes(runtimeEnvName());
+}
+
+export function assertSafeRuntimeConfig() {
+  if (!isProtectedEnv()) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  const errors = [];
+
+  if (process.env.AUTH_BYPASS === 'true') {
+    errors.push('AUTH_BYPASS must be disabled');
+  }
+
+  if (`${process.env.IDEMPOTENCY_STORE || ''}`.trim().toLowerCase() === 'memory') {
+    errors.push('IDEMPOTENCY_STORE must not be memory');
+  }
+
+  if (errors.length > 0) {
+    throw new Error(`Unsafe command-api runtime config for ${runtimeEnvName()}: ${errors.join('; ')}`);
+  }
+}
+
+export function assertSafeWorkerRuntimeConfig() {
+  if (!isProtectedEnv()) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  const errors = [];
+  const deliveryMode = `${process.env.PUSH_DELIVERY_MODE || 'live'}`.trim().toLowerCase();
+
+  if (deliveryMode !== 'live') {
+    errors.push('PUSH_DELIVERY_MODE must be live');
+  }
+
+  if (errors.length > 0) {
+    throw new Error(`Unsafe notification-worker runtime config for ${runtimeEnvName()}: ${errors.join('; ')}`);
+  }
+}

backend/command-api/src/middleware/auth.js

@@ -9,6 +9,30 @@ function getBearerToken(header) {
   return token;
 }
 
+function buildBypassActor() {
+  let policyContext = {
+    user: { userId: 'test-user' },
+    tenant: { tenantId: '*' },
+    business: { businessId: '*' },
+    staff: { staffId: '*', workforceId: '*' },
+  };
+
+  if (process.env.AUTH_BYPASS_CONTEXT) {
+    try {
+      policyContext = JSON.parse(process.env.AUTH_BYPASS_CONTEXT);
+    } catch (_error) {
+      policyContext = {
+        user: { userId: 'test-user' },
+        tenant: { tenantId: '*' },
+        business: { businessId: '*' },
+        staff: { staffId: '*', workforceId: '*' },
+      };
+    }
+  }
+
+  return { uid: 'test-user', email: 'test@krow.local', role: 'TEST', policyContext };
+}
+
 export async function requireAuth(req, _res, next) {
   try {
     const token = getBearerToken(req.get('Authorization'));
@@ -17,7 +41,7 @@ export async function requireAuth(req, _res, next) {
     }
 
     if (process.env.AUTH_BYPASS === 'true') {
-      req.actor = { uid: 'test-user', email: 'test@krow.local', role: 'TEST' };
+      req.actor = buildBypassActor();
       return next();
     }
 
@@ -36,10 +60,14 @@ export async function requireAuth(req, _res, next) {
 }
 
 export function requirePolicy(action, resource) {
-  return (req, _res, next) => {
+  return async (req, _res, next) => {
-    if (!can(action, resource, req.actor)) {
+    try {
+      if (!(await can(action, resource, req.actor, req))) {
         return next(new AppError('FORBIDDEN', 'Not allowed to perform this action', 403));
       }
       return next();
+    } catch (error) {
+      return next(error);
+    }
   };
 }

backend/command-api/src/services/command-service.js

@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ import { recordGeofenceIncident } from './attendance-monitoring.js';
 import { recordAttendanceSecurityProof } from './attendance-security.js';
 import { evaluateClockInAttempt } from './clock-in-policy.js';
 import { enqueueHubManagerAlert } from './notification-outbox.js';
+import {
+  requireClientContext as requireActorClientContext,
+  requireStaffContext as requireActorStaffContext,
+} from './actor-context.js';
 
 function toIsoOrNull(value) {
   return value ? new Date(value).toISOString() : null;
@@ -68,6 +72,33 @@ async function ensureStaffNotBlockedByBusiness(client, { tenantId, businessId, s
   }
 }
 
+function assertTenantScope(context, tenantId) {
+  if (context.tenant.tenantId !== tenantId) {
+    throw new AppError('FORBIDDEN', 'Resource is outside actor tenant scope', 403, {
+      tenantId,
+      actorTenantId: context.tenant.tenantId,
+    });
+  }
+}
+
+function assertBusinessScope(context, businessId) {
+  if (context.business && context.business.businessId !== businessId) {
+    throw new AppError('FORBIDDEN', 'Resource is outside actor business scope', 403, {
+      businessId,
+      actorBusinessId: context.business.businessId,
+    });
+  }
+}
+
+function assertStaffScope(context, staffId) {
+  if (context.staff.staffId !== staffId) {
+    throw new AppError('FORBIDDEN', 'Resource is outside actor staff scope', 403, {
+      staffId,
+      actorStaffId: context.staff.staffId,
+    });
+  }
+}
+
 async function insertDomainEvent(client, {
   tenantId,
   aggregateType,
@@ -451,6 +482,9 @@ function buildOrderUpdateStatement(payload) {
 export async function createOrder(actor, payload) {
   return withTransaction(async (client) => {
     await ensureActorUser(client, actor);
+    const actorContext = await requireActorClientContext(actor.uid);
+    assertTenantScope(actorContext, payload.tenantId);
+    assertBusinessScope(actorContext, payload.businessId);
     await requireBusiness(client, payload.tenantId, payload.businessId);
     if (payload.vendorId) {
       await requireVendor(client, payload.tenantId, payload.vendorId);
@@ -620,8 +654,10 @@ export async function createOrder(actor, payload) {
 export async function acceptShift(actor, payload) {
   return withTransaction(async (client) => {
     await ensureActorUser(client, actor);
+    const actorContext = await requireActorStaffContext(actor.uid);
 
     const shiftRole = await requireShiftRole(client, payload.shiftRoleId);
+    assertTenantScope(actorContext, shiftRole.tenant_id);
     if (payload.shiftId && shiftRole.shift_id !== payload.shiftId) {
       throw new AppError('VALIDATION_ERROR', 'shiftId does not match shiftRoleId', 400, {
         shiftId: payload.shiftId,
@@ -629,6 +665,13 @@ export async function acceptShift(actor, payload) {
       });
     }
 
