updates on the ai agents and time series prediction and updates on the api to

routes/routes.go

@@ -415,6 +415,13 @@ func RegisterRoutes(app *fiber.App, cfg *config.Config) {
 	adminAuth.Put("/bookings/:id/status", controllers.AdminUpdateBookingStatus)
 	adminAuth.Post("/bookings/:id/cancel", controllers.AdminCancelBooking)
 	adminAuth.Post("/bookings/bulk-cancel", controllers.AdminBulkCancelBookings)
+	// Batch assign, admin side. The same solver /hub/bookings/batch-assign
+	// uses (controllers/batchAssignService.go), with admin auth and scoped to
+	// the login's own tenant. This is what backs the console ops layer's
+	// `assignMiler` proposal, which had no executor because the hub route
+	// 403s for every admin token and /bookings/:id/assign-miler needs a rider
+	// the finding does not pick.
+	adminAuth.Post("/bookings/batch-assign", middlewares.DoormileStaffOnly, controllers.AdminBatchAssign)
 
 	// Consignments
 	adminAuth.Get("/consignments", controllers.GetAdminConsignments)
@@ -486,6 +493,23 @@ func RegisterRoutes(app *fiber.App, cfg *config.Config) {
 	aiRegistry.Patch("/skills/:id", middlewares.RoleCheckMiddleware(1), controllers.PatchAISkill)
 	aiRegistry.Get("/tools", controllers.GetAITools)
 	aiRegistry.Get("/audit", controllers.GetAIRegistryAudit)
+	// What the console's rule skills have been noticing. The findings used to
+	// exist for one render in the operator's browser and then vanish, so
+	// nothing could say whether a skill was useful or whether acting on a
+	// finding cleared it. Writes are open to the same roles as reads here:
+	// the console reports what it evaluated, it is not an operator action.
+	aiRegistry.Get("/findings", controllers.GetAIFindings)
+	aiRegistry.Get("/findings/stats", controllers.GetAIFindingStats)
+	aiRegistry.Post("/findings", controllers.UpsertAIFindings)
+	aiRegistry.Post("/findings/:fingerprint/acted", controllers.RecordAIFindingActed)
+	// Tomorrow's expected pickups per zone, with the staffing gap against
+	// riders actually on duty. A bare forecast number is not actionable — the
+	// gap is (docs/prediction-plan.md §2.4).
+	aiRegistry.Get("/forecast/demand", controllers.GetDemandForecast)
+	// The engine's live agent state, proxied. The console's Agents page cannot
+	// reach :8700 itself (ClusterIP, and it is a browser). A 503 here means
+	// "use the snapshot", not "broken" — see the controller.
+	aiRegistry.Get("/engine/agents", controllers.GetAIEngineAgents)
 	// What the agents did (Phase 4): runs from AI_engine telemetry, decisions
 	// from agent_decisions, live heartbeat from Redis. Read-only.
 	aiRegistry.Get("/insights", controllers.GetAIInsights)
@@ -591,10 +615,19 @@ func RegisterRoutes(app *fiber.App, cfg *config.Config) {
 	internal.Post("/notify", controllers.InternalNotify)
 	internal.Post("/bookings/:id/reassign", controllers.InternalReassign)
 	internal.Post("/agent-decisions", controllers.CreateAgentDecision)
-	internal.Get("/agent-decisions/similar", controllers.FindSimilarDecisions)
+	// POST, not GET: the handler needs a 1536-float embedding in the body, and
+	// a GET with a body is dropped by nginx and most HTTP clients — and this
+	// API is served THROUGH host nginx today (conf/nginx-doormile.conf), so it
+	// would not merely be risky, it would not work. Nothing called it while it
+	// was a GET, so changing the method breaks no caller.
+	internal.Post("/agent-decisions/similar", controllers.FindSimilarDecisions)
 	internal.Patch("/agent-decisions/:id/outcome", controllers.UpdateDecisionOutcome)
 	// The agent registry, for AI_engine to poll (ETag / If-None-Match → 304).
 	internal.Get("/ai/registry", controllers.GetInternalAIRegistry)
+	// The demand forecast, written by AI_engine's forecast job. The model lives
+	// in Python (prophet where it beats a seasonal baseline, the baseline
+	// otherwise); the backend stores and serves it.
+	internal.Post("/demand-forecast", controllers.UpsertDemandForecast)
 
