150 lines
4.9 KiB
Go
150 lines
4.9 KiB
Go
package utils
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import (
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"crypto/rand"
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"errors"
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"math/big"
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"time"
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"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"
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)
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func HashPassword(password string) (string, error) {
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bytes, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(password), bcrypt.DefaultCost)
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return string(bytes), err
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}
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// dbLocation is the timezone the database records wall-clock timestamps in: the
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// connection DSN sets TimeZone=Asia/Kolkata, so CURRENT_TIMESTAMP column
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// defaults write IST wall-clock into timestamp-without-timezone columns.
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var dbLocation = func() *time.Location {
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if loc, err := time.LoadLocation("Asia/Kolkata"); err == nil {
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return loc
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}
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// A container without tzdata can't load the database; IST observes no DST,
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// so a fixed +05:30 offset is exact rather than an approximation.
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return time.FixedZone("IST", 5*3600+30*60)
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}()
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// DBNow returns the current moment expressed as the wall-clock the database
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// stores, tagged UTC so the driver sends exactly those digits. Use it for any
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// comparison against a stored timestamp: comparing the container's UTC clock
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// against IST-stamped rows is what made date-range reports undercount.
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//
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// Deliberately independent of the container's own TZ, so it stays correct
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// whether or not TZ=Asia/Kolkata is set.
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func DBNow() time.Time {
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n := time.Now().In(dbLocation)
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return time.Date(n.Year(), n.Month(), n.Day(), n.Hour(), n.Minute(), n.Second(), n.Nanosecond(), time.UTC)
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}
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// DBToday returns midnight at the start of the current database-local day.
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func DBToday() time.Time {
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n := DBNow()
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return time.Date(n.Year(), n.Month(), n.Day(), 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
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}
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// GenerateNumericOTP returns a random n-digit code, leading zeros preserved.
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// crypto/rand rather than math/rand: this is the only thing standing between a
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// parcel and someone claiming it was delivered, so a predictable sequence would
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// defeat the point.
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func GenerateNumericOTP(n int) string {
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const digits = "0123456789"
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out := make([]byte, n)
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for i := range out {
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idx, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, big.NewInt(int64(len(digits))))
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if err != nil {
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// A failing system RNG must not silently downgrade to a guessable
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// code; the caller treats an empty OTP as "not issued".
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return ""
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}
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out[i] = digits[idx.Int64()]
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}
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return string(out)
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}
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func CheckPasswordHash(password, hash string) bool {
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err := bcrypt.CompareHashAndPassword([]byte(hash), []byte(password))
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return err == nil
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}
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type Claims struct {
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UserID int `json:"userid"`
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Email string `json:"email"`
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RoleID int `json:"roleid"`
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TenantID int `json:"tenantid"`
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ConfigID int `json:"configid,omitempty"`
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HubID int `json:"hubid,omitempty"`
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jwt.RegisteredClaims
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}
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func GenerateToken(userID int, email string, roleID int, tenantID int, configID int, secret string) (string, error) {
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return GenerateTokenWithTTL(userID, email, roleID, tenantID, configID, secret, 24*time.Hour)
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}
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// GenerateTokenWithTTL is GenerateToken with an explicit lifetime.
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//
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// The customer app pairs a short access token with a long-lived refresh token,
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// so a stolen access token expires in an hour rather than a day, while the
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// customer still stays signed in for months. The miler and console surfaces
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// keep the 24-hour default: they have no refresh endpoint, and shortening their
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// token would sign a rider out mid-shift.
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func GenerateTokenWithTTL(userID int, email string, roleID int, tenantID int, configID int, secret string, ttl time.Duration) (string, error) {
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expirationTime := time.Now().Add(ttl)
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claims := &Claims{
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UserID: userID,
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Email: email,
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RoleID: roleID,
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TenantID: tenantID,
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ConfigID: configID,
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RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
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ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(expirationTime),
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IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
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},
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}
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token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims)
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return token.SignedString([]byte(secret))
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}
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// GenerateHubStaffToken issues a JWT for hub console staff (role 6), carrying
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// HubID instead of TenantID/ConfigID so hub handlers can scope queries via
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// c.Locals("hubid") without colliding with the Miler role (5).
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func GenerateHubStaffToken(userID int, email string, hubID int, secret string) (string, error) {
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expirationTime := time.Now().Add(24 * time.Hour)
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claims := &Claims{
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UserID: userID,
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Email: email,
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RoleID: 6,
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HubID: hubID,
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RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
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ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(expirationTime),
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IssuedAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(time.Now()),
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},
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}
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token := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, claims)
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return token.SignedString([]byte(secret))
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}
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func ParseToken(tokenString string, secret string) (*Claims, error) {
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token, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(tokenString, &Claims{}, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {
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return []byte(secret), nil
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})
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if claims, ok := token.Claims.(*Claims); ok && token.Valid {
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return claims, nil
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}
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return nil, errors.New("invalid token")
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}
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func IntPtr(v int) *int {
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return &v
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}
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