+    if (!actorContext.staff.workforceId || actorContext.staff.workforceId !== payload.workforceId) {
+      throw new AppError('FORBIDDEN', 'Staff can only accept shifts for their own workforce record', 403, {
+        workforceId: payload.workforceId,
+        actorWorkforceId: actorContext.staff.workforceId || null,
+      });
+    }
+
     if (shiftRole.assigned_count >= shiftRole.workers_needed) {
       const existingFilledAssignment = await findAssignmentForShiftRoleWorkforce(
         client,
@@ -736,7 +779,10 @@ export async function acceptShift(actor, payload) {
 export async function updateOrder(actor, payload) {
   return withTransaction(async (client) => {
     await ensureActorUser(client, actor);
+    const actorContext = await requireActorClientContext(actor.uid);
+    assertTenantScope(actorContext, payload.tenantId);
     const existingOrder = await requireOrder(client, payload.tenantId, payload.orderId);
+    assertBusinessScope(actorContext, existingOrder.business_id);
 
     if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(payload, 'vendorId') && payload.vendorId) {
       await requireVendor(client, payload.tenantId, payload.vendorId);
@@ -787,7 +833,10 @@ export async function updateOrder(actor, payload) {
 export async function cancelOrder(actor, payload) {
   return withTransaction(async (client) => {
     await ensureActorUser(client, actor);
+    const actorContext = await requireActorClientContext(actor.uid);
+    assertTenantScope(actorContext, payload.tenantId);
     const order = await requireOrder(client, payload.tenantId, payload.orderId);
+    assertBusinessScope(actorContext, order.business_id);
 
     if (order.status === 'CANCELLED') {
       return {
@@ -910,7 +959,10 @@ export async function cancelOrder(actor, payload) {
 export async function changeShiftStatus(actor, payload) {
   return withTransaction(async (client) => {
     await ensureActorUser(client, actor);
+    const actorContext = await requireActorClientContext(actor.uid);
+    assertTenantScope(actorContext, payload.tenantId);
     const shift = await requireShift(client, payload.tenantId, payload.shiftId);
+    assertBusinessScope(actorContext, shift.business_id);
 
     if (payload.status === 'COMPLETED') {
       const openSession = await client.query(
@@ -999,7 +1051,10 @@ export async function changeShiftStatus(actor, payload) {
 export async function assignStaffToShift(actor, payload) {
   return withTransaction(async (client) => {
     await ensureActorUser(client, actor);
+    const actorContext = await requireActorClientContext(actor.uid);
+    assertTenantScope(actorContext, payload.tenantId);
     const shift = await requireShift(client, payload.tenantId, payload.shiftId);
+    assertBusinessScope(actorContext, shift.business_id);
     const shiftRole = await requireShiftRole(client, payload.shiftRoleId);
 
     if (shiftRole.shift_id !== shift.id) {
@@ -1120,7 +1175,10 @@ export async function assignStaffToShift(actor, payload) {
 async function createAttendanceEvent(actor, payload, eventType) {
   return withTransaction(async (client) => {
     await ensureActorUser(client, actor);
+    const actorContext = await requireActorStaffContext(actor.uid);
     const assignment = await requireAssignment(client, payload.assignmentId);
+    assertTenantScope(actorContext, assignment.tenant_id);
+    assertStaffScope(actorContext, assignment.staff_id);
     const capturedAt = toIsoOrNull(payload.capturedAt) || new Date().toISOString();
     let securityProof = null;
 
@@ -1553,6 +1611,9 @@ export async function clockOut(actor, payload) {
 export async function addFavoriteStaff(actor, payload) {
   return withTransaction(async (client) => {
     await ensureActorUser(client, actor);
+    const actorContext = await requireActorClientContext(actor.uid);
+    assertTenantScope(actorContext, payload.tenantId);
+    assertBusinessScope(actorContext, payload.businessId);
     await requireBusiness(client, payload.tenantId, payload.businessId);
 
     const staffResult = await client.query(
@@ -1605,6 +1666,9 @@ export async function addFavoriteStaff(actor, payload) {
 export async function removeFavoriteStaff(actor, payload) {
   return withTransaction(async (client) => {
     await ensureActorUser(client, actor);
+    const actorContext = await requireActorClientContext(actor.uid);
+    assertTenantScope(actorContext, payload.tenantId);
+    assertBusinessScope(actorContext, payload.businessId);
     const deleted = await client.query(
       `
       DELETE FROM staff_favorites
@@ -1640,7 +1704,11 @@ export async function removeFavoriteStaff(actor, payload) {
 export async function createStaffReview(actor, payload) {
   return withTransaction(async (client) => {
     await ensureActorUser(client, actor);
+    const actorContext = await requireActorClientContext(actor.uid);
+    assertTenantScope(actorContext, payload.tenantId);
+    assertBusinessScope(actorContext, payload.businessId);
     const assignment = await requireAssignment(client, payload.assignmentId);
+    assertBusinessScope(actorContext, assignment.business_id);
     if (assignment.business_id !== payload.businessId || assignment.staff_id !== payload.staffId) {
       throw new AppError('VALIDATION_ERROR', 'Assignment does not match business/staff review target', 400, {
         assignmentId: payload.assignmentId,