 	// Express-batch dispatch: the ExpressDispatchAgent reads a tenant's riders
 	// and the batch's bookings, then writes back the assignments it decided.

routes/routes_ai_registry_test.go

@@ -36,6 +36,14 @@ var aiReads = []string{
 	"/api/v1/admin/ai/insights?days=30",
 	"/api/v1/admin/ai/decisions",
 	"/api/v1/admin/ai/status",
+	// Added with the agent-platform work. Listed here so the existing
+	// invariants cover them: every /admin/ai read must require a login and
+	// must refuse miler, hub-staff and customer roles. A new route that skips
+	// this table is a new route nobody proved is gated.
+	"/api/v1/admin/ai/findings",
+	"/api/v1/admin/ai/findings/stats",
+	"/api/v1/admin/ai/forecast/demand",
+	"/api/v1/admin/ai/engine/agents",
 }
 
 var aiWrites = []struct{ method, path, body string }{
@@ -45,6 +53,46 @@ var aiWrites = []struct{ method, path, body string }{
 	{http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/admin/ai/playground/run", `{"agentid":"EXCEPTION_AGENT","prompt":"hi"}`},
 }
 
+// Finding reports are NOT registry mutations, and deliberately not role-1-only.
+//
+// The aiWrites table above encodes "changing the registry is an operator
+// decision, so role 1 only". Reporting what the rule skills noticed is a
+// different thing: it is telemetry from the Exceptions page, which managers (3)
+// and executives (4) open as part of their job. Gating it to role 1 would mean
+// a manager's session silently reported nothing, and the "how long has this
+// finding been open" measurement would depend on who happened to be logged in.
+//
+// What it must still refuse is everyone outside the console: miler, hub staff
+// and customer tokens.
+var aiFindingWrites = []struct{ method, path, body string }{
+	{http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/admin/ai/findings", `{"findings":[],"cleared":[]}`},
+	{http.MethodPost, "/api/v1/admin/ai/findings/abc/acted", `{"result":"ok"}`},
+}
+
+func TestFindingReportsAreOpenToConsoleRolesButNotOutsiders(t *testing.T) {
+	app := newApp()
+	for _, w := range aiFindingWrites {
+		// No token at all is refused.
+		if code, _ := do(t, app, w.method, w.path, "", w.body); code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+			t.Errorf("%s %s with no token = %d, want 401", w.method, w.path, code)
+		}
+		// Outside the console: refused.
+		for _, role := range []int{5, 6, 9} { // miler, hub staff, customer
+			if code, _ := do(t, app, w.method, w.path, token(t, 1, role), w.body); code != http.StatusForbidden && code != http.StatusUnauthorized {
+				t.Errorf("%s %s as role %d = %d, want 401/403", w.method, w.path, role, code)
+			}
+		}
+		// Console roles: NOT forbidden. The handler may still fail without a
+		// database in this app; what matters here is that authorisation let it
+		// through rather than stopping it.
+		for _, role := range []int{1, 3, 4} {
+			if code, _ := do(t, app, w.method, w.path, token(t, 1, role), w.body); code == http.StatusForbidden {
+				t.Errorf("%s %s as role %d = 403; the Exceptions page must be able to report findings", w.method, w.path, role)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 func TestAIRegistryRequiresALogin(t *testing.T) {
 	app := newApp()
 	for _, p := range aiReads {

routes/routes_client_onboarding_pg_test.go

@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ func onboardingDB(t *testing.T) *gorm.DB {
 
 func onboardBody(extra string) string {
 	return `{"companyname":"Peelamedu Provisions","contactname":"Priya Raman","email":"ops@peelamedu.test",
-		"phone":"9876543210","password":"Strong-pass-1","applocationid":1` + extra + `}`
+		"phone":"9876543210","password":"Strong-pass-1","applocationid":1,"deliverycategory":"Clothing"` + extra + `}`
 }
 
 const goodAddress = `,"address":"14 DB Road, RS Puram, Coimbatore","city":"Coimbatore","state":"Tamil Nadu",