backend/command-api/src/services/policy.js

@@ -1,5 +1,125 @@
-export function can(action, resource, actor) {
+import { loadActorContext } from './actor-context.js';
-  void action;
+
-  void resource;
+const TENANT_ADMIN_ROLES = new Set(['OWNER', 'ADMIN']);
-  return Boolean(actor?.uid);
+
+function normalize(value) {
+  return `${value || ''}`.trim();
+}
+
+function requestField(req, field) {
+  return normalize(
+    req?.params?.[field]
+      ?? req?.body?.[field]
+      ?? req?.query?.[field]
+  );
+}
+
+function isTenantAdmin(context) {
+  return TENANT_ADMIN_ROLES.has(normalize(context?.tenant?.role).toUpperCase());
+}
+
+function hasTenantScope(context) {
+  return Boolean(context?.user && context?.tenant);
+}
+
+function hasClientScope(context) {
+  return hasTenantScope(context) && Boolean(context?.business || isTenantAdmin(context));
+}
+
+function hasStaffScope(context) {
+  return hasTenantScope(context) && Boolean(context?.staff);
+}
+
+function requiredScopeFor(action) {
+  if (action === 'notifications.device.write') {
+    return 'tenant';
+  }
+
+  if (
+    action === 'orders.create'
+    || action === 'orders.update'
+    || action === 'orders.cancel'
+    || action === 'shifts.change-status'
+    || action === 'shifts.assign-staff'
+    || action === 'business.favorite-staff'
+    || action === 'business.unfavorite-staff'
+    || action === 'assignments.review-staff'
+    || action.startsWith('client.')
+    || action.startsWith('billing.')
+    || action.startsWith('coverage.')
+    || action.startsWith('hubs.')
+    || action.startsWith('vendors.')
+    || action.startsWith('reports.')
+  ) {
+    return 'client';
+  }
+
+  if (
+    action === 'shifts.accept'
+    || action === 'attendance.clock-in'
+    || action === 'attendance.clock-out'
+    || action === 'attendance.location-stream.write'
+    || action.startsWith('staff.')
+    || action.startsWith('payments.')
+  ) {
+    return 'staff';
+  }
+
+  return 'deny';
+}
+
+async function resolveActorContext(actor) {
+  if (!actor?.uid) {
+    return null;
+  }
+  if (actor.policyContext) {
+    return actor.policyContext;
+  }
+  const context = await loadActorContext(actor.uid);
+  actor.policyContext = context;
+  return context;
+}
+
+function requestScopeMatches(req, context, requiredScope) {
+  const tenantId = requestField(req, 'tenantId');
+  if (tenantId && context?.tenant?.tenantId !== '*' && context?.tenant?.tenantId !== tenantId) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  const businessId = requestField(req, 'businessId');
+  if (
+    requiredScope === 'client'
+    && businessId
+    && context?.business?.businessId
+    && context.business.businessId !== '*'
+    && context.business.businessId !== businessId
+  ) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+export async function can(action, resource, actor, req) {
+  void resource;
+  const context = await resolveActorContext(actor);
+  const requiredScope = requiredScopeFor(action);
+
+  if (requiredScope === 'deny' || !context?.user) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (requiredScope === 'tenant') {
+    return hasTenantScope(context) && requestScopeMatches(req, context, requiredScope);
+  }
+
+  if (requiredScope === 'client') {
+    return hasClientScope(context) && requestScopeMatches(req, context, requiredScope);
+  }
+
+  if (requiredScope === 'staff') {
+    return hasStaffScope(context) && requestScopeMatches(req, context, requiredScope);
+  }
+
+  return false;
 }

backend/command-api/src/worker-app.js

@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
 import express from 'express';
 import pino from 'pino';
 import pinoHttp from 'pino-http';
+import { assertSafeWorkerRuntimeConfig } from './lib/runtime-safety.js';
 
 const logger = pino({ level: process.env.LOG_LEVEL || 'info' });
 
 export function createWorkerApp({ dispatch = async () => ({}) } = {}) {
+  assertSafeWorkerRuntimeConfig();
   const app = express();
 
   app.use(

backend/command-api/test/app.test.js

@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ function validOrderCreatePayload() {
 
 beforeEach(() => {
   process.env.IDEMPOTENCY_STORE = 'memory';
+  delete process.env.AUTH_BYPASS_CONTEXT;
   delete process.env.IDEMPOTENCY_DATABASE_URL;
   delete process.env.DATABASE_URL;
   __resetIdempotencyStoreForTests();
@@ -63,6 +64,16 @@ test('GET /readyz reports database not configured when no database env is presen
   assert.equal(res.body.status, 'DATABASE_NOT_CONFIGURED');
 });
 
+test('createApp fails fast in protected env when auth bypass is enabled', async () => {
+  process.env.APP_ENV = 'staging';
+  process.env.AUTH_BYPASS = 'true';
+
+  assert.throws(() => createApp(), /AUTH_BYPASS must be disabled/);
+
+  delete process.env.APP_ENV;
+  process.env.AUTH_BYPASS = 'true';
+});
+
 test('command route requires idempotency key', async () => {
   const app = createApp();
   const res = await request(app)
@@ -116,3 +127,36 @@ test('command route is idempotent by key and only executes handler once', async
   assert.equal(first.body.idempotencyKey, 'abc-123');
   assert.equal(second.body.idempotencyKey, 'abc-123');
 });
+
+test('client command routes deny mismatched business scope before handler execution', async () => {
+  process.env.AUTH_BYPASS_CONTEXT = JSON.stringify({
+    user: { userId: 'test-user' },
+    tenant: { tenantId, role: 'MANAGER' },
+    business: { businessId: '99999999-9999-4999-8999-999999999999' },
+  });
+
+  const app = createApp({
+    commandHandlers: {
+      createOrder: async () => assert.fail('createOrder should not be called'),
+      acceptShift: async () => assert.fail('acceptShift should not be called'),
+      clockIn: async () => assert.fail('clockIn should not be called'),
+      clockOut: async () => assert.fail('clockOut should not be called'),
+      addFavoriteStaff: async () => assert.fail('addFavoriteStaff should not be called'),
+      removeFavoriteStaff: async () => assert.fail('removeFavoriteStaff should not be called'),
+      createStaffReview: async () => assert.fail('createStaffReview should not be called'),
+      updateOrder: async () => assert.fail('updateOrder should not be called'),
+      cancelOrder: async () => assert.fail('cancelOrder should not be called'),
+      changeShiftStatus: async () => assert.fail('changeShiftStatus should not be called'),
+      assignStaffToShift: async () => assert.fail('assignStaffToShift should not be called'),
+    },
+  });
+
+  const res = await request(app)
+    .post('/commands/orders/create')
+    .set('Authorization', 'Bearer test-token')
+    .set('Idempotency-Key', 'scope-mismatch')
+    .send(validOrderCreatePayload());
+
+  assert.equal(res.status, 403);
+  assert.equal(res.body.code, 'FORBIDDEN');
+});

backend/command-api/test/notification-worker.test.js

@@ -12,6 +12,16 @@ test('GET /readyz returns healthy response', async () => {
   assert.equal(res.body.service, 'notification-worker-v2');
 });
 
+test('createWorkerApp fails fast in protected env when push delivery is not live', async () => {
+  process.env.APP_ENV = 'staging';
+  process.env.PUSH_DELIVERY_MODE = 'log-only';
+
+  assert.throws(() => createWorkerApp(), /PUSH_DELIVERY_MODE must be live/);
+
+  delete process.env.APP_ENV;
+  delete process.env.PUSH_DELIVERY_MODE;
+});
+
 test('POST /tasks/dispatch-notifications returns dispatch summary', async () => {
   const app = createWorkerApp({
     dispatch: async () => ({

backend/command-api/test/policy.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+import test from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { can } from '../src/services/policy.js';
+
+test('client actions require business scope and matching business id', async () => {
+  const allowed = await can(
+    'orders.create',
+    'order',
+    {
+      uid: 'user-1',
+      policyContext: {
+        user: { userId: 'user-1' },
+        tenant: { tenantId: 'tenant-1', role: 'MANAGER' },
+        business: { businessId: 'business-1' },
+      },
+    },
+    { body: { tenantId: 'tenant-1', businessId: 'business-1' } }
+  );
+
+  const denied = await can(
+    'orders.create',
+    'order',
+    {
+      uid: 'user-1',
+      policyContext: {
+        user: { userId: 'user-1' },
+        tenant: { tenantId: 'tenant-1', role: 'MANAGER' },
+        business: { businessId: 'business-1' },
+      },
+    },
+    { body: { tenantId: 'tenant-1', businessId: 'business-2' } }
+  );
+
+  assert.equal(allowed, true);
+  assert.equal(denied, false);
+});
+
+test('staff actions require staff scope', async () => {
+  const allowed = await can(
+    'shifts.accept',
+    'shift',
+    {
+      uid: 'user-1',
+      policyContext: {
+        user: { userId: 'user-1' },
+        tenant: { tenantId: 'tenant-1' },
+        staff: { staffId: 'staff-1', workforceId: 'workforce-1' },
+      },
+    },
+    { body: { tenantId: 'tenant-1' } }
+  );
+
+  const denied = await can(
+    'shifts.accept',
+    'shift',
+    {
+      uid: 'user-1',
+      policyContext: {
+        user: { userId: 'user-1' },
+        tenant: { tenantId: 'tenant-1' },
+        business: { businessId: 'business-1' },
+      },
+    },
+    { body: { tenantId: 'tenant-1' } }
+  );
+
+  assert.equal(allowed, true);
+  assert.equal(denied, false);
+});
+
+test('notifications.device.write allows tenant-scoped actor', async () => {
+  const allowed = await can(
+    'notifications.device.write',
+    'device',
+    {
+      uid: 'user-1',
+      policyContext: {
+        user: { userId: 'user-1' },
+        tenant: { tenantId: 'tenant-1' },
+      },
+    },
+    { body: { tenantId: 'tenant-1' } }
+  );
+
+  assert.equal(allowed, true);
+});

backend/core-api/src/app.js

@@ -5,10 +5,12 @@ import { requestContext } from './middleware/request-context.js';
 import { errorHandler, notFoundHandler } from './middleware/error-handler.js';
 import { healthRouter } from './routes/health.js';
 import { createCoreRouter, createLegacyCoreRouter } from './routes/core.js';
+import { assertSafeRuntimeConfig } from './lib/runtime-safety.js';
 
 const logger = pino({ level: process.env.LOG_LEVEL || 'info' });
 
 export function createApp() {
+  assertSafeRuntimeConfig();
   const app = express();
 
   app.use(requestContext);

backend/core-api/src/lib/runtime-safety.js

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+function runtimeEnvName() {
+  return `${process.env.APP_ENV || process.env.NODE_ENV || ''}`.trim().toLowerCase();
+}
+
+function isProtectedEnv() {
+  return ['staging', 'prod', 'production'].includes(runtimeEnvName());
+}
+
+export function assertSafeRuntimeConfig() {
+  if (!isProtectedEnv()) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  const errors = [];
+
+  if (process.env.AUTH_BYPASS === 'true') {
+    errors.push('AUTH_BYPASS must be disabled');
+  }
+
+  if (process.env.UPLOAD_MOCK !== 'false') {
+    errors.push('UPLOAD_MOCK must be false');
+  }
+
+  if (process.env.SIGNED_URL_MOCK !== 'false') {
+    errors.push('SIGNED_URL_MOCK must be false');
+  }
+
+  if (process.env.LLM_MOCK !== 'false') {
+    errors.push('LLM_MOCK must be false');
+  }
+
+  const verificationStore = `${process.env.VERIFICATION_STORE || 'sql'}`.trim().toLowerCase();
+  if (verificationStore !== 'sql') {
+    errors.push('VERIFICATION_STORE must be sql');
+  }
+
+  const verificationAccessMode = `${process.env.VERIFICATION_ACCESS_MODE || 'tenant'}`.trim().toLowerCase();
+  if (verificationAccessMode === 'authenticated') {
+    errors.push('VERIFICATION_ACCESS_MODE must not be authenticated');
+  }
+
+  if (errors.length > 0) {
+    throw new Error(`Unsafe core-api runtime config for ${runtimeEnvName()}: ${errors.join('; ')}`);
+  }
+}

backend/core-api/src/middleware/auth.js

@@ -9,6 +9,28 @@ function getBearerToken(header) {
   return token;
 }
 
+function buildBypassActor() {
+  let policyContext = {
+    user: { userId: 'test-user' },
+    tenant: { tenantId: '*' },
+    staff: { staffId: '*', workforceId: '*' },
+  };
+
+  if (process.env.AUTH_BYPASS_CONTEXT) {
+    try {
+      policyContext = JSON.parse(process.env.AUTH_BYPASS_CONTEXT);
+    } catch (_error) {
+      policyContext = {
+        user: { userId: 'test-user' },
+        tenant: { tenantId: '*' },
+        staff: { staffId: '*', workforceId: '*' },
+      };
+    }
+  }
+
+  return { uid: 'test-user', email: 'test@krow.local', role: 'TEST', policyContext };
+}
+
 export async function requireAuth(req, _res, next) {
   try {
     const token = getBearerToken(req.get('Authorization'));
@@ -17,7 +39,7 @@ export async function requireAuth(req, _res, next) {
     }
 
     if (process.env.AUTH_BYPASS === 'true') {
-      req.actor = { uid: 'test-user', email: 'test@krow.local', role: 'TEST' };
+      req.actor = buildBypassActor();
       return next();
     }
 
@@ -36,10 +58,14 @@ export async function requireAuth(req, _res, next) {
 }
 
 export function requirePolicy(action, resource) {
-  return (req, _res, next) => {
+  return async (req, _res, next) => {
-    if (!can(action, resource, req.actor)) {
+    try {
+      if (!(await can(action, resource, req.actor, req))) {
         return next(new AppError('FORBIDDEN', 'Not allowed to perform this action', 403));
       }
       return next();
+    } catch (error) {
+      return next(error);
+    }
   };
 }

backend/core-api/src/services/policy.js

@@ -1,5 +1,46 @@
-export function can(action, resource, actor) {
+import { loadActorContext } from './actor-context.js';
-  void action;
+
-  void resource;
+function normalize(value) {
-  return Boolean(actor?.uid);
+  return `${value || ''}`.trim();
+}
+
+function requestField(req, field) {
+  return normalize(
+    req?.params?.[field]
+      ?? req?.body?.[field]
+      ?? req?.query?.[field]
+  );
+}
+
+async function resolveActorContext(actor) {
+  if (!actor?.uid) {
+    return null;
+  }
+  if (actor.policyContext) {
+    return actor.policyContext;
+  }
+  const context = await loadActorContext(actor.uid);
+  actor.policyContext = context;
+  return context;
+}
+
+export async function can(action, resource, actor, req) {
+  void resource;
+  if (!action.startsWith('core.')) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  const context = await resolveActorContext(actor);
+  if (!context?.user || !context?.tenant) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  const tenantId = requestField(req, 'tenantId');
+  if (!tenantId) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  if (context.tenant.tenantId === '*') {
+    return true;
+  }
+  return context.tenant.tenantId === tenantId;
 }

backend/core-api/src/services/verification-jobs.js

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import { AppError } from '../lib/errors.js';
 import { isDatabaseConfigured, query, withTransaction } from './db.js';
-import { requireTenantContext } from './actor-context.js';
+import { loadActorContext, requireTenantContext } from './actor-context.js';
 import { invokeVertexMultimodalModel } from './llm.js';
 
 export const VerificationStatus = Object.freeze({
@@ -95,7 +95,11 @@ async function processVerificationJobInMemory(verificationId) {
 }
 
 function accessMode() {
-  return process.env.VERIFICATION_ACCESS_MODE || 'authenticated';
+  const mode = `${process.env.VERIFICATION_ACCESS_MODE || 'tenant'}`.trim().toLowerCase();
+  if (mode === 'owner' || mode === 'tenant' || mode === 'authenticated') {
+    return mode;
+  }
+  return 'tenant';
 }
 
 function providerTimeoutMs() {
@@ -156,12 +160,27 @@ function toPublicJob(row) {
   };
 }
 
-function assertAccess(row, actorUid) {
+async function assertAccess(row, actorUid) {
-  if (accessMode() === 'authenticated') {
+  if (row.owner_user_id === actorUid) {
     return;
   }
-  if (row.owner_user_id !== actorUid) {
+
-    throw new AppError('FORBIDDEN', 'Not allowed to access this verification', 403);
+  const mode = accessMode();
+  if (mode === 'authenticated') {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (mode === 'owner' || !row.tenant_id) {
+    throw new AppError('FORBIDDEN', 'Not allowed to access this verification', 403, {
+      verificationId: row.id,
+    });
+  }
+
+  const actorContext = await loadActorContext(actorUid);
+  if (actorContext.tenant?.tenantId !== row.tenant_id) {
+    throw new AppError('FORBIDDEN', 'Not allowed to access this verification', 403, {
+      verificationId: row.id,
+    });
   }
 }
 
@@ -614,19 +633,19 @@ export async function createVerificationJob({ actorUid, payload }) {
 export async function getVerificationJob(verificationId, actorUid) {
   if (useMemoryStore()) {
     const job = loadMemoryJob(verificationId);
-    assertAccess(job, actorUid);
+    await assertAccess(job, actorUid);
     return toPublicJob(job);
   }
 
   const job = await loadJob(verificationId);
-  assertAccess(job, actorUid);
+  await assertAccess(job, actorUid);
   return toPublicJob(job);
 }
 
 export async function reviewVerificationJob(verificationId, actorUid, review) {
   if (useMemoryStore()) {
     const job = loadMemoryJob(verificationId);
-    assertAccess(job, actorUid);
+    await assertAccess(job, actorUid);
     if (HUMAN_TERMINAL_STATUSES.has(job.status)) {
       throw new AppError('CONFLICT', 'Verification already finalized', 409, {
         verificationId,
@@ -668,7 +687,7 @@ export async function reviewVerificationJob(verificationId, actorUid, review) {
     }
 
     const job = result.rows[0];
-    assertAccess(job, actorUid);
+    await assertAccess(job, actorUid);
     if (HUMAN_TERMINAL_STATUSES.has(job.status)) {
       throw new AppError('CONFLICT', 'Verification already finalized', 409, {
         verificationId,
@@ -735,7 +754,7 @@ export async function reviewVerificationJob(verificationId, actorUid, review) {
 export async function retryVerificationJob(verificationId, actorUid) {
   if (useMemoryStore()) {
     const job = loadMemoryJob(verificationId);
-    assertAccess(job, actorUid);
+    await assertAccess(job, actorUid);
     if (job.status === VerificationStatus.PROCESSING) {
       throw new AppError('CONFLICT', 'Cannot retry while verification is processing', 409, {
         verificationId,
@@ -774,7 +793,7 @@ export async function retryVerificationJob(verificationId, actorUid) {
     }
 
     const job = result.rows[0];
-    assertAccess(job, actorUid);
+    await assertAccess(job, actorUid);
     if (job.status === VerificationStatus.PROCESSING) {
       throw new AppError('CONFLICT', 'Cannot retry while verification is processing', 409, {
         verificationId,

backend/core-api/test/app.test.js

@@ -3,7 +3,11 @@ import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
 import request from 'supertest';
 import { createApp } from '../src/app.js';
 import { __resetLlmRateLimitForTests } from '../src/services/llm-rate-limit.js';
-import { __resetVerificationJobsForTests } from '../src/services/verification-jobs.js';
+import {
+  __resetVerificationJobsForTests,
+  createVerificationJob,
+  getVerificationJob,
+} from '../src/services/verification-jobs.js';
 
 beforeEach(async () => {
   process.env.AUTH_BYPASS = 'true';
@@ -13,7 +17,7 @@ beforeEach(async () => {
   process.env.MAX_SIGNED_URL_SECONDS = '900';
   process.env.LLM_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE = '20';
   process.env.VERIFICATION_REQUIRE_FILE_EXISTS = 'false';
-  process.env.VERIFICATION_ACCESS_MODE = 'authenticated';
+  process.env.VERIFICATION_ACCESS_MODE = 'tenant';
   process.env.VERIFICATION_ATTIRE_PROVIDER = 'mock';
   process.env.VERIFICATION_STORE = 'memory';
   __resetLlmRateLimitForTests();
@@ -66,6 +70,16 @@ test('GET /readyz reports database not configured when env is absent', async ()
   assert.equal(res.body.status, 'DATABASE_NOT_CONFIGURED');
 });
 
+test('createApp fails fast in protected env when unsafe core flags are enabled', async () => {
+  process.env.APP_ENV = 'staging';
+  process.env.AUTH_BYPASS = 'true';
+
+  assert.throws(() => createApp(), /AUTH_BYPASS must be disabled/);
+
+  delete process.env.APP_ENV;
+  process.env.AUTH_BYPASS = 'true';
+});
+
 test('POST /core/create-signed-url requires auth', async () => {
   process.env.AUTH_BYPASS = 'false';
   const app = createApp();
@@ -404,3 +418,24 @@ test('POST /core/verifications/:id/retry requeues verification', async () => {
   assert.equal(retried.status, 202);
   assert.equal(retried.body.status, 'PENDING');
 });
+
+test('verification access is denied to a different actor by default', async () => {
+  const created = await createVerificationJob({
+    actorUid: 'owner-user',
+    payload: {
+      type: 'attire',
+      subjectType: 'staff',
+      subjectId: 'staff_1',
+      fileUri: 'gs://krow-workforce-dev-private/uploads/owner-user/attire.jpg',
+      rules: { attireType: 'shoes' },
+    },
+  });
+
+  await assert.rejects(
+    () => getVerificationJob(created.verificationId, 'foreign-user'),
+    (error) => {
+      assert.equal(error.code, 'FORBIDDEN');
+      return true;
+    }
+  );
+});

backend/core-api/test/policy.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+import test from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { can } from '../src/services/policy.js';
+
+test('core actions require tenant scope', async () => {
+  const allowed = await can(
+    'core.verification.read',
+    'verification',
+    {
+      uid: 'user-1',
+      policyContext: {
+        user: { userId: 'user-1' },
+        tenant: { tenantId: 'tenant-1' },
+      },
+    },
+    {}
+  );
+
+  const denied = await can(
+    'core.verification.read',
+    'verification',
+    {
+      uid: 'user-1',
+      policyContext: {
+        user: { userId: 'user-1' },
+      },
+    },
+    {}
+  );
+
+  assert.equal(allowed, true);
+  assert.equal(denied, false);
+});

backend/query-api/src/app.js

@@ -6,10 +6,12 @@ import { errorHandler, notFoundHandler } from './middleware/error-handler.js';
 import { healthRouter } from './routes/health.js';
 import { createQueryRouter } from './routes/query.js';
 import { createMobileQueryRouter } from './routes/mobile.js';
+import { assertSafeRuntimeConfig } from './lib/runtime-safety.js';
 
 const logger = pino({ level: process.env.LOG_LEVEL || 'info' });
 
 export function createApp(options = {}) {
+  assertSafeRuntimeConfig();
   const app = express();
 
   app.use(requestContext);

backend/query-api/src/lib/runtime-safety.js

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+function runtimeEnvName() {
+  return `${process.env.APP_ENV || process.env.NODE_ENV || ''}`.trim().toLowerCase();
+}
+
+function isProtectedEnv() {
+  return ['staging', 'prod', 'production'].includes(runtimeEnvName());
+}
+
+export function assertSafeRuntimeConfig() {
+  if (!isProtectedEnv()) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (process.env.AUTH_BYPASS === 'true') {
+    throw new Error(`Unsafe query-api runtime config for ${runtimeEnvName()}: AUTH_BYPASS must be disabled`);
+  }
+}

backend/query-api/src/middleware/auth.js

@@ -9,6 +9,30 @@ function getBearerToken(header) {
   return token;
 }
 
+function buildBypassActor() {
+  let policyContext = {
+    user: { userId: 'test-user' },
+    tenant: { tenantId: '*' },
+    business: { businessId: '*' },
+    staff: { staffId: '*', workforceId: '*' },
+  };
+
+  if (process.env.AUTH_BYPASS_CONTEXT) {
+    try {
+      policyContext = JSON.parse(process.env.AUTH_BYPASS_CONTEXT);
+    } catch (_error) {
+      policyContext = {
+        user: { userId: 'test-user' },
+        tenant: { tenantId: '*' },
+        business: { businessId: '*' },
+        staff: { staffId: '*', workforceId: '*' },
+      };
+    }
+  }
+
+  return { uid: 'test-user', email: 'test@krow.local', role: 'TEST', policyContext };
+}
+
 export async function requireAuth(req, _res, next) {
   try {
     const token = getBearerToken(req.get('Authorization'));
@@ -17,7 +41,7 @@ export async function requireAuth(req, _res, next) {
     }
 
     if (process.env.AUTH_BYPASS === 'true') {
-      req.actor = { uid: 'test-user', email: 'test@krow.local', role: 'TEST' };
+      req.actor = buildBypassActor();
       return next();
     }
 
@@ -36,10 +60,14 @@ export async function requireAuth(req, _res, next) {
 }
 
 export function requirePolicy(action, resource) {
-  return (req, _res, next) => {
+  return async (req, _res, next) => {
-    if (!can(action, resource, req.actor)) {
+    try {
+      if (!(await can(action, resource, req.actor, req))) {
         return next(new AppError('FORBIDDEN', 'Not allowed to perform this action', 403));
       }
       return next();
+    } catch (error) {
+      return next(error);
+    }
   };
 }

backend/query-api/src/routes/query.js

@@ -27,6 +27,11 @@ function requireUuid(value, field) {
 export function createQueryRouter(queryService = defaultQueryService) {
   const router = Router();
 
+  function actorBusinessId(actor) {
+    const businessId = actor?.policyContext?.business?.businessId;
+    return businessId && businessId !== '*' ? businessId : null;
+  }
+
   router.get(
     '/tenants/:tenantId/orders',
     requireAuth,
@@ -34,9 +39,10 @@ export function createQueryRouter(queryService = defaultQueryService) {
     async (req, res, next) => {
       try {
         const tenantId = requireUuid(req.params.tenantId, 'tenantId');
+        const scopedBusinessId = actorBusinessId(req.actor);
         const orders = await queryService.listOrders({
           tenantId,
-          businessId: req.query.businessId,
+          businessId: scopedBusinessId || req.query.businessId,
           status: req.query.status,
           limit: req.query.limit,
           offset: req.query.offset,
@@ -57,10 +63,16 @@ export function createQueryRouter(queryService = defaultQueryService) {
     requirePolicy('orders.read', 'order'),
     async (req, res, next) => {
       try {
+        const scopedBusinessId = actorBusinessId(req.actor);
         const order = await queryService.getOrderDetail({
           tenantId: requireUuid(req.params.tenantId, 'tenantId'),
           orderId: requireUuid(req.params.orderId, 'orderId'),
         });
+        if (scopedBusinessId && order.businessId !== scopedBusinessId) {
+          throw new AppError('FORBIDDEN', 'Order is outside actor business scope', 403, {
+            orderId: req.params.orderId,
+          });
+        }
         return res.status(200).json({
           ...order,
           requestId: req.requestId,
@@ -77,9 +89,10 @@ export function createQueryRouter(queryService = defaultQueryService) {
     requirePolicy('business.favorite-staff.read', 'staff'),
     async (req, res, next) => {
       try {
+        const scopedBusinessId = actorBusinessId(req.actor);
         const items = await queryService.listFavoriteStaff({
           tenantId: requireUuid(req.params.tenantId, 'tenantId'),
-          businessId: requireUuid(req.params.businessId, 'businessId'),
+          businessId: requireUuid(scopedBusinessId || req.params.businessId, 'businessId'),
           limit: req.query.limit,
           offset: req.query.offset,
         });
@@ -120,12 +133,19 @@ export function createQueryRouter(queryService = defaultQueryService) {
     requirePolicy('attendance.read', 'attendance'),
     async (req, res, next) => {
       try {
+        const scopedBusinessId = actorBusinessId(req.actor);
         const attendance = await queryService.getAssignmentAttendance({
           tenantId: requireUuid(req.params.tenantId, 'tenantId'),
           assignmentId: requireUuid(req.params.assignmentId, 'assignmentId'),
         });
+        if (scopedBusinessId && attendance.businessId !== scopedBusinessId) {
+          throw new AppError('FORBIDDEN', 'Assignment attendance is outside actor business scope', 403, {
+            assignmentId: req.params.assignmentId,
+          });
+        }
+        const { businessId: _businessId, ...publicAttendance } = attendance;
         return res.status(200).json({
-          ...attendance,
+          ...publicAttendance,
           requestId: req.requestId,
         });
       } catch (error) {

backend/query-api/src/services/policy.js

@@ -1,5 +1,118 @@
-export function can(action, resource, actor) {
+import { loadActorContext } from './actor-context.js';
-  void action;
+
-  void resource;
+const TENANT_ADMIN_ROLES = new Set(['OWNER', 'ADMIN']);
-  return Boolean(actor?.uid);
+
+function normalize(value) {
+  return `${value || ''}`.trim();
+}
+
+function requestField(req, field) {
+  return normalize(
+    req?.params?.[field]
+      ?? req?.body?.[field]
+      ?? req?.query?.[field]
+  );
+}
+
+function isTenantAdmin(context) {
+  return TENANT_ADMIN_ROLES.has(normalize(context?.tenant?.role).toUpperCase());
+}
+
+function hasTenantScope(context) {
+  return Boolean(context?.user && context?.tenant);
+}
+
+function hasClientScope(context) {
+  return hasTenantScope(context) && Boolean(context?.business || isTenantAdmin(context));
+}
+
+function hasStaffScope(context) {
+  return hasTenantScope(context) && Boolean(context?.staff);
+}
+
+function requiredScopeFor(action) {
+  if (action === 'attendance.read') {
+    return 'tenant';
+  }
+
+  if (
+    action === 'orders.read'
+    || action === 'orders.reorder.read'
+    || action === 'business.favorite-staff.read'
+    || action === 'staff.reviews.read'
+    || action.startsWith('client.')
+    || action.startsWith('billing.')
+    || action.startsWith('coverage.')
+    || action.startsWith('hubs.')
+    || action.startsWith('vendors.')
+    || action.startsWith('reports.')
+  ) {
+    return 'client';
+  }
+
+  if (
+    action === 'shifts.read'
+    || action.startsWith('staff.')
+    || action.startsWith('payments.')
+  ) {
+    return 'staff';
+  }
+
+  return 'deny';
+}
+
+async function resolveActorContext(actor) {
+  if (!actor?.uid) {
+    return null;
+  }
+  if (actor.policyContext) {
+    return actor.policyContext;
+  }
+  const context = await loadActorContext(actor.uid);
+  actor.policyContext = context;
+  return context;
+}
+
+function requestScopeMatches(req, context, requiredScope) {
+  const tenantId = requestField(req, 'tenantId');
+  if (tenantId && context?.tenant?.tenantId !== '*' && context?.tenant?.tenantId !== tenantId) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  const businessId = requestField(req, 'businessId');
+  if (
+    requiredScope === 'client'
+    && businessId
+    && context?.business?.businessId
+    && context.business.businessId !== '*'
+    && context.business.businessId !== businessId
+  ) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+export async function can(action, resource, actor, req) {
+  void resource;
+  const context = await resolveActorContext(actor);
+  const requiredScope = requiredScopeFor(action);
+
+  if (requiredScope === 'deny' || !context?.user) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (requiredScope === 'tenant') {
+    return hasTenantScope(context) && requestScopeMatches(req, context, requiredScope);
+  }
+
+  if (requiredScope === 'client') {
+    return hasClientScope(context) && requestScopeMatches(req, context, requiredScope);
+  }
+
+  if (requiredScope === 'staff') {
+    return hasStaffScope(context) && requestScopeMatches(req, context, requiredScope);
+  }
+
+  return false;
 }

backend/query-api/src/services/query-service.js

@@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ export async function getAssignmentAttendance({ tenantId, assignmentId }) {
     SELECT
       a.id AS "assignmentId",
       a.status,
+      a.business_id AS "businessId",
       a.shift_id AS "shiftId",
       a.staff_id AS "staffId",
       s.title AS "shiftTitle",

backend/query-api/test/app.test.js

@@ -37,6 +37,20 @@ test('GET /readyz reports database not configured when no database env is presen
   assert.equal(res.body.status, 'DATABASE_NOT_CONFIGURED');
 });
 
+test.afterEach(() => {
+  delete process.env.AUTH_BYPASS_CONTEXT;
+});
+
+test('createApp fails fast in protected env when auth bypass is enabled', async () => {
+  process.env.APP_ENV = 'staging';
+  process.env.AUTH_BYPASS = 'true';
+
+  assert.throws(() => createApp(), /AUTH_BYPASS must be disabled/);
+
+  delete process.env.APP_ENV;
+  process.env.AUTH_BYPASS = 'true';
+});
+
 test('GET unknown route returns not found envelope', async () => {
   const app = createApp();
   const res = await request(app).get('/query/unknown');
@@ -124,3 +138,28 @@ test('GET /query/tenants/:tenantId/businesses/:businessId/favorite-staff validat
   assert.equal(res.status, 200);
   assert.equal(res.body.items[0].staffId, staffId);
 });
+
+test('GET /query/tenants/:tenantId/orders denies mismatched tenant scope before handler execution', async () => {
+  process.env.AUTH_BYPASS_CONTEXT = JSON.stringify({
+    user: { userId: 'test-user' },
+    tenant: { tenantId: '99999999-9999-4999-8999-999999999999', role: 'MANAGER' },
+    business: { businessId },
+  });
+
+  const app = createApp({
+    queryService: {
+      listOrders: async () => assert.fail('listOrders should not be called'),
+      getOrderDetail: async () => assert.fail('getOrderDetail should not be called'),
+      listFavoriteStaff: async () => assert.fail('listFavoriteStaff should not be called'),
+      getStaffReviewSummary: async () => assert.fail('getStaffReviewSummary should not be called'),
+      getAssignmentAttendance: async () => assert.fail('getAssignmentAttendance should not be called'),
+    },
+  });
+
+  const res = await request(app)
+    .get(`/query/tenants/${tenantId}/orders`)
+    .set('Authorization', 'Bearer test-token');
+
+  assert.equal(res.status, 403);
+  assert.equal(res.body.code, 'FORBIDDEN');
+});

backend/query-api/test/policy.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+import test from 'node:test';
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
+import { can } from '../src/services/policy.js';
+
+test('orders.read requires client scope and matching tenant/business scope', async () => {
+  const allowed = await can(
+    'orders.read',
+    'order',
+    {
+      uid: 'user-1',
+      policyContext: {
+        user: { userId: 'user-1' },
+        tenant: { tenantId: 'tenant-1', role: 'MANAGER' },
+        business: { businessId: 'business-1' },
+      },
+    },
+    { params: { tenantId: 'tenant-1' }, query: { businessId: 'business-1' } }
+  );
+
+  const denied = await can(
+    'orders.read',
+    'order',
+    {
+      uid: 'user-1',
+      policyContext: {
+        user: { userId: 'user-1' },
+        tenant: { tenantId: 'tenant-1', role: 'MANAGER' },
+        business: { businessId: 'business-1' },
+      },
+    },
+    { params: { tenantId: 'tenant-2' }, query: { businessId: 'business-1' } }
+  );
+
+  assert.equal(allowed, true);
+  assert.equal(denied, false);
+});
+
+test('shifts.read requires staff scope', async () => {
+  const allowed = await can(
+    'shifts.read',
+    'shift',
+    {
+      uid: 'user-1',
+      policyContext: {
+        user: { userId: 'user-1' },
+        tenant: { tenantId: 'tenant-1' },
+        staff: { staffId: 'staff-1' },
+      },
+    },
+    { params: {} }
+  );
+
+  const denied = await can(
+    'shifts.read',
+    'shift',
+    {
+      uid: 'user-1',
+      policyContext: {
+        user: { userId: 'user-1' },
+        tenant: { tenantId: 'tenant-1' },
+        business: { businessId: 'business-1' },
+      },
+    },
+    { params: {} }
+  );
+
+  assert.equal(allowed, true);
+  assert.equal(denied, false);
+});
+
+test('attendance.read allows tenant-scoped actor', async () => {
+  const allowed = await can(
+    'attendance.read',
+    'attendance',
+    {
+      uid: 'user-1',
+      policyContext: {
+        user: { userId: 'user-1' },
+        tenant: { tenantId: 'tenant-1' },
+      },
+    },
+    { params: { tenantId: 'tenant-1' } }
+  );
+
+  assert.equal(allowed, true);
+});

backend/unified-api/src/app.js

@@ -6,10 +6,12 @@ import { errorHandler, notFoundHandler } from './middleware/error-handler.js';
 import { healthRouter } from './routes/health.js';
 import { createAuthRouter } from './routes/auth.js';
 import { createProxyRouter } from './routes/proxy.js';
+import { assertSafeRuntimeConfig } from './lib/runtime-safety.js';
 
 const logger = pino({ level: process.env.LOG_LEVEL || 'info' });
 
 export function createApp(options = {}) {
+  assertSafeRuntimeConfig();
   const app = express();
 
   app.use(requestContext);

backend/unified-api/src/lib/runtime-safety.js

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+function runtimeEnvName() {
+  return `${process.env.APP_ENV || process.env.NODE_ENV || ''}`.trim().toLowerCase();
+}
+
+function isProtectedEnv() {
+  return ['staging', 'prod', 'production'].includes(runtimeEnvName());
+}
+
+export function assertSafeRuntimeConfig() {
+  if (!isProtectedEnv()) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  const errors = [];
+
+  if (process.env.AUTH_BYPASS === 'true') {
+    errors.push('AUTH_BYPASS must be disabled');
+  }
+
+  if (!process.env.CORE_API_BASE_URL) {
+    errors.push('CORE_API_BASE_URL is required');
+  }
+
+  if (!process.env.COMMAND_API_BASE_URL) {
+    errors.push('COMMAND_API_BASE_URL is required');
+  }
+
+  if (!process.env.QUERY_API_BASE_URL) {
+    errors.push('QUERY_API_BASE_URL is required');
+  }
+
+  if (errors.length > 0) {
+    throw new Error(`Unsafe unified-api runtime config for ${runtimeEnvName()}: ${errors.join('; ')}`);
+  }
+}

backend/unified-api/test/app.test.js

@@ -29,6 +29,19 @@ test('GET /readyz reports database not configured when env is absent', async ()
   assert.equal(res.body.status, 'DATABASE_NOT_CONFIGURED');
 });
 
+test('createApp fails fast in protected env when upstream config is unsafe', async () => {
+  process.env.APP_ENV = 'staging';
+  process.env.AUTH_BYPASS = 'true';
+  delete process.env.CORE_API_BASE_URL;
+  delete process.env.COMMAND_API_BASE_URL;
+  delete process.env.QUERY_API_BASE_URL;
+
+  assert.throws(() => createApp(), /AUTH_BYPASS must be disabled/);
+
+  delete process.env.APP_ENV;
+  process.env.AUTH_BYPASS = 'true';
+});
+
 test('POST /auth/client/sign-in validates payload', async () => {
   const app = createApp();
   const res = await request(app).post('/auth/client/sign-in').send({